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Bankson, Peter R., MAJ, USA

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The military services provide the Administration with trained, deployable, resources to support U. S. foreign policy in peacetime. These resources vary in the type of product involved, the military function, and the source of funds. This study develops a three dimensional matrix as a conceptual framework for reviewing the variety of these activities, which are referred to as "military interchange." The matrix is then used to examine the history of U.S. relations with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since early 1946. Following this review, use of the matrix as a planning tool is demonstrated to identify possible potential for military interchange between the U.S. and other East European nations. It is concluded that:

1. The matrix is an effective device for reviewing military interchange.
2. The matrix shows promise as an aid for strategic planners in identifying potential future interchange tasks for the U.S. military.
3. Military interchange has been a regular element in U.S. - Yugoslav relations since World War II. The types of interchange used have varied, but some use of it has been available to policy makers under nearly every set of international political conditions.

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PROTOTYPES FROM THE
YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

PETER R. BANKSON, Major, U.S. Army
B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1961
M.A., The George Washington University, 1973

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Name of Candidate PETER R. BANKSON

Title of Thesis MILITARY INTERCHANGE POTENTIALS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN EAST EUROPE: PROTOTYPES FROM THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE

Approved by:

R. E. Pate, Research and Thesis Adviser
RUPERT E. PATE, MAJ, MI

Peter H. Bouton, Member, Graduate Research Faculty
PETER H. BOUTON, MAJ, IN

Anthony G. Federici, Member, Consulting Faculty
ANTHONY G. FEDERICI, COL, MI

Anthony P. PIA, Member, Consulting Faculty
ANTHONY PIA, COL, MI

Richard D. Hirtzel, Member, Consulting Faculty
RICHARD D. HIRTZEL, LTC, IN

Date: 14 June 1974

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

The military services of the United States provide the Administration with trained, deployed, available resources to support U.S. foreign policy in peacetime. These resources vary in the type of product involved, the military function addressed and the source of funds to support the operation.

This study develops a three dimensional matrix as a conceptual framework for reviewing the variety of these activities, which are referred to as "military interchange." The matrix is then used to examine the history of U.S. relations with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since early 1946.

Following this review, use of the matrix as a planning tool is demonstrated, to identify possible potential for military interchange between the U.S. and other East European nations.

From the study it is concluded that:

1. The matrix is an effective device for reviewing military interchange.
2. The matrix shows promise as an aid for strategic planners in identifying potential future interchange tasks for the U.S. military.
3. Military interchange has been a regular element in U.S.-Yugoslav relations since World War II. The types of interchange used have varied, but some use of this means of supporting U.S. policy has been available to U.S. policy makers under nearly every set of international political conditions.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: MILITARY INTERCHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE

Since the earliest days of the United States, the President has called upon the military services in peacetime to perform activities which support the foreign policies of the nation. Although President Washington cautioned against "entangling alliances" abroad, no nation can remain totally isolated from the rest of the world, and the U.S. is no exception.¹ The military has played a continuing role as an action arm of the President in the conduct of foreign relations. The U.S. armed forces are organized, trained and equipped to fight in defense of the nation. Yet many military personnel are involved on a day-to-day basis in contacts with foreign personnel. These contacts often have little to do with fighting, but do contribute to the development of U.S. relations with the foreign nations involved.

Soldiers who never become involved in such international activity often have only a vague idea that such things are taking place. Many individuals involved in one of these forms of "military interchange" know only what their own responsibilities are, and have but the vaguest idea of how their actions fit into the larger picture of U.S. foreign policy. One purpose of this study is to examine the various elements

¹President Washington's Farewell Address did not argue for total isolation. He recommended a flexible position of involvement only to serve American goals, without long term commitments. See James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume I (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1896), pp. 222-23.

of military interchange and develop some technique to relate these diverse activities to each other and to the overall foreign policy effort.

Since World War II, the role of the military in U.S. foreign policy has expanded considerably. Most American embassies have an attache from one or more of the military services. Leaders from the Department of Defense sit on the highest national councils, where foreign policies are formulated. An extensive system of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), military missions and military groups are located in foreign countries to coordinate and administer various aid and assistance activities that are an important part of U.S. policies. Each of these efforts requires resources from the military. At the operational level, the importance of military participation in all of these varied activities continues to grow.

In his annual foreign policy report to the Congress, in February, 1970, President Nixon made two important points that will impact upon the future role of the United States' military in America's relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. The President said:

The United States views the nations of East Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we accept no doctrine which abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others.²

As the postwar rigidity between Eastern and Western Europe eases, peoples in both areas expect to see the benefits of relaxation in their daily lives. These aspirations are fully justified. An era of cooperation in Europe should produce a variety of new relationships not just between governments but between organizations,

²U.S. President (Nixon), U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace, a Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 139.

institutions, business firms, and people in all walks of life. If peace in Europe is to be durable, its foundations must be broad.³

This is a commitment by the President to stand ready to increase the level and diversity of U.S. relations with these nations. It is a call to all elements of the United States government to be prepared to participate in new forms of contact with these East European states. As one of the traditional elements of U.S. foreign policy operations abroad, the military must be prepared to answer this call.

The second point made by the President is implied by what has come to be called the "Nixon doctrine." Originally announced by the President at Guam in the summer of 1969 as the basis for U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, the Nixon doctrine has been developed as one of the basic elements of the President's Strategy for Peace. According to the Secretary of Defense this new doctrine emphasizes:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.⁴

This new doctrine places limitations on the active combat role of U.S. forces, particularly in those areas where these forces are not currently deployed. Further, it increases the emphasis being given to

³U.S. President (Nixon), U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace, a Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 91.

⁴U.S. Secretary of Defense (Laird), "The Foundations of a Strategy for Peace: The Secretary's Summary" from The Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 21.

other roles for the military as a part of the foreign policy process. It stresses the many different capabilities which the military has been able to develop, and stands as a call to the military to prepare itself to act with greater flexibility to further the nation's foreign policy objectives in peaceful situations.

The term "military interchange" will be used in this study to refer to the broad spectrum of military activity in support of foreign policy. This term is not defined in any current military dictionary. Other words used to denote some of the related elements, such as "military assistance," "foreign military sales," "military liaison," "military contacts" and others are accurate for their intended purpose, but none of them are broad enough to include all of the military activity that supports peaceful foreign policy. For this discussion, military interchange may be defined as follows:

Any act involving the transfer or exchange of military information, goods, or services between military establishments of different governments, as an element of broader, non-hostile relations between those governments.

Military interchange is not a formally structured program of activities, nor is it a well defined system which can be described in terms of process, inputs and outputs. It is accomplished by many organizations which have other assigned tasks that they consider more important. Thus, military interchange is largely a peripheral activity for most of the military. The importance of this type of activity is growing, however, as the nation turns to a foreign policy based on peace, partnership and a willingness to negotiate, as has been expressed in the Nixon doctrine.

THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE

The Nixon doctrine has raised military interchange activities to a place of central importance in the plans and operations of the U.S. military establishment. It stresses U.S. support for allies threatened by internal or localized wars, not by providing combat forces, but through an active military assistance program, embodied in the concept of Total Force Planning.⁵ Under this concept, described in detail by the Secretary of Defense in his Fiscal Year 1972 report to the Congress, the decision on where to spend each defense dollar must be made on the basis of where it will buy the most effective defense and deterrence. The rationale for military assistance thus rests on a careful cost benefit analysis in terms of U.S. costs and U.S. benefits, not just U.S. costs and allied benefits.

The actions necessary to plan and carry out the overseas portion of such a total force concept all fall within the scope of military interchange, as defined in this study. Because of the increased dependence on these "non-fighting" functions, military interchange is likely to become a part of many more contingency plans for U.S. assistance throughout the world. Such planning requires an overall appreciation of the value of the various forms of military interchange, the different types of products involved in the interchange activity, and the sources of funding available to support the various activities. This information is scattered throughout many sources which are not always available to the planner in a timely manner.

⁵Laird, op. cit., p. 23.

THE FRAGMENTED NATURE OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE

Military interchange activities are carried out by many different people, working at many levels within the government. Their operations are supported by funds from many sources. They deal with different military functions. Often there are several activities funded from different sources and performed by different agencies that could be used to further U.S. relations in a given situation, but because of the traditional roles of military organizations and the diversified nature of military interchange management within the military services, this flexibility does not become apparent until too late. For example, activities of the Defense attaches are coordinated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).⁶

Foreign Military Sales are coordinated by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), an agency subordinate to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA).⁷ Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), Military Groups and Military Missions are under the control of the Unified Command which has responsibility for the area to which the MAAG is deployed. Headquarters, Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Surgeon General are each responsible for coordinating and providing the training

⁶U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5105.32: Defense Attache System (CONFIDENTIAL) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

⁷U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5132.3: DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 5-7.

for foreign military students in Army schools in the United States.⁸

The U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) is responsible for providing equipment purchased under the Foreign Military Sales program administered by DSAA, and for coordinating the various types of services furnished under the International Logistics Program.⁹ It is a fractured system, built up piecemeal over the years, each function added as it was needed and placed under the management of whichever agency was logical and available at the time. That the system has worked as well as it has since the end of World War II is a tribute to the flexibility of the people involved, not to the organization of the system.

Military personnel who are involved in military interchange must operate within this fragmented system, and provide the support required by the current foreign policies of the government. The system must be coordinated to function as a single unit, particularly from the perspective of a recipient foreign nation. Military officers can expect several assignments involving some aspect of military interchange, with duties as varied as attache, MAAG staff officer, service school instructor teaching foreign military personnel, or member of an operational planning team in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For these individuals, and for others in the military whose contact with military interchange is even more peripheral, some organized system of looking at the functions of military interchange is required. One approach to such a system is developed in this study.

⁸U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 550-50: Training of Foreign Personnel by the U.S. Army (Washington, D.C.: The Adjutant General's Office, 1970), p. 1-2.

⁹U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 795-204: General Policies and Principles for Furnishing Defense Articles and Services on a Sale or Loan Basis (Washington, D.C.: The Adjutant General's Office, 1973), p. 3-2.

THE PROBLEM

This study addresses the use of military resources for foreign policy operations in non-hostile situations. The problem is twofold. First, the spectrum of U.S. military interchange will be examined to develop a matrix for identifying and cataloging these activities. This descriptive framework will be structured in terms of the type of PRODUCT provided, the basic military FUNCTION involved, and type of FUNDING used to pay the costs of the activity. Second, this framework will be used to review the relationship between the United States and the Federated Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia since World War II. U.S.-Yugoslav relations have been selected for this study because of the unique position of Yugoslavia as an East European nation with a Communist-led government that has maintained favorable military contacts with the U.S. The utility of the descriptive matrix can thus be evaluated through the use of a specific example.

The insights gained from this review will then be applied to the problem of using the military interchange matrix as a planning tool for "projecting" or identifying possible future uses for military resources to support the development of U.S. relations with the other nations of East Europe.

The problem can therefore be formally stated:

Can U.S. military activities which support U.S. foreign policy in non-hostile relations be described in a logical manner that shows their interrelationships and provides a method for identifying possible future military tasks in new policy situations; is such a method useful for analyzing postwar U.S.-Yugoslav reactions; and does such a method aid in projecting or identifying future roles for the U.S. military in developing positive relations with the nations of East Europe.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This study will consider as elements of military interchange all expenditure of military resources which support U.S. foreign policy objectives in non-hostile situations. Some activities are much easier to measure than others. Specific instances of military sales or grant aid are not difficult to measure: detailed reports are available in the classified records of the Defense Department, although seldom mentioned in the press. On the other hand, the good will generated by a Presidential visit, while easy to document, is difficult to measure. This study attempts to be logical and comprehensive in the types of interchange considered possible. It identifies, but makes no attempt to be precise in measuring either the costs of military interchange or the positive benefit derived by either party.

In order to project, or identify potential future roles for military interchange in other situations, it must be assumed that the U.S. government will continue to a military system that is similar in its missions and capabilities to the present military community, and that the government will continue to desire to use military resources as one means of supporting U.S. foreign policy. The emphasis placed upon security assistance by the Nixon Administration in the early 1970's makes this a relatively safe assumption.

A further assumption in the attempt to project potential military interchange into other East European situations is that the United States will continue to desire improved relations with the separate nations of East Europe, and that these nations will continue to develop along lines which do not diverge sharply from their long term characteristic patterns of behavior.

This study is limited to the role of the military in non-hostile situations for two reasons. First, the relative importance of the military in time of war is very different than in time of peace. This was certainly true during periods of total conflict such as World Wars I and II, but seems to remain true in limited war environments, if the U.S. experience in Vietnam can be considered typical. Attitudes about using military power, accounting for the use of military resources and letting the military leaders have a dominant voice in making national policies make these periods markedly different. Second, and perhaps more to the point, the kinds of activities that are included in the term "military interchange" are concerned with building friendly relations between nations, as opposed to the concerns of short range expediency that are more typical during hostilities, even among allies. It is in this arena of long term development of positive relations that U.S. relations with the nations of East Europe appear to be set. And it is here that the U.S. military may have a growing role, through military interchange.

One major restriction has limited the information available for this study. No classified documents have been directly used in developing the historical data on U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Specific amounts of aid, particularly the dollar value of military goods shipped to Yugoslavia, are not yet a matter of public record. The research done in this study has relied heavily on The New York Times for announcement of military interchange activities. This normally provided information on the timing and general nature of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange, but seldom addressed the exact content of these activities. Enough examples of military interchange were found to demonstrate the potential value of the matrix, and to provide insights on the role of military interchange in U.S.-Yugoslav relations since 1946.

This study will be presented by developing the military interchange matrix, applying it to a review of U.S.-Yugoslav relations, and then demonstrating its application to projecting possible future uses of military interchange elsewhere in East Europe. Chapter II begins with a survey of major studies concerned with aspects of military interchange. Appropriate elements are used to develop the military interchange matrix, which is described in detail.

Chapters III through V describe the history of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. Chapter III covers the background of the relations, including the period during World War II until the rise of Josip Broz Tito to a position of official national power in Yugoslavia. This chapter serves as a background for the period under study, and establishes the initial conditions for later discussion. Chapter IV covers the history of the relationship from March 1946 when Tito came to national power through the Hungarian uprising in November 1956. Chapter V discusses the time after the Soviet intervention in Hungary until the end of 1972. The purpose of these chapters is to describe the history of the U.S.-Yugoslav relationship in sufficient detail to put military interchange into the proper historical context, and to provide enough information about specific acts of interchange to associate them with a particular cell of the matrix.

In Chapter VI the information presented in the previous chapters will be evaluated using the matrix, to determine the effectiveness of this method of analysis, and the insights that can be gained about the relationship. A graphical technique will be used, employing the matrix to summarize the types of interchange used during different periods. Summary charts are presented in the chapter, with detailed charts in

Appendix I. This review will result in a set of general observations about the viability of the various types of interchange in U.S. relations with Yugoslavia.

Chapter VI will conclude with a speculative effort: an attempt to apply the military interchange matrix to possible future U.S. relations with other East European states. One case will be examined in the text of the chapter to demonstrate the method. Two other examples are included in Appendix II. These scenarios will not apply every potential type of military interchange to each of the three nations considered, nor will they address each program in detail. The purpose will be to use the methodology developed in the study as a planning aid, to assist in identifying possible new military interchange tasks.

The study concludes with Chapter VII, which is a summary of the findings regarding the concept of "military interchange," the usefulness of the matrix as a framework for review, and the potential for using the matrix as a planning tool for future military interchange in East Europe.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY: MILITARY INTERCHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT

In order to develop a utilitarian approach to the study of military interchange, a comprehensive description of potential means is required. Most previous studies of military assistance, defense information exchange and quasi-diplomatic military activities are restricted in their ability to satisfy this requirement. A number of historical, structural/functional, program/budgetary and operational studies were consulted in an effort to find a model that would be comprehensive in its consideration of all identified interchange instruments, and detailed enough to permit some projection of possible interchange measures that might be developed to expand military operations in support of foreign policy. Most of these studies are based on an analytical or descriptive framework that flows naturally from the data being considered. They do not provide a conceptual framework for relating the different elements of existing military interchange programs. In one most important aspect, these analytical structures do not provide the means for logical projection from existing interchange efforts to new possibilities that may benefit the development of bilateral relations between the U.S. and other nations such as those of East Europe.

In the discussion which follows the analytical or descriptive structures used in a number of historical/regional, structural/functional, program/budgetary and operational studies will be reviewed.

From these separate elements a military interchange matrix will be developed which can encompass all of the elements of current interchange activities.

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

A study such as this one which attempts to bring together in some logical manner a number of different elements of military activity which have been well described and discussed in official and critical literature must have an analytical approach that is sufficient to the task. The focus of this study is on the actual functions of military interchange as they are carried out. It is a descriptive effort, that concentrates more on projecting military interchange into new situations than on dissecting past programs and attempting to compare the relative effectiveness of one form of interchange over another. The approach described below draws elements from several typical methods used in dealing with the several aspects of military interchange.

Application of the military interchange model must take into account the historical context of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Yugoslavia. There are many historical studies of the development of military assistance, military relations between nations and the role of the military in the conduct of foreign affairs. Reports prepared for the President by special committees studying military assistance provided a useful overview of the development of this form of foreign aid.¹

¹The seven reports, in chronological order, with the name of the senior responsible individual, are:

a. Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1940). (Gordon Gray).

A number of descriptions of U.S.-Yugoslav relations have tended to focus on the life and national leadership of Josip Broz Tito. A number of these studies provide good insight into the circumstances under which military interchange developed.

The historical/regional approach is useful in that it provides a simple, commonly accepted framework for ordering data. For the purposes of projecting new possibilities for interchange operations it emphasizes chronological trends and stresses the development of programs based on past successes, but does not insure that the future environment is taken adequately into account. Factors which permit the projection of new, different operations for planning are often implicit in historical studies. Historical analyses frequently imply that the past and present will flow smoothly into the future with no major discontinuities, particularly when the past and present are seen to be successful. In simple terms, if the history of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia has been

b. Partners in Progress: A Report to the President by the International Development Advisory Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1951), (Nelson Rockefeller).

c. Report to the President and the Congress by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1954), (Clarence Randall).

d. Report to the President by the President's Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1957), (Benjamin Fairless).

e. A New Emphasis on Economic Development Abroad, A Report to the President of the United States, by the International Development Advisory Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1957), (Eric Johnston).

f. Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1959), (William Draper).

g. Report to the President of the United States from the Committee to Strengthen the Free World: Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1963), (Lucius Clay).

good, there is a strong implication that in the future we should try to maintain the status quo in order to keep things on an even keel. Since the history of military interchange between the U.S. and East European nations other than Yugoslavia is limited, a simple projection of this experience into the future is not likely to reveal new roles for the armed forces of the U.S.

There have been many general historical studies of Yugoslavia that treat the question of U.S.-Yugoslav relations in general. Robert Wolff's history of The Balkans in Our Time was one of the more useful, particularly the two chapters on the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the status of Yugoslavia since the break with the Cominform.² This account of Yugoslav-American relations discussed a number of incidents of military interchange. In a similar manner, the later study by George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal provided information from many Yugoslav sources that were not available during the research for this study.³ A number of accounts of the World War II period have been written by persons who were close to the situation in Yugoslavia. While these are often exciting, first-hand accounts, they are of limited scholarly value, since they are not footnoted or cross referenced in any way. These eye-witness accounts are an excellent source of insight into the attitudes of the authors who, in several cases, were leaders in the early Yugoslav partisan movement and close associates of Tito.⁴ A

²See Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), Chapters 11 and 12.

³George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962).

⁴Of these several accounts, those of Fitzroy Maclean are among the most interesting and useful. Maclean was the British liaison to

well researched study of the period of the break between Tito and Stalin is Adam Ulam's Titoism and the Cominform.⁵ Written in 1951, this book is largely based on historical archives of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), and minutes of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland, both sources that were not previously available in the west.

Although easier to compile and present than the effort set forth below, an historical approach to the development of military interchange between the U.S. and Yugoslavia would be less effective as an analysis of the military interchange function. History is not naturally a storehouse of discrete units of data.⁶ The historian must sift through the evidence left for him, and apply his experience to what he finds. The resulting patterns are either based on the data, and therefore good historiography, or they are generally unacceptable as scholarly work. Because of the emphasis on the past, and the search for trends or curves that fit the available data well, the historian is not always able to project from his analysis into the future, particularly when events are not progressing smoothly as time progresses. Stanley Hoffman suggests that ". . . researcher bias is a positive inventive tool."⁷ By

Tito during the later portion of World War II, and gives some vivid descriptions of the nature of military interchange during hostilities. See Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: J. Cape, 1950); The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz Tito (New York: Harper, 1957); Escape to Adventure (Boston: Little, Brown and Son, 1950).

⁵Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

⁶Stanley Hoffman, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 49.

⁷Ibid., p. 171.

approaching data that has been gathered and assessed from a historical perspective, and attempting to cast it in a new light, there is a chance that the insights gained may be useful for projecting possibilities in the future as well as for understanding the actions of the past. The military interchange matrix is an effort to develop such a perspective.

Other studies focus on one or more of the functions of foreign policy operations. In The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy, H. Bradford Westerfield discussed military, economic, informational (U.S. Information Agency) and covert (Central Intelligence Agency) actions in support of American foreign policy.⁸ Westerfield covered the role of the military in support of U.S. foreign policy as primarily a war fighting capability which could be used, although reluctantly, to oppose the spread of Communism, or conduct a preventive war that would solve the problems of the world once, and for all time.⁹ In his discussion of overt and covert intervention in internal politics of other nations, Westerfield identifies several additional roles for the military. First, he discusses the "show of force" by naval and marine forces, such as the task force that assisted King Hussein of Jordan to maintain his position in April of 1957.¹⁰ A second role is the non-violent intervention by combat forces, such as the U.S. entry into Lebanon, which was less successful in maintaining the government of President Chamoun.¹¹ Finally, he covers the more peripheral role of military assistance exemplified by the U.S. support for the 1954 "invasion" of Guatemala.¹² These examples

⁸H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of American Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963).

⁹Ibid., pp. 173-75.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 477-80.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 484-90.

¹²Ibid., pp. 422-38.

illustrate three possible roles for the military in support of U.S. foreign policy, but do not place these options in the context of a complete spectrum of military interchange.

Applied within the military establishment, a structural or functional approach tends to focus on a single organization, and the impact it has on foreign policy operations. This results in descriptions that are easy to understand, but difficult to use to emphasize the need for integration which was discussed earlier, in Chapter I.

A third common approach is the analysis of separately funded government programs that result in military operations with foreign policy significance. Most of these efforts since 1950 have focused on the Mutual Security Program and its successors, the Military Assistance Program and the Foreign Military Sales Program. Data to support such studies are generally available. The Department of Defense must request funds from Congress annually, and the authorizing and appropriating process produces analyses and reports in a continuing stream. Most of these studies focus on funds that are made available under these programs for the explicit support of the various military assistance programs. The special Presidential studies discussed above are, for the most part, organized along program or budgetary lines. These studies tend to take on the characteristics of economic analyses, drawing on the analytical tools of economists such as cost-benefit analysis or evaluation of the economics of foreign aid versus domestic spending in order to draw conclusions about the value of military assistance as a part of foreign aid. Some of the studies make broad recommendations about the management of military assistance. For example, in his assessment of U.S. foreign economic policies (reported to the President in 1950) Gordon Gray

recommended that U.S. aid to Europe be divided so that aid for economic and military production in recipient countries was separated from direct assistance to improve the military posture of the recipient.¹³ The implication was that production assistance must be part of a long term plan, while military readiness assistance can not be. This introduces a flexibility for military interchange, since the military is involved in both types of aid: long term help to build up the ability of a recipient state to defend itself in the future; and short term help to enable a recipient state to meet an immediate threat.

Charles Wolfe, in a later analysis of the Military Assistance Program, follows the same theme by suggesting three questions regarding allocations as a logical focus for the study of MAP as an instrument of foreign policy: (1) What is the most effective allocation of the MAP budget within a single country? (2) What is the most effective allocation of MAP resources among different countries? (3) What is the most effective allocation of U.S. funds between MAP and other programs?¹⁴ The possible variations of answers to these questions are at the heart of the military assistance problem from a budgetary or programing perspective. From the military perspective, U.S. forces will be involved in interchange activities in the country under study no matter how the resources are distributed by Congress. Even in countries where the MAP program has been terminated, such as Yugoslavia, the requirement remains to develop positive relations using available resources. Termination of MAP support may restrict the choice of military interchange means

¹³Gray. op. cit., p. 39.

¹⁴Charles Wolfe Jr., "Military Assistance Programs," a monograph by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, October 1965.

available, but it is not likely to eliminate the requirement for military interchange of some kind.

This leads to conceptual difficulties, which were clearly recognized and well stated in a special Senate study in 1957:

Assistance to America's friends and allies can take many forms, and it is impossible to go far in discussing military aid programs without encountering problems of definition in distinguishing these types of aid from one another. The terminological confusion springs in part from the close inherent relationship of the military force of a country to its economic productive base. The more one allows one's thinking to become compartmentalized so that one thinks of "economic assistance" being for economic ends and "military assistance" for military ends, the greater the likelihood of magnifying a distinction which may be greater in form than in function.¹⁵

These problems of definition remain today. They are abetted within the military establishment by the division of responsibility for military interchange activities among many offices and agencies, supported by resources from many programs. The military interchange matrix developed below is an attempt to separate the types of aid by viewing them from an operational perspective without losing sight of the overall impact of these activities on the success of U.S. foreign policy.

The annual DOD presentation to Congress in support of the Military Assistance Program outlines five primary military interchange functions:

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Foreign Aid Program: A Compilation of Studies and Surveys (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 914.

1. Identifying military assistance and foreign military sales requirements;
2. Developing and implementing military assistance and foreign military sales arrangements;
3. Assisting in materiel transfer;
4. Providing training assistance; and
5. Giving advice on military operations.¹⁶

These functions are all part of the overall military interchange effort, but not the only activities that fall into this category.

Not all program-oriented analyses of military assistance are positive. In The Arrogance of Power, written in 1966, Senator Fulbright condemns military assistance in general for providing weapons and training that are used against the best interests of the United States:

We are sustaining over three million non-fighting men along the borders of Russia and China who do guard duty while American soldiers fight in Vietnam. One wonders whether some of the countries which maintain these forces would not be more stable and secure today if much of the money spent on armaments over the years had been used instead for development and social reform.¹⁷

Based on this liberal, generally anti-military observation, the U.S. supports oppression and gets no help from these foreign "mercenaries." Viewed from this narrow perspective of formally funded military assistance, and drawing upon selected examples, this condemnation has gained a measure of general popularity. The condemnation is not as easy to support when military assistance is analyzed in the broader context of military interchange, where military assistance is not given for military ends alone.

The fourth general category of studies, the instrumental or operational approach, does provide a helpful range of activities. A

¹⁶U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, "Congressional Presentation, FY 1974," p. 10.

¹⁷J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 230.

recent study of military commitments abroad by Roland A. Paul identifies seven categories of military interchange action:

1. Security treaties;
2. Security agreements (unratified);
3. Unilateral declarations;
4. Stationing of U.S. troops;
5. Moral commitments;
6. General (cultural) identification; and
7. Accretion of small supportive efforts.¹⁸

These categories demonstrate the range of military involvement in foreign policy during non-hostile conditions. They imply a flexibility that may at best benefit the military interchange planner, or at least complicate his task. For example, the first category, treaty agreements, require Congressional ratification, while the second does not. These both demand agreement by the recipient nation, while the third does not. The fourth category communicates a level of commitment by the United States to the agreement that may not be signaled by an agreement or declaration alone. Moral commitment, such as the U.S. demonstrated with regard to Israel following the 1967 "Six-Day War," and the category of general identification (which might be inferred from the history which the United States shares with those Western European nations that do not belong to NATO) may not involve active military interchange, but do require planning if they are ever to be used as a coordinated part of military support of U.S. foreign policy. For example, the U.S. could not support the Swiss, or the Austrians, if they requested it, without prior planning. Several of these categories may bind the U.S. government in a manner not desired, as when continued small acts of assistance to an unpopular government develop pressure within the U.S. government to

¹⁸Roland A. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), pp. 8-11.

support a recipient government whose internal policies are no longer consonant with popular perception of American values. This uncomfortable dilemma leads to the charges of government "arrogance" toward the common people of the United States and the recipient nation alike.

Another attempt to identify the roles of the military in international affairs was completed by Thomas H. Tackaberry in 1966 as a U.S. Army War College thesis. General (then Lieutenant Colonel) Tackaberry identifies ten types of projects where military personnel carry out U.S. foreign policy:

1. Military Assistance Program;
2. Military schooling for foreigners, in the United States, and overseas;
3. International alliances;
4. Overseas forces and bases;
5. Quasi-diplomatic roles, i.e., attaches;
6. Civic action by U.S. forces;
7. Civil Affairs advice and administrative assistance;
8. Counterinsurgency operations;
9. Offshore procurement; and
10. Naval presence.¹⁹

This group of military interchange roles shows a variety not found in previous studies. Unfortunately, the study was designed to evaluate the potential effectiveness of military personnel in these roles, but not to provide a planning tool or a structure for comparative analysis.

The military interchange structure discussed below is an attempt to overcome two problems: the dilemma created by narrow perspectives of military involvement in foreign policy operations; and the lack of a flexible planning tool that provides for projection of future potentials for military interchange in new or expanding situations.

¹⁹Thomas H. Tackaberry, "U.S. Military Personnel: Instrumentalities of Foreign Affairs" (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 8 April 1966), pp. 11-35 passim.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The approaches discussed in the preceding section all have some contribution to make to the study of military interchange. However, they do not focus on the one issue which lies at the heart of this study: where can the role of military interchange be expanded into new techniques to support U.S. foreign policy? One method common to political science researchers that does focus on the problem of projecting new activities within an existing framework is the technique normally referred to as coding. Coding is the classification of variables into a number of classes or categories for the purpose of analysis. If two or more variables are examined, the possible combinations of the classes of these variables can be represented as a matrix. Thus, the consideration of two variables of military interchange, such as "type of interchange product" and "category of military activity" would result in a two dimensional matrix. A study of military interchange involving three or more variables could be represented in a similar manner, although when more than three variables are involved, graphical representation becomes difficult, and usually not worth the effort. G. David Garson establishes the following criteria for good coding:

1. The code must serve the purposes of the researcher. This is the overriding criterion.
2. The coding should avoid having too large a proportion of the observations fall into any one class.
3. The code should be comprehensive, so that all observations fall into some class.
4. Classes should not overlap, so that any observation will fall into only one class.²⁰

²⁰G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1971), p. 76.

As an analytical technique, coding has several drawbacks. First, the classes or ranges of variables must be comprehensive, and this is often difficult to establish. In this study, the variables used represent the ranges of options observed; the limits established for the variables are justified below to establish their full range within the scope of the study. Second, the problem of avoiding overlap is difficult. In the discussion below, the categories of each variable are carefully defined so that actual parameters are included while insuring that each category is unique. Finally, coded data is often not of a high enough level to permit arithmetic analysis of the results. Since actual levels of military interchange activities are often classified for security reasons, measurable intensities are not available. The instances described in this study are nominal data, which do not permit the use of cost-effectiveness, relative benefit or other more quantitative forms of analysis.²¹ The purpose of the study is not to judge the effectiveness of military interchange as compared to any other form of foreign policy operation, but to identify possible applications of military interchange to that foreign policy. Quantitative analysis is not essential within the context of this paper. Once such potentials for interchange have been identified and described, the decision of whether or not to employ them will undoubtedly be preceded by a more quantitative analysis based on careful cost estimates and more precise information than is currently available.

²¹The order in which nominal data are listed has no connection with the relative value of individual items. Number "1" is not necessarily better or worse than number "10." A nominal listing signifies only that items are different. See Garson, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

There is one major advantage to the form of coding which makes it a particularly useful form of analysis for this study. If the variables are selected properly and the classes within those variables are comprehensive as discussed above, then the matrix which results may contain cells which are possible combinations of the variables that are not in public use today. If such a cell exists, and if the conditions of the military interchange environment are favorable, the analysis may lead to a new potential for interchange which could improve the flexibility of military support for U.S. foreign policy.

STRUCTURING THE MILITARY INTERCHANGE FUNCTION

Several approaches to bringing order to this varied collection of tasks have been considered. The method described here is based on three characteristics of military interchange which are well known in isolation. When these characteristics are considered together, they provide both a framework for description of present military interchange activities and a structure for projecting possible interchange for the future. The characteristics used are: the type of military interchange product involved; the military function of that product; and the source of funding support for the product. These will be arranged along the axes of a three dimensional grid to form the military interchange matrix, as indicated in Figure 2.1.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX

NOTE: This simplified matrix shows the relationship of the three major variables. Each military interchange event will be described in terms of the type of PRODUCT, military FUNCTION and type of FUNDING involved.




Figure 2.1

TYPE OF PRODUCT

Perhaps the easiest characteristic for differentiating various interchange events is the type of product involved. This might be described as the subject of the interchange: it is that which one nation desires and the other nation provides during the process of interchange. Four categories of product will be used in this model: information, goods, services and representation. In every instance of military interchange one of these products is involved, no matter what military function is being addressed, or how the interchange is financed.

The first category, information, can be defined as follows:

Information for military interchange is any document, writing, picture, plan, prototype or other communication, written or oral,

which relates to any military function and is communicated between governments.²²

Information is provided through a number of programs. Unclassified information on equipment, procedures and tactics is taught to allied students at U.S. service schools. U.S. Army regulations and field manuals are sold or given to friendly foreign nations. International agreements to cooperate in the assembly, repair, maintenance, or operation of defense equipment involve information exchange between the nations involved. Classified military information may be exchanged with foreign nations, when such disclosure supports overall U.S. policy. Procedures governing such disclosures are monitored by the National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee, under the supervision of the ASD/ISA. Once approved, this activity can take place within many military agencies, from attache offices and advisory groups to combined command staffs and U.S. service schools.

Military interchange goods, the second category of products, can be defined as follows:

Goods for military interchange include any weapon, munitions, aircraft, vessel or other implement of war; or any property, installation, material or equipment used to provide military assistance; or any item or supply used to service these goods.²³

Goods for military interchange include the tanks, aircraft, small arms and ammunition provided to a foreign country under the Military Assistance Program, or sold under the Foreign Military Sales

²²U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 795-204: Policies and Procedures for Furnishing Defense Articles and Services on a Loan Basis (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1973), p. G-4, provided the basic definition. (Hereafter referred to as AR 795-204.)

²³This definition is derived from the definition of defense articles. See Ibid.

Program. This category also includes food for a foreign army, clothing or individual equipment for soldiers, and raw materials needed by the foreign country to manufacture military articles in their own production facilities.

Services used as military interchange products, the third category, are not difficult to identify.

Military interchange services include any test, inspection, repair, training, publication, by military related facilities of one nation to support the military services of another; and any purchase of goods or services by the military forces of one nation that assists the economic or productive capability of another.²⁴

This category includes the maintenance of jet aircraft now owned by a foreign country using U.S. military maintenance teams. It includes agreements that permit foreign nations to requisition parts through the U.S. logistics system. It includes the purchase by the U.S. military of ammunition, or foodstuffs, or even quarters furniture from a foreign nation in such a manner that the economy or the productive capability of the manufacturer is helped. For example, at various times since 1951 the U.S. has purchased artillery ammunition, navy minesweepers, fresh meat and household furniture from Yugoslav producers. These actions would be considered services regardless of who was benefited in Yugoslavia, since in each case U.S. military resources were used in the interchange.

The fourth category of military interchange products is representation. Representation is not normally considered part of the U.S. military assistance program, and is not as carefully defined in military

²⁴Ibid.

regulations as the other products. For the purposes of this study, the following definition will be used:

In military interchange, representation is the personal contact between representatives of the nations involved that fosters increased trust and confidence, improved coordination of effort, or more complete understanding between the states.

Representation is normally thought of as the function of high level government representatives and defense attaches. Alfred Vagts, in his seminal work on the history of military attaches, mentions representation as one of the basic duties of the attache or liaison officer from one military service to that of another nation.²⁵ Since the nation's inception, military representatives of the President of the United States have been used to represent the government in foreign policy matters. Early during President Washington's administration, there was reason to send a reliable, official, yet informal representative to Lisbon to determine the proper grade for the emissaries to be exchanged when the U.S. and Portugal established diplomatic relations. Colonel David Humphries was sent "... in a private character . . ." to conduct the preliminary negotiations.²⁶ In 1820, President Monroe sent Commodore William Bainbridge to command the Mediterranean Squadron. His representational mission was to sound out the Turkish government on the feasibility of entering into a treaty with the United States. The mission was successfully completed, and

²⁵Vagts lists planning and coordination, advice, monitoring use of aid and representation as the basic functions of the liaison officer (or military interchange operator) throughout history. See Alfred Vagts, The Military Attache (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 4.

²⁶Henry Merriest Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), pp. 316-17.

Bainbridge was later praised for his skill in dealing with a very wary Turkish government.²⁷

As used in this study, representation does not include the interchange of information, goods or services. Thus, in many situations, representation is an adjunct to some other form of interchange product. There are, of course, purely representational interchanges, such as the friendship visit to Yugoslavia in 1956 by Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.²⁸

The four categories of product involved in military interchange are shown along one axis of the matrix in Figure 2.2.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX PRODUCTS




Figure 2.2

²⁷Ibid., pp. 320-21.

²⁸Vice Admiral Brown's visit to Split, Yugoslavia, in the summer of 1956, was an apparent attempt on the part of the U.S. administration to soften the blow of a major Congressional restriction on U.S. military assistance for Yugoslavia. See The New York Times, 8 August 1956, p. 7.

TYPE OF FUNCTION

The second characteristic used to describe military interchange is the military function involved in the event. Four functions, familiar to anyone with a military background, have been selected: personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics. These are the functions that form the basis for the separation of staff responsibilities into major functional areas. Although the definitions for these functions are well known, and the terms themselves are nearly self explanatory, the following definitions are included to insure a common basis for the discussion that follows.

The personnel function in military interchange can be defined as follows:

Personnel functions include the management and execution of all matters concerning the health and welfare of personnel, and the organization of military personnel into units.²⁹

This function includes providing food for the Yugoslav military forces from U.S. supplies, or the provision of emergency medical supplies, equipment or services from military reserves for disaster relief. In general, this function contains military interchange events concerned with the maintenance of unit strengths, personnel and manpower management, development and maintenance of morale, health services,

²⁹The definition for each of the military interchange functions was developed from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and the U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5: Staff Organization and Procedure. Applicable concepts were taken from both of these publications to develop a definition suitable for this study. See U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 January 1972) (hereafter referred to as JCS Pub 1); and U.S. Department of Army, Field Manual 101-5: Staff Organization and Procedure (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of Army, July 1972 (hereafter referred to as FM 101-5)).

maintenance of discipline, law and order, dependent affairs and general administrative duties.³⁰

Intelligence is the second military interchange function. It is defined in the same manner that it is used throughout the U.S. military:

The intelligence function includes the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies and operations.³¹

Intelligence has been a basic part of the military interchange operations since the earliest times. Vagts begins his study by emphasizing the historic origins of the attache's function: "Observation of the armed forces of a foreign country, their readiness or unreadiness for war, and the country's war power in general. . . ." ³² The trading of information about third countries by attaches is also common in history, and was an important part of British interchange with the Yugoslav Partisans during World War II. FM 101-5 includes the use of intelligence and information; counterintelligence; and intelligence training.³³ These tasks are consistent with the DOD definition, and will be used with it in the study of military interchange.

The third military interchange function, operations, is defined as follows:

³⁰FM 101-5, p. 4-2.

³¹JCS Pub 1, p. 157.

³²Vagts, op. cit., p. 3.

³³FM 101-5, pp. 4-3 to 4-4.

Operations functions include the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, training or administrative military mission. This includes the process of carrying on combat, including movement on the battlefield, attack, defense and other maneuvers to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.³⁴

This includes much of the military assistance between the U.S. and Yugoslavia during the period under study. The provision of tanks and aircraft, the training of Yugoslav personnel as pilots in U.S. facilities, and the visits of American generals to Yugoslav maneuvers are all examples of interchange involving the operational function.

The final category of military interchange functions is logistics, which will be defined as follows for the purposes of this study:

Logistic functions include planning for and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. This includes design and development, acquisition, maintenance, disposition, of materiel, and construction, operation, and disposition of facilities.³⁵

Logistics functions can include engineer assistance to develop roads, repair services to maintain tanks or aircraft, or logistics management training for foreign officers in U.S. schools.

The developing military interchange matrix is shown in Figure 2.3. For clarity, the characteristics on the "Product" axis which were previously discussed are indicated by an abbreviation.

Using this two dimensional matrix, it is possible to begin to see the distribution of familiar types of military interchange. Figure 2.4 is included to clarify the idea of the matrix, before proceeding to develop the third dimension of funding. The interchange events shown

³⁴JCS Pub 1, p. 216.

³⁵Ibid., p. 178.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX FUNCTION




Figure 2.3

in Figure 2.4 are not all found in the history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. They are, however, all possible types of interchange under the proper conditions.

This sample military interchange matrix begins to show the possible variety of means available to assist in carrying out U.S. foreign policy. For the officer assigned to a MAAG or attache's office, such a catalogue of possible actions could serve as an aid in identifying projects that would meet the desires of the host country while remaining within the capability of the U.S. to provide. The separate entries in each cell of the matrix are not the only activities of that type that might be possible in a given situation. Most of them have not been used in the U.S.-Yugoslav relationship. They are meant only to show the general type of military interchange that is suggested by this matrix approach.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE

| PRODUCTS | | SAMPLE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MATRIX | | | |
|-----------------|-----------|--|---|---|---------------------------------|
| | | INFORMATION | ARTICLES | SERVICES | REPRESENTATION |
| F U N C T I O N | A D M I N | *Advice on health care *Leadership training | *Management hardware *Health care facilities | *Integration into combined commands *Civic action | *High level visits *Protocol |
| | I N T E L | *Strategic intelligence *Tactical intelligence | *Surveillance devices | *Collection for recipient *Agents | ? |
| | O P N S | *Plans & strategies *Advice *Production technology *Allied training | *Fighting hardware *Strategic hardware *Military supplies | *Strategic deterrence *Combat developments *Forward basing *Port calls | *Alliances |
| | L O G | *Advice *Management info systems | *L.O.C. development Ports Airfields Communication facilities | *International logistics program *Offshore procurement for U.S. forces | *Procurement mission |

Figure 2.4

The blank cell in Figure 2.4 under "Intelligence Representation" illustrates one potential for using the matrix as an aid to planning. Although no interchange activity of this type has been identified, it is possible that a bilateral agreement for intelligence liaison or future intelligence training would meet a need in one country and be within the capability of the other to provide. The act of concluding the treaty, and all of the discussion and planning that would be required to develop it could have an important positive effect on relations between the two countries involved, quite separate from the liaison or training itself.

Military interchange is not a one-way street. There is nothing in this concept that requires the U.S. to give and some other nation to take in every instance. By definition, military interchange is a two-way flow of products or funds. Although much interchange is funded by one nation or the other and conducted on a sale or loan basis, some interchange activity, particularly in the categories of information and representation there is a significant amount of barter or trading, as will be seen from a more detailed consideration of the history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

Although the matrix as depicted obviously has some utility, it does not consider one major variable that affects military interchange in a basic manner, the source of funds to support the activity. This variable can be introduced by the addition of the third axis to the matrix, to enable distinguishing among the different methods of paying for military interchange activity.

TYPE OF FUNDING SOURCE

In general, funds to support military interchange come from three different sources: the resources of the recipient nation; the resources

of the donor nation that are specifically allocated for foreign aid; and the resources of the donor nation that are allocated for the operation of the donor nation's military forces. In other words, in every instance of military interchange, either the recipient buys, or the donor pays with foreign aid funds, or the donor uses military forces in being, and pays through the funds set aside for running the military. Each of these sources of funds has certain restrictions or constraints surrounding its use. Recipient nations are often not willing or able to buy some forms of military interchange. For example, sophisticated jet aircraft may be a desirable weapons system from the perception of a small nation with well armed neighbors, but they may be too expensive for the recipient to afford.

Foreign aid funds are often appropriated for specific projects, and cannot be spent for other forms of assistance that develop after the funds have been set aside. In the United States, the Congress has been particularly vigilant in monitoring where foreign aid funds are spent, and restricting the amount of support available as a means of influencing the course of foreign aid. The history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations since World War II is dominated by the continuing struggle between the Congress and Administration within the United States over the use of foreign aid funds for assistance to Yugoslavia.

Funds appropriated for military operations are not as easily monitored by Congress, because of the nature of their use in military interchange. If, for example, the President orders the U.S. Army to send a military mission to Yugoslavia on a temporary basis to conduct training for the Yugoslavs, the cost of paying, feeding, transporting and maintaining the mission can be met from funds appropriated for the maintenance and training of the members of the military mission. The

personnel would be paid and fed no matter where they were assigned for duty, and commanders have a relatively wide latitude in assigning personnel in whatever way is necessary to accomplish the mission. As the detailed discussion of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange will demonstrate, there have been many instances where the President has used this flexibility to respond to Yugoslav needs with military interchange means that are available, in spite of restrictions imposed by Congress. In order to describe the differences among these three types of military interchange funding each of them will be defined and described briefly.

The first type of funding, by the recipient nation, is defined as follows for the purposes of this study:

Recipient nation funding includes all transactions paid for by the recipient, regardless of the type of product or military function involved, without regard to the source of funds within the recipient nation.

Resources may become available to the recipient nation through internal taxation, profits from state owned industry or from loans from some international agency such as the Export-Import bank. These funds can be used to purchase information, goods or services from a donor government, or from some private manufacturer as arranged through the donor government. These transactions, known as foreign military sales, are licensed by the State Department in the U.S. in order to provide a means of control over the flow of strategic information and materials to potential opponents of the United States. In cases of commercial sales, the military is often involved only in the initial stages of identifying the recipient's needs and assisting in the initial arrangements. Once the sales contract has been completed and the goods begin to flow, there is little military involvement in some cases. For example,

if Yugoslavia were to contract with an American aerospace manufacturer to purchase helicopters (a hypothetical but not unlikely situation) the military attaches in Belgrade would be more involved in the initial negotiations than in the later delivery activities. This is not necessarily better or worse than if the Yugoslavs purchased from the U.S. Air Force, but it provides fewer opportunities for military contribution to the relations between the two countries.

There are three instances of cash sales where the military is deeply involved: initial delivery through military supply channels; routine resupply through military channels; and storage and modernization of material in the military supply system. In each instance, the recipient, Yugoslavia for example, agrees to pay the U.S. government in dollars, in order to have access to the U.S. supply system for certain types of goods or services. These agreements are known as "foreign military sales arrangements," and are described in detail in U.S. military regulations.³⁶

The second type of funding is through monies appropriated by the donor nation for the specific purpose of foreign aid:

Foreign aid funding includes all transactions paid for by the donor with funds made available through specific Congressional appropriation for foreign aid.

Funds in this category are provided by Congress primarily through the annual process of revising the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) (FAA) and the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA).³⁷

³⁶See AR 795-204, p. G-4.

³⁷These acts are codified in Chapter 22 and 39 of Title 10, United States Code.

These acts establish programs for grant aid, loan of military goods and services, the outright gift of excess goods under certain conditions, and so called "supporting assistance," which aids the recipient in some way that allows him to divert his own resources to military use.

Grant aid formed the basis of most U.S. military assistance efforts after World War II. Because grants were outright gifts that were never repaid, Congress has traditionally been concerned that the recipients were contributing to the security of the United States in some way. Through the years, Congress has placed many restrictions on what form grant aid might take, and which nations could receive it. In 1964, for example, aid to nations trading with Cuba was prohibited. Four years later this restriction was extended to nations trading with North Vietnam. Congress has also specified that goods furnished through grant aid must be used only by the nation to which they are given, that training services can be offered to military recipients only if a program to educate civilians is also in effect with the recipient, and that grant aid be reduced, then terminated as soon as possible.³⁸

Provisions for loaning military goods and services were established in the 1973 version of the FAA. These laws permit the President to loan equipment or detail personnel to assist any friendly government; the recipient of the loan must return the equipment and pay for any depreciation.³⁹ Loans are nearly as restricted as grant aid, except that equipment to be loaned is often on hand in military stockpiles.

³⁸The details of the restrictions imposed in the FAA and FMMA are much more complex than these examples can portray. Details can be found in: 22 U.S.C. 2313; 2319; 2320; 2321a.

³⁹United States, 93d Congress, 1st Session, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (27 November 1973), Section 12.

Gifts of excess articles are no less restricted than loans or grant aid. In this form of foreign aid funded assistance, the military service which gives excess goods to a foreign nation is reimbursed from funds appropriated for the Military Assistance Program. Excess goods are thus subject to the same restrictions placed on grant aid. There is one advantage here, however. Like goods to be loaned, excess goods are often immediately available, particularly during periods when the donor is undergoing a reduction in the size of the military, or a modernization program. This availability of materials permits very rapid response to requests for assistance, if excess goods can be used. Excess goods, like grant aid, are not paid for by the recipient, which permits giving assistance of this type to nations that could not afford to pay for the materiel.

In addition to funds appropriated for military assistance, other funds set aside by the U.S. Congress to aid a foreign nation can have a positive impact on military readiness. For example, if the U.S. government agrees to loan dollars to Yugoslavia so that other dollars held by the Yugoslavs can be used to buy weapons, then Yugoslav military readiness has been indirectly supported through U.S. aid. This mechanism of providing "security supporting assistance" is authorized on a limited basis under the 1973 version of the FAA, and can be an important element of the total program of military interchange.

To summarize foreign aid funding briefly, there are three programs for channeling monies appropriated by the Congress into military assistance: grant aid (either directly for military use or for support of the recipient economy so as to permit recipient expenditure for military preparedness); loans of goods or services; and gifts of excess goods

to the recipient. Each program has its own strengths and weaknesses, however they all are bound by restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress. In the case of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange, Congressional restrictions have eliminated this type of funding for military interchange activity for much of the period since World War II.

The third type of funding of military interchange is through appropriations made for the routine operation of the military forces:

Military funding includes all information, goods, services and representation supported through the operating budget of the military services of the donor nation.

The activities of military attaches fall under this funding type.⁴⁰ Since much of the work done by attaches is directly concerned with military interchange in some form or another, their salaries can be considered one of the costs of the military interchange effort, and a cost borne by the military service of the donor nation.

The presence of military personnel or units in a foreign country is a situation with military interchange significance. The U.S. military forces stationed in Germany provide an important component of the U.S. investment in the defense of Europe. In May, 1973, President Nixon observed that:

The conditions of this decade require the United States to maintain substantial forces in Europe. . . . In light of the present strategic balance and of similar efforts by our allies, we will

⁴⁰Under current practices, all military personnel assigned to attache duties are paid from the same appropriation for military pay and allowances as all other military personnel. Civilian employees in attache offices are paid with funds provided from State Department and Defense Department operating and maintenance budgets on an equal share basis.

not only maintain but improve our forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by our adversaries.⁴¹

The U.S. troops in Europe comprise a major component of American foreign policy in that area. Therefore, they are an important form of military interchange, and have a large role to play in the development of positive relations between the United States and the host nation. This is a type of military support for U.S. foreign policy that is funded by the military budget.

SUMMARY

With the definition of the elements on each axis of the matrix, the variety of military interchange means can now be represented schematically. Figure 2.5 shows the types of military interchange product, function and funding.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX COMPLETE




Figure 2.5

⁴¹Richard M. Nixon, Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress (3 May 1973), p. 84.

As discussed earlier, this matrix has been developed to serve two related functions: to assist in understanding the relationship between the diverse forms of military interchange between the United States and a recipient nation in the past; and to project (but not predict) the potential for military interchange in future U.S. international relations. The discussion in the three chapters immediately following addresses the first task. The scenarios in Chapter VI and Appendix II are designed to address the second.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH SLAVS:

DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS

From a rather theoretical discussion of the potential role of military interchange in the foreign relations of the United States, the discussion now turns to the review of a specific example of this role. Instances of U.S. military contact with the Yugoslavs have been reported from time to time in the press. The importance of Allied support to Yugoslav guerrillas who were fighting German forces during World War II is noted by historians. In order to review instances of military interchange since World War II in more detail and place them in the framework of possible uses of military resources to support foreign relations, a review of the development of U.S.-Yugoslav relations is necessary.

Military interchange between the United States and Yugoslavia since 1945 has been strongly influenced by past Yugoslav-American contacts. This discussion of recent Yugoslav history is not designed to be a detailed review of the history of the Balkan region, or a full survey of Yugoslav-American relations since the formation of a Yugoslav Kingdom following World War I.¹ Such a detailed review is beyond the scope of this study. A brief review will serve to highlight the factors

¹Three useful studies of the overall development of the Yugoslav state are: Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962); and U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-99, Area Handbook for Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971) (hereafter referred to as DA Pam 550-99).

in the cultural and political history of the South Slavs that affected relations with the United States in general, and the military's role in those relations in particular.

The Balkan peninsula, with Yugoslavia at its center, has a long history of diversity and dissension. The land itself contributes to this history: Yugoslavia contains a number of different geographic regions. The fertile basin of the Danube is separated from the Dalmatian coast by jumbled, rugged mountains which themselves form several distinct regions. The steep peaks and narrow valleys between them have served to isolate the people of one region from those of the others. This geographic phenomenon has supported the political fragmentation and parochialism that has hampered efforts to unify the peninsula, and has made the term "Balkanize" a part of the common vocabulary of politics.² The peoples who have settled in this region have come from different backgrounds, at different times throughout history. They have tended to preserve their differences rather than blending into a single amalgamated culture. This has resulted in a cultural diversity within Yugoslavia, which is one of the major internal factors affecting Yugoslav participation in international relations.

YUGOSLAV DIVERSITY

Yugoslavia is so diverse as to challenge brief description. To illustrate the variety with which the United States must deal in relations with this small state, it can be said that Yugoslavia has:

²Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 11.

- 7 Neighbors,
- 6 Republics,
- 5 Indigenous Nationalities,
- 4 Religious or Ethical Systems,
- 3 Official Languages,
- 2 Alphabets, and
- 1 Unifying Political Leader--Tito.

Although this series of characteristics is too orderly to fit exactly, it does form a useful outline for discussing the basic nature of the Yugoslav state.

Seven Neighbors. In addition to its more than 1200 miles of coastline on the Adriatic Sea, Yugoslavia is bounded by Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. In the northwest, the Italian border has long been a source of contention. The dispute with Italy over the Fiume (Rijeka) area was never settled to Yugoslav satisfaction after World War I. The Rapallo Treaty of 1920 halted open fighting between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but the issue was only dormant, not dead.³ Frustration over this border flared again after World War II in the dispute over Trieste, which took nearly ten years to reach a settlement.⁴ Yugoslavia has also carried on territorial disputes of longstanding with her other neighbors, not always openly hostile, but always present as an undercurrent to other international relationships.⁵

³R. L. Wolff discusses the struggle between the forces of King Alexander and the government in Rome both before and after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 4 December 1918. See Wolff, op. cit., p. 98.

⁴For a discussion of the Trieste dispute, see Ibid., pp. 417-23.

⁵Wolff describes Yugoslav disputes over Transylvania (with Romania), Macedonia (with Bulgaria and Greece), Kossovo (with Albania), Istria (with Italy), Carinthia (with Austria) and Vojvodina (with Hungary). See Ibid., pp. 143-56.

Six Republics. The Yugoslav Constituent Republics, along with two other administrative areas, are the major political subdivisions of the state.⁶ They have a high degree of political autonomy, which permits variety among provinces in dealing with the cultural and ethnic variety without unacceptable domination by one region, or one nationality group. The progress toward recognition of the South (or Yugo) Slavs as a separate ethnic group has been hampered from the outset by fears that one nationality would dominate the coalition, and force other groups to lose their own identities. This has fed the parochialism created by the geography, and created problems for each government since 1918. The theoretically autonomous republics are designed to eliminate the traditional threat of Serbian domination over the smaller minorities. The system of republics was proposed by Tito in late 1944, and came into effect with the promulgation of the postwar constitution on 30 January 1946.⁷ Because the republics are established along lines of traditional ethnic division, and each republic shows the distinct character of its separate ethnic background, they demonstrate the fact that Yugoslav internal cohesion is still a serious and delicate problem for the Belgrade government.

Five Nationalities. At the heart of the current federalist structure of the Yugoslav government is the problem of the five nationalities: Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin. Each of

⁶The Autonomous Province of the Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kossovo-Metohija, the remaining administrative areas, have long been under dispute between Yugoslavia and her southern neighbors.

⁷See Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 82-83, for a discussion of federalism in postwar Yugoslavia.

these peoples has a different cultural heritage and a different history of relations with the governments that have ruled in the Balkan peninsula. The Serbs are the largest of the officially recognized national groups. Most Serbs live in the eastern plains, in the province of Serbia, along the Morava River, and through the mountainous region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have been the largest political influence since the founding of a separate Yugoslav state, however, there has been intense rivalry and strife among all of the cultural factions and nationalities within the country. The Serbs are a slavic people, descendants of early tribes who came to the lowlands of present-day Yugoslavia in the sixth century.⁸ They came from the Carpathian Mountains, southwest of present-day Soviet borders, migrated through the Pannonian Basin, and settled the valleys and tributaries of the Sava River in the north, and the mountainous regions of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina to the south.⁹ Religious and political pressures from east and west were focused on the Serbs, causing some to move away from the Orthodox faith, but in the main, Serbian culture has persevered.¹⁰ Twice, in the tenth and fourteenth centuries, the Serbs had a major impact on the development of Russian Orthodoxy.¹¹ In short, the Serbs have a long, proud heritage that permits them to see themselves as the natural leaders in any Balkan multinational

⁸Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 27.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Wolff, op. cit., p. 39.

¹¹James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 56.

federation, and this has been cause for concern for many of the other national groups in Yugoslavia.

The Croats, who have the same ethnic origins as the Serbs, are separated primarily by religion. The Croats were generally located farther north and west than the Serbs, and came more heavily under German influence. They were absorbed into the Kingdom of Hungary in 1102 as a separate province with special rights and a privileged nobility. The ancient line dividing East from West in Europe ran through the Serbo-Croatian people. The Croats became Roman Catholic and adopted the Roman alphabet, while the Serbs became Orthodox and adopted Cyrillic.¹² These two groups comprise the bulk of the Yugoslav people, but other national groups are active, important parts of the political climate.

The Slovenes, with a distinct language, are concentrated in the northwestern areas of the country, in the region under contest between Yugoslavia, Italy and Austria. They have been under Teutonic domination, first Frankish then Hapsburg, since the eighth century. This cosmopolitan European influence made the Slovenes, as Wolff comments, ". . . certainly the most literate and well read of the South Slavs . . ." by the end of World War II.¹³ Perhaps also as a result of this long Germanic influence, the Slovenes are the least turbulent of the South Slav peoples.

The Macedonians, also a Slavic people, live in a region divided between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. Since 1945, when the Republic

¹²Wolff, op. cit., p. 39.

¹³Ibid.

of Macedonia was organized within Yugoslavia, Macedonians living there have been encouraged by the Yugoslav government to preserve their distinctive language and traditions.¹⁴ Most Yugoslav Macedonians live in the Republic of Macedonia, which is nearly surrounded by Albania, Greece and Bulgaria, and has been the location of considerable separatist activity in the recent past.

The Montenegrins take their name from the Black Mountain region to whence they fled in order to escape Turkish domination after the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. They are generally considered to be the most volatile, violent people of Yugoslavia. Of the South Slavs, the Montenegrins alone have never been subjected to foreign domination. They are a proud people, whose pride has been known to overpower their prudence. Hoffman and Neal describe the attack by Milovan Djilas, a well known Montenegrin and wartime assistant to Tito, and close associate of Tito, against the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1953, as an example of this fierce emotion-charged pride:

Whether or not he had word of Tito's disapproval, Djilas realized that he had overstepped the bounds. He could have easily stopped the Nova Misao article [a bitter and violent attack on the top level of the LCY] from appearing, but he did not. He was then in that wild sort of Montenegrin mood which scorns prudence. He deliberately sought a showdown that he almost certainly knew was likely to ruin him.¹⁵

The Albanians, who are nearly as numerous in Yugoslavia as the Macedonians, are considered by many to be a separate major nationality. Albanian communities are concentrated in the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija, bordering on Albania. Most of these people of Albanian origin

¹⁴Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 190.

are Muslim, which is a further source of alienation from many of the Catholic and Orthodox traditions of other Yugoslav nationalities.¹⁶ In addition to the Albanians, Yugoslavia contains a number of other minority groups. In 1970, 11.6 percent of the total population did not belong to one of the five major national groups.¹⁷ Throughout the country there are small groups of Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Gypsies, Bulgars, Germans, Rumanians, Vlachs, Ruthenians, Italians, Czechs, Russians and Jews as well as the Albanians mentioned above. This ethnic diversity is part of the Yugoslav heritage, and part of the environment in which U.S.-Yugoslav relations must take place.

Four Religious or Ethical Systems. The nationalities issue is closely tied to the diversity of major beliefs in Yugoslavia. The four major conflicting systems, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim and atheist, reflect the struggles for control of the area that have continued since the arrival of Byzantine Orthodoxy from Constantinople in the ninth century. Under an Orthodox ruler, Stephen Dusan, the Serbs rose to a position of power in the Balkans in the fourteenth century, threatening the overthrow of Constantinople before his death in 1355.¹⁸ Following the death of Stephen, the Turks moved northwest into the Balkans, crushing the Serbs at Kosovo, and forcing their Muslim beliefs on many in the area. This conflict was added to the longstanding split between Catholic Slavs under the influence of Hungary (the Croats) and the Orthodox (Serb) Slavs under the Serbian Empire of Dusan. In

¹⁶Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁷DA Pam 550-99, p. 76.

¹⁸Wolff, op. cit., p. 54.

modern Yugoslavia, being a Serb is nearly synonymous to being Orthodox, while nearly all Croats are Roman Catholic.

The Muslim community began in the fourteenth century with the arrival of the Ottoman Turks. Although both Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity had been firmly rooted among the Serbs and Croats, the people living in Bosnia came under Turkish rule by the mid-fifteenth century, and converted to Islam.¹⁹ Today, Yugoslav Muslims are especially conservative in the religious practices which they observe. They continue to practice customs adopted from the Turks in the fifteenth century, although many of them now also participate in Christian holidays.²⁰

Since 1945, the Communist Party has made efforts to eliminate the political power and influence of the churches. Church property was nationalized at the end of World War II, and churches made subject to taxation. Many religious leaders were lost during the war, and several powerful figures were tried for war crimes by the new Communist led government. When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, and Tito began to seek stronger ties with the West, this pressure diminished.²¹ Now, the state considers all citizens equal under the law, regardless of religious beliefs. The LCY (Communist Party) does not forbid members to have a religious affiliation, and in 1966 Yugoslavia was the second Communist led state (after Cuba) to establish formal relations with the Holy See.²² The government tolerates, but does not accept, the church.

¹⁹DA Pam 550-99, pp. 202-203.

²⁰Ibid., p. 213.

²¹Ibid., pp. 214-15.

²²Ibid., pp. 218-19.

As a result, Yugoslav churches have been stripped of their former importance in the areas of education, marriage, divorce and the maintenance of officially accepted records, such as birth and death certificates. This has had its effect, particularly on the younger, urban population, where government surveys prior to 1971 report that less than 25 percent profess a belief in God.²³

The long traditions of the three religious systems, the tenacity of their beliefs, the tolerance shown by the government for the continuance of organized religion, and the comparative success of atheistic beliefs in the cities, all reflect a conflicting pattern of an old culture with attitudes undergoing slow changes. This impression is accurate, and presages the kind of conflicts that the state is undergoing in cultural, social and economic areas as well.

Three Languages. The languages of Yugoslavia, like the religious differences, reflect the legacy of successive domination by foreign powers. The state has three official languages, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian. In addition, more than a dozen minority languages are spoken.²⁴ Serbo-Croatian is the most common language, spoken by some 74 percent of the people.²⁵ Language differences provide a constant reminder of the more general differences between people, and the survival of language differences in Yugoslavia can be seen as an indication of the deep seated diversity of the peoples.

²³Ibid., pp. 219-20.

²⁴Of these, only Albanian, Hungarian and Turkish are spoken by more than 1 percent of the population. See DA Pam 550-99, p. 90.

²⁵Ibid.

Two Alphabets. Although a majority of Yugoslavs speak Serbo-Croatian as their primary language and nearly all understand it to some degree, this language is written in two different alphabets. The Serbs, with their Orthodox traditions, write in cyrillic; the Croats use the Roman alphabet. Although this difference is easily overcome since transcription is simple and direct, the two alphabets survive as another bit of evidence of the separation between Serb and Croat which exists as a carefully bridged rift between the two major Yugoslav subcultures.

One Tito. The final element of this survey of Yugoslav diversity, which stands alone in its importance and influence on U.S.-Yugoslav relations is the personality and reputation of the leader of the Yugoslav people, Josip Broz (Tito). Although he is a Croat, Josip Broz has led the government of Yugoslavia since the end of World War II, and become a symbol of the unification of the diverse elements of Yugoslavia into a single nation. The son of a peasant landowner, he came in contact with the Communist Party while interred as a prisoner of war in Russia during World War I.²⁶ He returned to his native land after six years in Russia, and in September, 1920, began his service in the newly formed Yugoslav Communist Party.²⁷ He was soon active in the early efforts of the party, leading strikes for higher wages, working at first within the political structure of the kingdom until the party was outlawed in 1923 by King Alexander, then continuing as an underground

²⁶Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 39. This is the English version of the official biography of Tito, by a longtime associate.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 47-53.

activist. By the time he assumed control of the anti-German, Communist led Partisan guerrilla movement during World War II, Tito had a full career as a Communist leader already behind him. His strong adherence to Communist theory, which he had learned during his youth as a craftsman and trade union activist, tempered by the independence required of Communist leaders in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, resulted in a unique interpretation of the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism. Titoism, as this Yugoslav version has come to be called, has several factors which form an important part of Tito's contribution to the Yugoslav system: market socialism, or the ownership and management of the means of production by the workers rather than the state; non-alignment in international relations; all-peoples' defense, based on the concept of Partisan-style warfare in the rugged interior to deter any invader; and a federal government based on regional administrative autonomy and centralized party strength.

These elements, in the brief form presented here, are not fully descriptive of the long, divided, often violent history of the Yugoslav people. However, they do illustrate the diversity of the Yugoslav people, their independence of spirit, and commitment to the leadership of Tito. These factors have influenced the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, and established the environment for the development of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange.

EARLY U.S.-YUGOSLAV MILITARY CONTACT:

INTERCHANGE AND ASSISTANCE

Although King Alexander of Serbia had proclaimed the South Slav (or Yugoslav) ideal in 1916, two years of extensive negotiation were

required to develop enough unity among the still antagonistic Balkan nationalities to establish an independent state. A Yugoslav commission visited the United States during this period, in January, 1918. Dr. M. R. Vesnic, head of the commission, accompanied by General Racic of the Serbian army, addressed the U.S. Senate, conveying the thanks of the Serbian people for American support during the war.²⁸ During their stay the commission visited the U.S. Military Academy. This visit to West Point is one of the earliest instance of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. Although details of the visit were not available for this study, it was at the very least a representational encounter between U.S. and Serbian military officers, designed to foster good will and build positive relationships between the two states. Thus, no matter what was discussed, the U.S. Army was involved here in a measure of military interchange in support of the foreign policies of the United States.

Later in the year, the U.S. provided financial credit to the Serbians. Three million dollars was provided for Serbian purchases of foodstuffs and war materiel, as part of an overall credit program for the Allies of the United States.²⁹ As with the earlier visit, the details of the war materiel purchased are not available, but even without knowing what was purchased, this incident is an example of military interchange involving some type of military goods, funded by the U.S. Congress.

²⁸The New York Times, 6 January 1918, p. 3.

²⁹Ibid., 31 July 1918, p. 4.

Although not as clearly an example of military interchange, the role of the U.S. in the move for Yugoslav independence was an important factor in shaping the later relationships between these countries. Toward the end of 1918, pressure mounted in the Balkans, as Austria, Italy and representatives of the yet unborn state of the South Slavs vied for control over northern Croatia. Dedijer, in his biography of Tito, conveys the intense desire of the Croatian peasants for freedom and union with the South Slavs.³⁰ In an act which directly benefited the Yugoslav people, President Wilson of the U.S. refused, on 20 October, to accept the Austro-Hungarian offer of peace with "autonomy" for the Czechs and Yugoslavs, because it did not guarantee them the true independence which they desired.³¹ This stand for Yugoslav independence was greeted with great enthusiasm by the Serbs, many of whom saw it as U.S. support for an independent Serbian state. The Croats were also encouraged. It was reported that:

Scenes of indescribable enthusiasm occurred at Agram (Zagreb), capital of Croatia-Slavonia, when President Wilson's reply to Austria was made public. Immediately the whole city, which is the Slav headquarters, was beflagged, and the delighted citizens paraded the streets, venting their joy.³²

Unfortunately, the friction among South Slav nationalities was not to be easily overcome, and the President's actions, while contributing to the independence of Yugoslavia, also became a political weapon for Serbian leaders in the internal struggle for dominance. The Croats, faced with the prospect of an independent state dominated by the Serbs, reacted differently. A Croatian regiment in Zagorje (to which Tito had belonged

³⁰Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

³¹The New York Times, 20 October 1918, p. 15.

³²Ibid., 28 October 1918, p. 2.

at the outbreak of the war) started a mutinous riot that finally resulted in 300 deaths in Zagabria, and 400 more in Fiume (Rijaka), on the Italian border.³³ In the land of the South Slavs, then as now, political tempers are as high as national differences are deep, and a simple act of foreign policy operations, such as was President Wilson's demand, often has complex and unpredictable results.

During the interwar period, several other events took place which also reveal the nature of early U.S.-Yugoslav relations. In the summer of 1919 a steady flow of Yugoslav emigres, who had come to the U.S. between 1910 and 1912, began to return to the Balkans.³⁴ Many of these individuals had come from the mountainous, underdeveloped central region of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and were returning to take up jobs made available by the war. At about the same time, a group of American citizens of Yugoslav birth returned to the U.S. from military duty in the Serbian army during the war. These individuals, naturalized Americans fighting for Yugoslav nationalism against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had not acted as official representatives of the United States, but had been identified as Americans fighting for Yugoslav independence. Although not common, particularly under the circumstances that obtain today, this military service was a form of "recipient funded operational service," one of the categories of military interchange.

³³The riots were reported in The New York Times on 29 October 1918, p. 2. The identity of the Croatian regiment is found in Dedijs, op. cit., p. 44.

³⁴The New York Times reported on 24 August 1919 that the flow had reached a rate of 2000 individuals per month. See Section VII, p. 14.

By December, 1918, the new state had come to be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in an effort to build support among the non-Serb peoples. The country's population was small, and occupied a relatively weak position in comparison with the rest of the more developed world. Although more united than before, the nation was still largely at the mercy of external events over which it had no control. Robert Lee Wolff identifies, in this regard, the beginning of the depression in the United States, consolidation of Communism in Russia and the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany as major influences on the development of Yugoslavia during this period.³⁵ The depression in the United States was forcing the attention of the nation inward in a return to the isolationism that had characterized U.S. foreign policy prior to the Great War. This retrenchment effectively stopped military interchange as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, and restored the supremacy of "avoiding entangling alliances" as a cornerstone of U.S. international relations. This isolationist attitude was not completely set aside again until the attack on Pearl Harbor rendered it obsolete.

During this same period, Communist power in Russia was being consolidated under the personal control of Joseph Stalin. The Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) looked to Moscow for strength and guidance. Dedijs describes Tito's leadership in the regional party in Zagreb during this period and his direct appeal, in 1928, over the heads of his Yugoslav Party superiors for assistance in ridding the Party of factionalism.³⁶ For his efforts, Tito won the recognition of the

³⁵Wolff, op. cit., p. 120.

³⁶Dedijs, op. cit., pp. 64-77. See also Adam Ulam, Titism and the Cominform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 14.

Bolshevik leadership in Moscow, and emerged under his party name "Walter" as a leader in the Yugoslav Party from this time forward. In 1937 Tito, by now a loyal Stalinist, became the Secretary General of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and moved into a position of national importance.³⁷

The rise of Fascism as an ideological focus for German and Italian dreams of expansion was a final threat to the young Yugoslav state. The geography of the Balkans placed the new state in the direct path of German expansion into the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Italian irredentist claims for the territories at the head of the Adriatic, which had been allocated to Yugoslavia by the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo, was all the more cause for Axis designs on Yugoslavia.

As World War II approached, the situation in Yugoslavia was not hopeful. Wolff catches the complexity of the times in the following passage:

Yugoslavia thus reached the moment when a new World War was about to break out, with its two most important nationalities substantially unreconciled, and civil liberties denied to all its population, as they had been for a decade. Its government did not command the loyalty of a substantial portion of the public, which looked with undisguised dismay upon the efforts at rapprochement with Germany and Italy. Underground, the Ustashi were waiting their chance. So were the Communists, their ranks swollen by many who cared nothing for Marxism and knew less about it, but hated oppression and wanted liberty. Their leadership was in the hands of a skillful group of doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist-Stalinists, who had studied war and revolution with Comrade Walter, soon to emerge in his incarnation as Tito.³⁸

³⁷ Adam Ulam describes Tito as an excellent choice for this job: "He was not an intellectual . . . of peasant and working class origins . . . not likely to bother with problems of ideology . . . enamoured of action . . . blindly loyal to his supervisors in Moscow." Ulam, op. cit., p. 21.

³⁸ Wolff, op. cit., p. 126. The Ustashi were Croatian nationalists with extreme anti-Serb views based largely on the religious friction between Croats and Serbs. Early in World War II they began collaborating with the Axis powers.

World War II in the Balkans began on the morning of 6 April 1941, with an aerial bombardment of Belgrade by the German Luftwaffe. On the 25th of March, Prince Paul, primary regent for the still underage King Peter, had acceded to mounting German pressure, and signed the Axis Tripartite Pact, trading Yugoslav loyalty for German assurances of territorial integrity (and the prospect of personal glory for Paul as the future King of Yugoslavia or even Russia).³⁹ Enraged, a group of Serbian army officers staged a coup d'etat, arrested Prince Paul, and placed Peter on the throne, even though he was six months from the legal age of eighteen.

This Yugoslav resistance interrupted Hitler's plans, and on the 6th of April he announced that his invasion of the Balkans had begun. The Yugoslav army, internally divided and concerned with the change of government to King Peter, was not prepared to oppose the German blitzkrieg which followed. Hitler justified his action against this ally of twelve days as necessary to crush the forces which had placed King Peter on the throne, forces which he characterized as ". . . criminal usurpers of the new Belgrade government who took the power of the state unto themselves, which is a result of being in the pay of Churchill and Britain."⁴⁰

An additional factor which may have strengthened Hitler's resolve, but was unlikely to have influenced his decision to invade, was the establishment of formal relations between Yugoslavia and the

³⁹Wolff describes this long period of pressure, and the popular antagonism which was generated by Paul's move. See Wolff, op. cit., p. 139.

⁴⁰Hitler's announcement quoted in The New York Times, 6 April 1941.

Soviet Union, and the treaty of friendship that marked the occasion. This treaty, in which the U.S.S.R. pledged to guarantee the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, was signed in Belgrade on the day of the German invasion, after the attack had been announced in Berlin, but before German bombs began to fall in the Yugoslav capital.⁴¹

At this point, early in April of 1941, the history of Yugoslav movement toward independence and the early course of Yugoslav-American relations suggest several factors that are likely to have a significant effect on military interchange between the two countries. First, Yugoslav national diversity and independence of spirit had led to the development of a proud, stubborn people who have a strong desire for independence but have great difficulty working together to achieve it. Second, by 1941, Josip Broz, the loyal disciple of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, had risen to a position of power in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, from which he would be able to influence the course of wartime events in the Balkans. Third, the chaos of Yugoslav politics, culminating in the arrest of Prince Paul and the installation of seventeen year old Peter as King, had fractured the internal government of Yugoslavia so deeply as to threaten that government's ability to control the affairs of the state, or of the people once the state has capitulated to Germany. Fourth, Yugoslav disunity was such that a cohesive, unified underground resistance was impossible. Fifth, there is a tradition of humanitarian concern in the United States for the people of Yugoslavia, which had been expressed in assistance following the first World War. Sixth,

⁴¹The pact is discussed by Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 200. See also The New York Times of 6 and 7 April 1941 for the chronology of these events.

U.S.-Yugoslav contact had been strengthened by a steady migration of Yugoslavs to the United States, and the return of many of these people to Yugoslavia to fight in the war or repopulate the area once the war was over. Finally, there was a strong American isolationist movement, centered in the U.S. Senate, that sought to keep the United States from becoming involved in the war in Europe. By the beginning of German hostilities against Yugoslavia the strength of this movement had begun to wane, but American aid was not forthcoming to the Yugoslavs during the critical days of their stand against the Germans, and this has had an important effect on the later development of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange.

WARTIME MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Yugoslavia had been attacked, and was fast being overrun by the German blitzkrieg. In the United States there was still debate over the Senate imposed embargo on arms shipments to belligerents. During the month of April, for example, a group of Senate isolationists, led by Charles Tobey (Rep., N.H.) fought to pass a resolution forbidding the conveying of ships, which they regarded as an act of war.⁴² The isolationists were by this time in a minority in the Senate, and Senator Tobey's measure was kept in the Foreign Relations Committee, while debate on the Senate floor turned again to the question of lend-lease, the basic vehicle of military assistance during World War II. During

⁴²Marjory Z. Bankson, The Isolationism of Senator Charles W. Tobey (Unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Alaska, May 1971), pp. 138-41. According to the isolationists, forming U.S. ships into convoys, with U.S. Navy escort to protect against German submarine attack would be perceived by the Germans as a belligerent act, which was likely to precipitate American involvement in what they considered to be a European problem.

this debate, the Administration was moving to gather assistance for the Yugoslav people. On the day after the German attack, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pledged American support:

This government, with its policy of helping those who are defending themselves against would-be conquerors, is now proceeding as speedily as possible to send military and other supplies to Yugoslavia.⁴³

At the same time, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Fotic was in London conferring with British and American officials in order to arrange for transportation of necessary supplies to Yugoslavia. Although the United States was preparing to send goods to help the beleaguered Yugoslavs, there was still a Senate restriction on the use of American ships in the hostile waters near Yugoslavia. On the 8th of April, The New York Times reported that, among other supplies, ". . . munitions, including 75mm field guns, machineguns, bombs, ammunition and other supplies are being assembled, and will be shipped in Yugoslav vessels within the week." Ten ambulances were also reported to be among the supplies.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, these supplies did not arrive in time to help the Yugoslav government hold off the German attack. By the 18th of April, 1941, Yugoslav forces had been rolled up by the Germans and the fledgling government of King Peter had fled the country. Wolff comments that the army had been hampered in its defensive effort by poor dispositions, sabotage within the organization, bad equipment and inferior communications.⁴⁵ With these basic disabilities, American military assistance would have done little to help, even if it had arrived in time.

⁴³The New York Times, 7 April 1941, p. 1.

⁴⁴Ibid., 8 April 1941, p. 3.

⁴⁵Wolff, op. cit., p. 201.

Once the German assault was complete, Hitler divided Yugoslav territory into two puppet states loyal to the Reich, and other smaller territories that were given to Germany's allies in the Balkans. The attack had been so swift that many Yugoslav units had not been fully mobilized and committed. Some of these units avoided capture, and moved into the rugged hills of central Yugoslavia. Here they were joined by individual survivors from other military units, and other Yugoslavs retreating before the German advance.

In the hills, traditional Yugoslav opposition to foreign domination began to manifest itself in resistance groups. By mid 1941 two major groups were forming. The Serbian Cetnici (Chetniks), who took their name from Serbian guerrillas of previous eras, were led by Colonel Draza Mihailovic.⁴⁶ The other group was led by Josip Broz, who built his group, known as the Partisans, around the national structure of the underground Communist Party.

Mihailovic, who had led the uprising that placed King Peter on the throne, was the ranking guerrilla, and a member of the Royal Army. He was appointed Minister of Defense by King Peter, which gave him initial legitimacy with the Allies.

During the war, the uneasy coalition which had been the basis for Yugoslav national unity broke up. Old territorial issues and political conflicts were rekindled, and a bloody civil war broke out between the Partisans and the Chetniks. The Chetniks had initial international popularity, helped by Mihailovic's position in the cabinet of exiled King Peter, memories of the 1941 Serbian revolt that had put

⁴⁶The name "Cetnici" is derived from the Serbian word "ceta" or guerrilla band.

the king on the throne, and a favorable press in the Allied nations, fed by Serbian emigre groups. However, their attention was split between opposing the German invaders and insuring a favorable position in any postwar government of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic, conscious of the German practice of retaliating against the civilian populace for actions by guerrilla forces, chose a cautious approach. He avoided doing battle with the Germans, and conserved his strength, waiting for the arrival of an Allied rescue force which had not been promised, and was not planned.⁴⁷ His organization was decentralized: Mihailovic often had little personal contact with his subordinates.⁴⁸ There were many reports of Chetnik forces collaborating with the Germans, which cost the movement much support among the Yugoslav people, as well as with the Allies later in the war.⁴⁹

Although they did initially not have official liaison or support from any of the Allies, the Partisans organized under Tito's leadership and began an active campaign of sabotage and guerrilla operations. This program was more in keeping with the volatile, South Slavic temperament, and the Partisans were surprisingly successful in spite of their lack of outside help and internal struggles with the

⁴⁷Wolff, op. cit., p. 207.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Major Linn Farish, a U.S. Army OSS observer with the Partisans during the summer of 1943 reports that the Partisans had extensive evidence of Chetnik collaboration with the Germans and Italians. See his report to Major Louis Huot, OSS, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers--The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 605-15. (Hereafter referred to as Teheran Papers.)

Chetniks. The diversity, internal political chaos, traditions of guerrilla activity and personal power of Tito, which were evident before the war, continued to shape the relationship between the U.S. and Yugoslav representatives during the war years. The following examples of wartime military interchange illustrate the role of the military in this relationship.

The King's Bomb. In March, 1942, King Peter, then in exile in London, purchased a 500 pound bomb from the British as a symbol of the commitment of the exile government to rid Yugoslavia of German occupation.⁵⁰ The King pledged that this bomb would be dropped on Germany during an Allied air raid on the anniversary of the first German attack on Belgrade.⁵¹ This single bomb may have had little if any tactical significance, in light of the German strength at the time or the magnitude of Allied air operations. It did, however, have the potential for some psychological value for King Peter, in encouraging emigres. The King's bomb was an example of two types of military interchange in one act: transfer of operational goods funded by the recipient (who bought the bomb); and an operational service funded by the donor (who delivered it to Germany).

Yugoslav Military Missions to the U.S. Both Mihailovic and Tito used military liaison with the United States as a psychological weapon. While the King was making his bomb gesture in London, a military mission from the Royal Yugoslav Government, headed by a Colonel Savic, arrived

⁵⁰The New York Times, 22 March 1942, p. 32.

⁵¹Plans for delivery of the bomb were reported in The New York Times, 1 April 1942.

in the United States to seek lend-lease aid for the Chetnik forces. He addressed the Allied High Command in Washington, requesting that military supplies be delivered to the underground forces by parachute drop or by submarine rendezvous with Chetnik bands along the Dalmatian Coast. His request also included the suggestion that Chetnik activity be coordinated with Allied operations. Colonel Savic stressed the importance of Yugoslav guerrillas as the ". . . only island of resistance in Europe . . ." and noted their strategic location on the right flank of any German drive toward India and a possible linkup with the Japanese.⁵²

By the end of April, 1942, American lend-lease negotiations with the forces of General Mihailovic were reported to be in progress.⁵³ By June the arrangements were complete, and on the same day (13 June) that the lend-lease agreement with the U.S.S.R. was made public, a U.S. invitation to the Royal Yugoslav Government to sign the United Nations Lend-Lease Pact was also announced.⁵⁴ Formal action on the agreement was taken by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mincic and U.S. Secretary of State Hull at the conclusion of a visit to the U.S. by King Peter. This agreement, formalized a military interchange operation involving goods of all functional types, funded by the U.S. on a loan basis. The agreement grew out of the earlier representational interchange of the initial military mission. Although little actual materiel was transferred to the Chetniks under lend-lease, the agreement itself gave the Royal Government some advantage over the Partisans even if the promised materiel was a long time in coming.

⁵²The visit of Colonel Savic was reported in The New York Times, 28 March 1942, p. 8, and 2 April 1942, p. 7.

⁵³Ibid., 28 April 1942, p. 6.

⁵⁴Ibid., 13 June 1942, p. 6.

Later in the war there were other examples of the use of military missions as military interchange instruments. In addition to the major Allied mission which figured prominently in the Tito-Mihailovic struggle (and is described in the next section), the following missions were suggested, or used to implement some aspect of U.S.-Yugoslav policy.

In January, 1943, as the fighting between the Partisan and Chetnik forces became more serious, Yugoslav emigres in London suggested sending an Allied mission to Yugoslavia to bring the two leaders together.⁵⁵ Although the British mission headed by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean (M.P.) was sent less than four months later, it was never successful in this basic reconciliation effort.

With the announcement of the Allied mission to the Partisans headed by Brigadier Maclean, analysts saw British effort shifting from sole support of King Peter to equal support for both sides.⁵⁶ Brigadier Maclean and Major Linn Farish, the only American on the British mission, were in Yugoslavia to coordinate Allied support, but both were also gathering information on the Partisans for their governments. Their reports were instrumental in shaping the positions of the U.S. and British leaders at the conferences in Cairo and Teheran in November and December, 1943, where a policy of Allied support for the Partisans was adopted.

In March, 1944, Mihailovic (by now a General in the Royal Army) sent a mission to London to seek aid for his forces, claiming that he

⁵⁵Ibid., 26 January 1943, p. 3.

⁵⁶C. L. Sulzberger in Ibid., 22 July 1943, p. 5.

had ". . . 30,000 troops waiting for the call from the Allies to clear a path for the invasion. . . ." ⁵⁷ By that time Chetnik forces were avoiding contact with the Germans, and saving their strength to support the Allied invasion that had not yet been promised. General Mihailovic explained that "we figure it is better to make one big offensive than waste our bullets in smaller actions." ⁵⁸ By that time the British had evaluated the information provided by Brigadier Maclean and decided to provide whatever support went into Yugoslavia to the Partisans. General Mihailovic's mission to London accomplished little more than an occasion for emigres loyal to King Peter to raise the issue of their own needs in the British press.

One month later another Chetnik mission was reported in the United States, seeking weapons, medical supplies, shoes, clothing, and food. Although the Americans were still willing to listen, the Allied decision at Teheran the preceding December to concentrate support on the Partisans meant that there was no support for Mihailovic here either. In discussing the visit of the Chetnik mission, The New York Times revealed that Allied aid to the Chetniks during November and December, 1943, (the last two months before the policy changes made at the Teheran conference would have taken effect) had totaled four transport plane loads of supplies, hardly more than a token. ⁵⁹

In May of 1944 Tito countered these Chetnik efforts, sending two missions to the Allies. General Velebit was dispatched to London to

⁵⁷Quoted in Ibid., 26 March 1944, p. 5.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹For more detailed listing of supplies requested by the Chetniks see Ibid., 19 April 1944, p. 5.

seek increased supplies, in addition to the support already being provided by the Allied forces in the Mediterranean.⁶⁰ A difference of perception between Partisan and Allied leaders can be seen at work here. Tito and his staff spoke and wrote throughout this period in terms of getting enough supplies to overcome the German forces occupying Yugoslavia. Theirs was a local mission of freeing their homeland from another in a long series of invaders, and the Allies had the means that would make a Partisan victory possible. Allied failure to provide everything desired by the Partisans was seen as a clear lack of commitment to the interests of the Yugoslav people. On the other hand, the Allies had been committed since the Teheran conference to the support of the Partisans, but this effort could not interfere with the Allied invasion of France, Operation OVERLORD. The buildup for the invasion at Normandy required everything that could be spared from every other theater of the war. However, the Balkans could not be forgotten. Through the discussions among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin the previous winter there had run the thread of an argument that the Partisan resistance in Yugoslavia was keeping as many as forty Axis divisions occupied, divisions that could prove fatal to the invasion if they were free to move northwest into France.⁶¹ From the Allied perspective, Tito must be supported, but only with the minimum essential supplies required to keep him in the field. At the strategic level, the Allies saw Yugoslavia as an economy of force operation to tie down German forces in the Balkans with minimum forces and permit

⁶⁰Ibid., 2 May 1944, p. 3.

⁶¹See the Teheran Papers, especially minutes from the Second Plenary meeting, on 29 November 1943, p. 543.

the application of Allied mass in the invasion. A clear Yugoslav perception of this might, however, destroy the effectiveness of the impending operation and result in the defeat of both the Yugoslav resistance and Operation OVERLORD.

The second Partisan military mission of May, 1944, was the trip by General Terzic and Milovan Djilas to Moscow. Djilas describes this historic first mission of the Yugoslav Communists to the "motherland of socialism" in his Conversations With Stalin as a special project, different in character from the mission sent to the British:

Superficially it resembled the mission that had been sent to the British, but in composition and conception it in fact marked an informal nexus with a political leadership of identical views and aims. More simply, the Mission had to have both a military and a Party character.⁶²

The objective of this mission was to arrange for Soviet help for the Partisan armed forces, and to seek Soviet assistance in securing relief for the liberated areas of Yugoslavia from UNRRA, the United Nations Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Administration.⁶³ Much to the disappointment of Djilas, the mission was not immediately received by the Soviet High Command, who were very cautious lest the Communist nature of the Partisan organization frighten the British and Americans. From the vantage of seventeen years of history, Djilas felt that:

. . . Stalin was deliberately frightening the Yugoslav leaders in order to decrease their ties with the West, and at the same time tried to subordinate their policy to his interests and to his relations with the Western states, primarily with Great Britain.⁶⁴

⁶²Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 13.

⁶³Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 82.

Here is an example of both Stalin and Tito using a form of military interchange, the military mission, as an instrument of foreign policy with the United States.

Later in the war, the U.S. military mission to the Chetniks disturbed Tito and his followers. During the reorganization of the Royal Government in 1945 which finally gave Tito a legitimate seat in the government of King Peter, Tito's followers in London complained that the United States continued to provide a mission to Mihailovic, even though Allied policy was to supply all aid to Tito. They also commented that the Tito government hoped for a "normal" mission, rather than one from the OSS.⁶⁵ The OSS mission implied to Tito, and presumably to the rest of the world, that the Partisans were an irregular force being assisted by the Allies, not the legitimate government of Yugoslavia. A normal military mission would have improved the states of the representation provided, although it might have resulted in a less well coordinated assistance program, than the one developed and operated by the OSS.

In April of 1945, the official Yugoslav government, consolidated now with Tito in the dual position of Premier and Minister of Defense, sent a military mission to Paris, to participate with the Allies in the final stages of war planning.⁶⁶ By October of that year this mission had been admitted to the Allied Control Council in Germany, and another indicator of legitimacy and equality had been achieved by the Tito government through the use of military interchange.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Reported in The New York Times, 22 January 1945.

⁶⁶Ibid., 1 April 1945, p. 8.

⁶⁷Ibid., 12 October 1945, p. 9.

Since the forces in Yugoslavia were largely isolated from the rest of the Allies for much of the war, military missions assumed a greater importance than might have otherwise been the case. Defense goods were not available in large quantities until late in the war. The close coordination of plans and information that might have added another dimension to the interchange effort was reduced by the internal struggle between the Partisans and Chetniks, and by the politics of the Western Alliance: the union of Britain and the United States with the U.S.S.R. never extended far beyond military matters necessary to win the war against Germany. Disagreements about how to deal with the U.S.S.R. threatened to drive a wedge between Britain and the U.S. The availability of military interchange resources was limited by the magnitude of the war effort in other areas. Allied willingness to use it was tempered by differences of opinion about the importance of the Balkan theater, and lack of understanding of the internal situation in Yugoslavia.

The Internal Struggle: Tito vs Mihailovic. Although Mihailovic was initially held in great esteem by the Allies, his forces were not as active as those of Tito, nor were they as tightly controlled. Both leaders saw themselves as the primary figure in the Yugoslav resistance movement, and both used various forms of military interchange to further their positions. They sparred internally during the fall and winter of 1941, while the underground movements were being organized. Mihailovic organized his forces into widely dispersed bands, which lay low and began to wait for the Allied invasion. He was a cautious leader, and did not give his followers the action that they expected as Southern Slavs fighting against a foreign invader. Tito, on the other hand, was as

bold as Mihailovic was cautious. He welcomed into his ranks any Yugoslav who was willing to fight the Germans, and continued to take action even when the German reprisals against civilians began to mount. On 28 May 1943, the British sent a military mission to Tito, headed by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, M.P., who was sent out by Prime Minister Churchill to be a "daring Ambassador-leader" to the Partisans.⁶⁸ Until the arrival of the British mission, there was no effective way of getting military information about the partisan movement to the outside world. He took with him special radio equipment that would permit regular communication with the Allied Headquarters in Cairo, and thereby provided an important form of service funded information interchange concerning all types of military functions. As the Allied Command began to get a clearer picture of both sides of the Yugoslav civil war between Mihailovic and Tito, British sympathies began to shift toward the Partisans. Where the mission to the Partisans was initially seen as an effort to consolidate the rival forces into a single guerrilla movement loyal to the government in exile, by the fall of 1943 the balance had begun to swing toward the Partisans.⁶⁹ By November, Sulzberger reported that Tito was receiving more Allied aid than the Mihailovic forces.⁷⁰ A month earlier the first U.S. correspondent to visit the Partisans had reported that he had been treated like royalty during his visit.⁷¹

⁶⁸The date is recorded by Dedijs, op. cit., p. 320. A description of the arrival of the mission by parachute can be found there, as well as in Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: J. Cape, 1950), pp. 293-305.

⁶⁹For an early analysis of the rationale for sending the mission to the Patriots, see C. L. Sulzberger in The New York Times, 22 July 1943, p. 5.

⁷⁰Ibid., 2 November 1943, p. 5.

⁷¹Ibid., 9 October 1943, p. 5.

Like the reports coming from Brigadier Maclean at Partisan headquarters, these first reports from the field stressed the need for arms, ammunition and food to support the guerrilla effort.

At a meeting of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff, held at the first Cairo conference in preparation for the meetings at Teheran in late 1943, General Eisenhower, who was then commanding Allied Forces in the Mediterranean theater, expressed his belief that "all possible equipment should be sent to Tito, since Mihailovic's forces are of relatively little value."⁷² Thus, when Prime Minister Churchill began his strong arguments for support of the Partisans they were not surprising or without support from the Americans.⁷³ Churchill's arguments throughout the series of conferences at Cairo and Teheran crystallized the ideas that had come in the reports of Brigadier Maclean, just as the position of Eisenhower had echoed the observations of Major Farish, the OSS officer in Yugoslavia with the British mission. Here, the information mission to the Partisans became a powerful channel for operational information from Tito to the Allied Commander in Chief.

At the Teheran conference in December, 1943, the Allied Commanders in Chief reached agreement on providing increased support for the underground resistance in Yugoslavia.⁷⁴ Although this news was not made

⁷²Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 26 November 1943, 2:30 P.M., Mena House, in the Teheran Papers, p. 361.

⁷³It is ironic, but Churchill and to a lesser extent Roosevelt, worked throughout the Teheran conference to change Stalin's professed reluctance to give full support to the Partisans. Stalin was being particularly cautious lest the Communist characteristics of the Partisan movement cause the U.S. and Britain to turn away from Tito. See Djilas, op. cit., pp. 72-73

⁷⁴"Military Conclusions of the Teheran Conference," a memorandum initiated by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, in the Teheran Papers, p. 652.

immediately public, it had an immediate effect on support for the Partisans in West. Maclean was called to Cairo to report, and asked to bring a military mission from Tito's headquarters. This increased representation was a strong lever in the Tito-Mihailovic struggle. A second form of the changed support for the Partisans was in the press coverage given to the movement in American papers. Beginning on 19 December, C. L. Sulzberger filed a series of long dispatches about Partisan operations, and the growing disappointment with Chetnik inaction.⁷⁶ During this period, in an effort to strengthen his position, Mihailovic issued an order to all armed resistance forces in Yugoslavia to obey his command, under threat of punishment.⁷⁷ This threat, to punish those who did not join the ranks of the Chetniks, was a weak one: it depended for its ultimate success on the restoration to power of the Royal Government at the end of the war, and by 1943 that was unlikely.

But the prestige of the Chetniks was slipping. After the Teheran conference Churchill met with Maclean, and gave him a personal letter and autographed picture for Tito. Maclean describes the note as follows:

⁷⁵Fitzroy Maclean, Escape to Adventure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), pp. 395-402.

⁷⁶See particularly articles in the editions of 19 and 22 December 1943. The latter article presents an excellent, concise summary of the first two years of the Partisan movement in a most favorable light. From its style and the choice of events described it shows many similarities to early portions of the diary of Vladimir Dedijer. This diary, critical of the Allies in its later sections, was published in Serbian in August, 1945, and in English in 1953 under the title With Tito Through the War: Partisan Diary (London: Alexander Hamilton, 1951).

⁷⁷This decree by the Chetnik leader was quoted in The New York Times, 8 December 1943, p. 11.

The Partisans, Mr. Churchill felt, needed some encouragement in their time of trouble, and he accordingly sat down and wrote a personal letter to Tito, congratulating him on his past achievements and holding out the hope of future help.⁷⁸

On his return to Yugoslavia, Maclean delivered the envelope to Tito, and recorded the effect:

I watched his face closely to see how he liked it, as one watches a child with a new toy. There could be no doubt of the effect. As he broke the seal, and, unfolding the crisp sheets of heavy paper within, saw the address of 10 Downing Street at the top and the Prime Minister's signature at the foot, a broad smile of unaffected delight spread slowly over his face, which became broader still when he found a large signed photograph of Mr. Churchill in a separate envelope.⁷⁹

This note to Tito at a critical time in the history of Yugoslav relations with the Allies is as clear an example of a purely representational interchange as is likely to be found in actual practice. The British did not spend any resources to make this gesture: there was no promise of help, or even recognition for Tito as the formal leader of the Yugoslav resistance. Yet made sincerely and at the critical time, this gesture had a definite uplifting effect on the Partisan movement, and on Yugoslav relations with the Western Allies.

Churchill was no doubt sincere in his admiration for Tito. Maclean describes his cautioning the Prime Minister about the Communist dedication of Tito and his intentions to see Yugoslavia dominated by Communism after the war. Churchill asked: "Do you intend to make Yugoslavia your home after the war?" When Maclean replied in the negative, Churchill continued:

⁷⁸Maclean, Escape to Adventure, p. 413.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 418

Neither do I. And that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up the better. That is for them to decide. What interests us, is, which of them Tito or Mikhailovitch [sic] is doing more harm to the Germans.⁸⁰

Churchill's pragmatism won out over the continued reluctance of American leadership, and by the end of 1943, plans for extensive support of the Partisans were underway. Shortly after the New Year, Captain Randolph Churchill, son of the Prime Minister, was sent to join the British mission to the Partisans, thus adding considerably to the status of the mission. Although prior to the Teheran conference, the United States had allowed her Allies to determine the thrust of Allied relations toward Yugoslavia, the situation changed somewhat in 1944.⁸¹ Where the British ceased all assistance to the Chetniks by early 1944, the U.S. received a military mission from Mihailovic's headquarters in April, 1944, who requested weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, shoes, radio supplies, clothing and food.⁸² Dedijser claimed that the U.S. continued to aid the Chetniks during this period, and in doing so, made an interesting statement about the value of representational military interchange:

However, at that moment when the British withdrew all support from Mihailovic there began an independent policy of the United States toward events in Yugoslavia. Far from stopping further assistance to Draga Mihailovic, they sent him a military mission headed by a colonel.⁸³

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 402-403.

⁸¹Dedijser expresses dismay at this American action, and cites it as the reason for the cancellation of an official visit to the U.S. by a Partisan military mission headed by General Velebit. Dedijser, Tito, pp. 214-15.

⁸²The request by Captain Todorovitch, head of the mission was reported in The New York Times, 19 April 1944, p. 5.

⁸³Dedijser, Tito, p. 515.

Apparently, Vladimir Dedijer is clear in his understanding of the positive support rendered by the presence of a military mission whether or not it arranges for any other kind of aid.

The U.S. government did act publicly on the basis of the Teheran agreement. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated on the 10th of December that:

It is our intention to assist in every possible way the resistance forces [in Yugoslavia] from the point of view of their military effectiveness, without, during the fighting, entering into discussions of political differences.⁸⁴

The rise of Tito to a position of de facto leader of the government in Yugoslavia by late 1943 did create a dilemma for Britain and the U.S. Just before the Teheran conference, Tito denounced King Peter and forbade him to return to Yugoslavia. The U.S. and Britain were forced to decide between the legal, Royalist Government and the effective guerrilla government. Britain moved first, and by September, 1944, had completely stopped dealing with Mihailovic. The U.S. moved more slowly, but did come to a position of full support for Tito after King Peter had reorganized the government to include Tito as the Minister of Defense, and Mihailovic had been rejected by his own king.⁸⁵

By the end of the war, the Partisans were receiving regular air and naval support from the Allies, coordinated by the military missions with major Partisan maneuver units as well as with Tito's

⁸⁴From an official release quoted in The New York Times, 10 December 1943, p. 2.

⁸⁵Colonel Trevor Dupuy, in a history of European Partisan Movements during World War II, implies that this shift was in large measure the result of Communist propaganda in Yugoslavia, London and the U.S., a view contrary to most other students of the period. See Trevor Dupuy, European Resistance Movements (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), pp. 49-61.

headquarters. An American engineer, Major Linn Farish, had spent considerable time with the Partisans giving them his knowledge in the construction of military airfields.⁸⁶ Lend-lease supplies, including individual clothing and equipment from the U.S., Italian equipment captured in North Africa, and extensive theater transfers from the stocks issued to other Allied forces but diverted to Yugoslavia had been delivered by air drop and small boat.⁸⁷

Once the Allied liaison effort to the Partisans was well established, more operational services could be provided. Brigadier Maclean describes how this was done:

Tactical air support on a much larger scale also became possible now that we had officers attached to Partisan formations throughout the country. We had arranged that they should have direct wireless communications with the R.A.F. in Italy, and it became relatively common for Beaufighters, Spitfires or rocket firing Hurricanes to be rushed in the nick of time to the support of some hard-pressed Partisan outpost, or prepare the way for a Partisan attack on a German strong-point.⁸⁸

Several specific incidents were reported in the press at the time, including news of one 24 hour air raid to support Partisan defenses, and a report of tons of supplies provided to the Partisans.⁸⁹

⁸⁶Maclean records the presence of "Slim" Farish as a member of his mission. See Maclean, Escape to Adventure, p. 297.

⁸⁷Categories of lend-lease aid, and amounts shipped directly from the U.S. are enumerated in U.S., War Department, Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II (CONFIDENTIAL), 31 December 1946 (copy in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Classified Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). On the use of air drop and small boats for delivery of supplies, see The New York Times, 1 October 1943, p. 6; 19 December 1943, p. 1.

⁸⁸Maclean, Escape to Adventure, p. 429.

⁸⁹The 24 hour raid assisted the Partisans against the Sixth German offensive, as reported in The New York Times, 18 December 1943, p. 4. The report of supplies was filed by C. L. Sulzberger in The New York Times, 16 December 1943, p. 6. Both of these reports were made public shortly after the Teheran conference, even though some of the incidents had taken place much earlier.

By early 1945, plans for aid to Yugoslavia through UNRRA were being completed.⁹⁰ In Belgrade, Marshall Tito signed the UNRRA agreement with military representatives from the U.S. and Britain.⁹¹ According to the agreement, the U.S. and Britain would deliver supplies to Yugoslavia, and the Communist Yugoslav government would supervise their further distribution. Sulzberger reported that Tito was reluctant to admit the large numbers of administrative personnel that would be required for normal UNRRA activity, although he did allow the entry of 100 observers (40 military individuals) to assist in the program.⁹² This agreement permitted the movement of 7,000 tons of UNRRA goods that were awaiting shipment into Yugoslavia. The UNRRA program was, in many ways, a military interchange effort. It used military resources to organize and administer the supply of necessary goods for the rehabilitation and immediate relief of Allied people whose economy had been destroyed by the war. It was a logical sequel to the lend-lease program, which had involved military planners, supply and transportation experts in support of many of these same areas. This use of immediately trained, available military manpower to support a new policy is one of the basic reasons for the continued use of military interchange as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

Through the succeeding months Tito strengthened his position in the provisional government. In April he announced his plans for the

⁹⁰This was nearly a year after the Djilas mission had made its request to the Soviets for assistance in this matter, but a definite connection between these events could not be established from the available evidence.

⁹¹Details of the signing, and special terms demanded by Tito are in The New York Times, 22 January 1945, p. 5.

⁹²Ibid., 22 January 1945, p. 5.; 23 January 1945, p. 4.

structure of the internal government of postwar Yugoslavia, with six major political units and two autonomous regions.⁹³ This structure was designed to eliminate the divisive nationalism that had been so destructive of earlier Yugoslav attempts to build an effective state. In the elections in November, 1945, Tito received a large mandate, and moved into an official position as Yugoslav Chief of State, a position he has now held for nearly 29 years. His Partisan staff became the nucleus for his new government. The Partisan National Liberation Army, loyal to him throughout the war, provided a base of power for his consolidation of control and transition to a Communist inspired form of government. Tito was in control in Yugoslavia, King Peter had been maneuvered aside, and the opportunity lay ahead for the development of a Communist state as Tito and the Yugoslavs had come to understand that concept. Among the forces that had helped to put him in power was Allied military interchange during World War II.

CONCLUSION

Was the success of the Communist Tito a failure for Allied military interchange during the war? The evidence suggests that the Allies received a fair return for the military resources used to support the Partisans. The U.S. had consistently sought to defer consideration of the internal politics of Yugoslavia until the Germans were defeated. Given the nature of the Yugoslav situation this was impossible, since the Partisan-Chetnik dispute was inseparably linked to the resistance needed by the Allies to hold German forces in the Balkans in place.

⁹³Ibid., 16 April 1945, p. 11.

There may have been some disparity between Allied policies for the short and long terms, but that is not a negative reflection on U.S. military interchange.

The same major themes that dominated the interwar period were influential in U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange during World War II: internal dissension among the Yugoslavs; fierce independence of spirit; Tito's loyalty to Moscow; his rise to a position of increased power through his own personal leadership; and U.S. reluctance to deal with the complexity of the total Balkan issue. Within these general limits, the available instruments of military interchange were employed to pursue U.S. goals in the area: defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. U.S. reluctance to abandon Mihailovic until dropped by his own king seems to have been based on a desire to support the status quo, and a continuing suspicion of the long term goals of the Communist movement and those who embrace it.

These same factors have continued to influence the U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia and the choice of military interchange means employed in support of these policies, as the following discussion of the post-war period hopefully will indicate.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY INTERCHANGE WITH POSTWAR YUGOSLAVIA

Relations between the United States and Yugoslavia during the first twelve years following World War II followed a cyclic course, from dogmatic rejection of the U.S. by the new, Communist led Yugoslav government, through a period of close accommodation of U.S. and Yugoslav interests, to the termination of a formal military assistance agreement in the spring of 1958. This cycle was itself the product of forces operating upon the governments of each of these states. American desires to return to a relatively isolated position in world affairs conflicted with a humanitarian desire to help rebuild the nations which had been devastated by the war. The desire to help rebuild Europe was stronger, resulting in large U.S. contributions to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the massive support that went into the Marshall Plan. Finally, by the mid 1950's, a growing American distrust of the U.S.S.R., who was seen as the leader of a monolithic Communist conspiracy to dominate the world, led to a proliferation of mutual security pacts with states bordering the Soviet bloc.¹ Growing U.S.-Soviet antagonism was also reflected by a hypersensitive domestic concern for eliminating all influences of Communism, real and imagined, within the United States.

¹U.S. assistance to Greece, to thwart an attempted Communist takeover, was perceived by the Yugoslavs as a potential threat to their internal security, since the Greeks were still interested in gaining control of Yugoslav Macedonia.

In Yugoslavia, the forces of the wartime period--Tito's fierce independence of spirit and his ideological trust in the leadership in Moscow--continued to define the broad outlines of Yugoslav foreign policy. Until the Soviet inspired action in 1948 to oust Yugoslavia from the international Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), Yugoslav relations were marked by a dogmatic adherence to the "lines" of the Communist Party as directed from Moscow.² Following the Soviet-Yugoslav split, three distinct periods in Yugoslav relations with the West have been identified: an era of "mutual suspicions, [with] little cooperation with the West," a time of close political and military cooperation with the West, and a Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union in which Yugoslav neutrality became pro-Soviet without becoming anti-Western.³

The interaction of these shifting forces during this period of adjustment and development following the war can be divided into five identifiable phases of military interchange activity. These separate phases, identified in Figure 4.1, will be discussed in turn below. In each phase the type of military interchange activity used will be identified, and related to the broader patterns of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

²The Cominform was established in 1947, in order to ". . . organize the interchange of experience . . . and if need be to coordinate the activities of the Communist Parties on the basis of mutual agreement." Quote from the official organ of the Cominform, For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy in Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 60. For a discussion of the formation of the Cominform, see Ibid., pp. 58-64.

³George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 417.

PHASES OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE, 1946-1958

| | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|
| Jan 46 - Jun 48 | Dogmatic Yugoslav rejection |
| Jun 48 - Mar 51 | Worried rapprochement |
| Mar 51 - May 55 | Active community of interest |
| May 55 - May 57 | Fearful alienation |
| May 57 - Mar 58 | Trial reconciliation |

Figure 4.1

Dogmatic Yugoslav Rejection: January 1946 - June 1958. From the rise of Tito to a position of recognized national power in 1946 until the Soviet action to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform in the summer of 1948, the atmosphere between the U.S. and Yugoslavia was not cooperative. The Yugoslav government was in the process of consolidating its hold over the nation, and was using all the means at its disposal. This included the diversion from planned recipients of U.S. aid provided through the UNRRA, which the U.S. saw as a misuse of aid. The United States was deeply committed to the reconstruction of Europe, and during this period began to make positive action to deal with the growing threat of Communist (read Soviet) expansion into the heart of Europe.

Military affairs and military-to-military contacts with the U.S. and Britain were used by the Yugoslavs as one of many channels to communicate their criticism of Western "democracy" on ideological grounds. These negative contacts are not considered to be within the scope of military interchange as used in this study, since they do not serve to support the development of positive bilateral relations, but they do shed light on the varied roles of military elements--personnel, equipment, organizations and communications means--in the conduct of foreign relations. Examples of this use of military means to express negative relations during this period are too numerous to present in detail.

however, Figure 4.2 does list several instances which were typical of those occurring during the period.

USE OF MILITARY MEANS FOR NEGATIVE INTERCHANGE
Jan 46 - Jun 48

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> |
|-------------|--|
| Apr 46 | U.S. told it must "export" military aviation control equipment installed at Belgrade, used during the war by the U.S. Air Transportation Command to support Partisan forces; implying that all U.S. equipment in Yugoslavia is Yugoslav property. ⁴ |
| Jun 46 | U.S. and British warships anchor in Trieste harbor, sent by Western governments to keep the peace during Italian-Yugoslav dispute over control of the city. ⁵ |
| Jul 46 | Yugoslav government bars U.S. military flights into Yugoslavia: seen in U.S. as political action. ⁶ |
| Aug 46 | Selected U.S. military personnel, dependents and defense civilian employees detained without charges; some charged with espionage. ⁷ |
| Jan 47 | Yugoslav government is reported requesting the withdrawal of all U.S. military attaches, including administrators of UNRRA aid: Yugoslavs charge espionage. ⁸ |
| May 47 | Yugoslav lend-lease settlement negotiations begin, then drag on without progress: talks become another form for denunciation of the West. ⁹ |

Figure 4.2

⁴The history of placement and the attempted recovery of this equipment was discussed in The New York Times, 27 April 1946, p. 2.

⁵Ibid., 28 June 1946, p. 11.

⁶Ibid., 23 July 1946, p. 2.

⁷Ibid., 6 August 1946, p. 14; 24 September 1946, p. 10; 20 November 1946, IV, p. 12.

⁸Ibid., 23 January 1947, p. 13.

⁹Ibid., 17 May 1947, p. 1; 4 August 1947, p. 5; 8 August 1947, p. 4.

The political nature of these military events is evident without detailed examination of the circumstances of each case. Although relatively low level military personnel, and military equipment were involved, the Yugoslavs had high level, political reasons for these actions. The ideological nature of the struggle, and the growing differences of opinion between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia were attested to by Milovan Djilas in his recollections of the Yugoslav mission to Moscow at the beginning of 1948:

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were the only two East European countries that were decisively against the Marshall Plan--the former largely out of revolutionary dogmatism, and the latter for fear that American economic aid might shake up the empire it had so recently acquired militarily.¹⁰

Some American observers had noticed the growing separation between these two Communist ruled states the previous summer:

. . . Yugoslav Communism already shows significant divergencies from the Russian, despite its position as favorite child and the basic similarity of race and political tradition. Yugoslav Communism is as suspicious, arbitrary, brutal, intolerant of opposition, fanatical and tortuous as Russian. On the other hand, it leads by no means the hermit-like existence led by Russian Communism. . . . People not suspected by the government are freer in their contact with foreigners and in their willingness to discuss ideology and international politics than is generally realized. . . .¹¹

This difference in perspective may have been seen by astute observers in Belgrade and Washington, but it did not prevent the overall pattern of relations between the two states from degenerating during this period.

¹⁰Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 127.

¹¹From a letter by John M. Cabot to the Secretary of State, in U.S. Department of State, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Vol. IV in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 818-19. (Hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations: 1947, Vol. IV.

The general state of relations notwithstanding, there were two examples of military interchange which illustrate how it can work to build positive relations, even in a hostile political environment. These two examples are shown in Figure 4.3 in the format that will be used throughout the remainder of this discussion to display military interchange examples.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE
Jan 46 - Jun 48

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Type Interchange</u> |
|-------------|---|--|
| Jul 47 | U.S. military attache was commended for his representation: "... friendly contact with a number of Yugoslav officials has been established and their confidence secured." ¹² | Military funded, administration representation |
| Jan 48 | Secret clause in Italian surrender revealed, covering transfer of Italian ships to Yugoslavia, Greece, France, U.S.S.R. disclosed. ¹³ | Military funded, operational, representation ¹⁴ |

Figure 4.3

In summary, U.S. suspicions of Communism, American interest in preventing a Communist takeover in Greece and U.S. interest in efforts to rebuild Europe put relations with Yugoslavia in a minor role during this phase. The new Communist government of Yugoslavia saw itself as a partner of the U.S.S.R. on the path to socialism. The political climate between the U.S. and Yugoslavia was one of dogmatic rejection

¹²Ibid., p. 823.

¹³Hanson W. Baldwin in The New York Times, 12 January 1948; State Department confirmation, The New York Times, 18 January 1948; first ships move for France, 9 February 1948.

¹⁴This is an example of U.S. military interchange to assist in setting up the peace treaty arrangements that required Italian reparations to Yugoslavia, and later U.S. willingness, in the uncooperative atmosphere of U.S.-Yugoslav relations, to allow the delivery to be completed.

by the Yugoslavs, and there was little room for military interchange. The two examples of interchange that could be identified during this phase show how it can be carried out in a hostile political environment. These are isolated examples only, and not indicative of the general trend of the phase.

Worried Rapprochement: June 1948 - March 1951. From the Soviet action to ostracize Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June, 1948, until the beginning of U.S. arms aid to Yugoslavia almost three years later, relations between the two countries were characterized by a slow, worried rapprochement. Improvement began first in words and later in fact, and the use of military interchange to assist in building the relationship was altered to keep pace.

Milovan Djilas was not the only Yugoslav who noticed that all was not right in the Yugoslav relationship with the U.S.S.R. during the early months of 1948. Dedijer describes a Yugoslav move toward discussion of an eventual federation of Balkan states, without the U.S.S.R., that incensed the Kremlin leadership. During a visit to Rumania in January, Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian who had been highly regarded as one of the leaders of the international Communist movement before World War II, responded to a question on a federation of Balkan states by saying:

When the question matures, as it must inevitably mature, then our peoples, the nations of peoples' democracy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece--mind you, and Greece!--will settle it.¹⁵

¹⁵Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 314. For a background discussion of Georgi Dimitrov, "a person who enjoyed Stalin's rare regard . . .," see Djilas, op. cit., p. 33.

This statement by an old international Communist and close associate of Tito's was not lost on Moscow ears. The charge of plotting to form a federation outside the guidance of true (Moscow-style) Marxism-Leninism was a central part of the accusations against Tito.

During the week preceding the Cominform attack on Yugoslavia, two major events began to define U.S. attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. even more clearly than they had been; the Berlin blockade, which necessitated the massive airlift of supplies into the western sectors of the city; and the successful takeover in Czechoslovakia by the Communist Party. In the West, it appeared that the U.S.S.R. was on the move again.

The first positive act between the U.S. and Yugoslavia of a military interchange nature took place within two weeks of the Cominform action. On July 10th the Yugoslav Ambassador and the Undersecretary of State conferred in Washington on the still unsettled lend-lease account, and the press reported that a settlement was near.¹⁶ This agreement was a form of administrative representation, which was necessary as a prior condition to any other discussion of U.S. aid for the Yugoslavs. The terms of the agreement called for Yugoslav payment of \$17 million for U.S. owned assets lost during the war, and \$900 thousand in Yugoslav currency for lend-lease supplies not used in the war. In response, the U.S. released Yugoslav gold which had been held in American banks during the war, thus eliminating a major Yugoslav frustration.¹⁷

Except for this immediate reaction, to release Yugoslav gold, there was little change in the relationship. Yugoslav speeches and

¹⁶The settlement agreement was signed by Secretary Marshall and Deputy Minister Hlagojevic in Washington on July 10th.

¹⁷The New York Times, 20 July 1948, p. 1.

official pronouncements continued to be hostile toward western "imperialism" for some time, although at the Yugoslav government anniversary celebration dinner Mosa Pijade made a point of praising the U.S. and Britain for their support of the Partisans during the war. This expression of thankfulness was so unusual that it was taken as an important signal of the changing relationship.¹⁸

In April, 1949, Italy ceded nine small naval vessels to Yugoslavia, as part of the secret clause of the Italian peace settlement discussed above. This act of reparations might have helped heal the breach between these neighboring countries, but the issue of control of the zone surrounding Trieste was having a long term negative effect on Italian-Yugoslav relations, which served to keep this example of Yugoslav-Italian military interchange from having any significant effect on relations between the two countries.

In August, 1949, President Truman responded favorably to a Yugoslav request to buy equipment in the United States to set up a steel rolling mill in Yugoslavia. Secretary of Defense Johnson was initially opposed to the move, on the grounds that it would allow Communist led Yugoslavia to develop an improved ability to make steel stock of the sort used in military equipment. The matter was submitted to the National Security Council, where the Secretary of Defense withdrew his objection on the grounds that the decision could be reviewed before the equipment was actually shipped.¹⁹ Although a steel finishing

¹⁸Pijade was the oldest member of the Yugoslav Communist Party when it was formed in 1920. He became the Party theoretician, and was one of Tito's closest personal associates. See Djilas, op. cit., pp. 200-201. Pijade's remarks were made in Belgrade on 29 November 1948. For comments, see The New York Times, 30 November 1948, p. 9.

¹⁹Ibid., 19 August 1949, p. 3.

mill is not in itself an item of defense "goods" in the sense used in this study, it could have had military significance, if the Yugoslavs had used the steel for military purposes. American willingness to provide the equipment, and the information that could be gained by the Yugoslavs from examining and using it, was an important element of building a confident relationship between the U.S. and Yugoslavia. A comment in The New York Times after the decision was announced put the event in perspective: "The move is in line with this country's cautious encouragement of Marshal Tito's government, and is the most vital step thus far in this policy."²⁰

During the fall of 1949, Soviet troops were concentrated in the satellite states bordering Yugoslavia.²¹ In August Tito had stressed his need for a large army to defend Yugoslavia in the crisis with other nations in the Cominform.²² The Soviet troops appeared to many to be part of the Soviet effort to bring Yugoslavia to terms with the Cominform. Rumors of U.S. military aid to the Yugoslavs began to circulate in Washington,²³ and radio Hungary reported that the U.S. was providing arms aid to the Yugoslavs.²⁴ These rumors were sharply denied by Secretary of State Acheson, as they had been whenever they had arisen in the past year.²⁵

²⁰Robert F. Whitney in Ibid., 18 August 1949, p. 1.

²¹Ibid., 1 September 1949, p. 4.

²²Ibid., 6 August 1949, p. 7.

²³Ibid., 1 September 1949, p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., 8 September 1949, p. 13.

²⁵For Secretary Acheson's denial see Ibid., 1 September 1949, p. 4. An earlier rumor and its sharp denial by the State Department is described in Ibid., 6 November 1948, p. 5.

However, this time the U.S. was about to make a major change in relations with Yugoslavia: on 8 September 1949, the U.S. Export-Import Bank made a \$20 million loan to the Yugoslav government for general economic development. On the eve of the official announcement of the loan, C. L. Sulzberger, of The New York Times, with the combination of insight and advance information that had characterized his coverage of U.S.-Yugoslav relations, noted that: "... a somewhat friendlier attitude toward the West is dimly becoming visible."²⁶ Within a month, the U.S.S.R. and five of her satellite allies had abrogated their friendship pacts with Yugoslavia, and the dim light of U.S.-Yugoslav friendship was becoming brighter. By early November, Sulzberger saw the U.S. prepared to provide "... all aid short of military support in assisting Marshal Tito to maintain his independence."²⁷ Within a week, the Secretary of State was quoted by Swiss sources as saying essentially the same thing. Officially the report was denied, but the perception of a shifting U.S. policy remained.²⁸ The shifting policy was no more than verbal posturing by both the U.S. and the Yugoslavs until the fall of 1950. Tito was insistent that as much as he needed economic and military assistance to replace what the Soviets had been providing and to counter the threat that the Cominform nations now presented, he was not going to trade Yugoslav independence, in domestic or international matters, for U.S. assistance. The Yugoslavs were trying not to take sides in the growing U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict. Yugoslav ideas

²⁶Ibid., 8 September 1949, p. 13.

²⁷Ibid., 4 November 1949, p. 12.

²⁸Ibid., 7 November 1949, p. 1; denial two days later, in Ibid., 9 November 1949, p. 19.

of nonalignment, which have played an important part of Yugoslav foreign policy in the recent past, were beginning to be formulated during this period, and Belgrade was working to build a reputation for existing outside the two major blocs of nations. The Yugoslavs seemed worried lest by accepting U.S. aid, which they needed, they might destroy their fragile independence, not to mention their image as a nonaligned power.

The U.S., on the other hand, was moving slowly in its relations with Yugoslavia for other reasons. There was a growing aversion to relations with a Communist government, no matter how independent from Moscow it appeared. American leaders were concentrating their attention on the war in Korea, which was competing for U.S. military resources with the need to strengthen Europe. Development of stronger ties with Yugoslavia, under the unconstrained conditions which the Yugoslavs would accept, did not appear to be a major U.S. goal at this time.

In November, 1950, after a disastrous harvest, the Yugoslavs were faced with major food shortages. The U.S. offered to provide funds through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to feed the Yugoslav Armed Forces, freeing existing foodstuffs for use in the civilian community. MDAP funds were a logical candidate for this assistance for several reasons. First, the funds were available: earlier in the fall Congress had appropriated an additional \$4 billion in MDAP funds, primarily to support the United Nations operations in Korea. The authorization legislation gave the President flexibility to divert up to 10 percent of the MDAP funds without prior Congressional approval, if the security of the United States required it. This permitted the President to shift these funds to help Yugoslavia. On November 16th President Truman granted \$16 million from MDAP funds to feed the Yugoslav military. He also promised to ask Congress for additional help specifically for

Yugoslavia. When news of this help was made public in Yugoslavia, many people mistook it for the beginning of a U.S.-Yugoslav military alliance. The notion of such an alliance had surprising popularity, according to U.S. observers on the scene.²⁹ This use of MDAP funds to feed the Yugoslav military for four months, thereby averting a food crisis is an example military interchange in the category of foreign assistance funded, administrative (personnel) goods.

During the discussion which preceded President Truman's decision to use MDAP funds in this instance, Marshal Tito was interviewed by a Western correspondent on Yugoslav needs and the role of U.S. aid. During the course of the interview he said: "If our independence is threatened even more by the Soviet-led Cominform countries, we shall buy arms from the West."³⁰ This was not the first time that Yugoslav interest in Western arms assistance had surfaced, but it was the first time that it had been stated so explicitly. This growing Yugoslav sense of need for Western arms, the U.S. desire to bolster Yugoslav independence from Moscow, and the sense on both sides that cooperation to attain shared goals was possible, set the stage for the period of active military cooperation that followed.

Active Community of Interest: March 1951 - May 1955. This four year period might be called the golden age of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. It began with a secret request by the Yugoslav government for grant aid from the United States to modernize the Yugoslav military forces and terminated with the shift of Yugoslav foreign

²⁹For observations from Belgrade see Ibid., 26 November 1950, p. 16.

³⁰Ibid., 24 November 1950, p. 18.

policy from neutral but pro-Western to neutral but pro-Communist. During this period both the United States and Yugoslavia were interested in developing a closer relationship, and both states were willing to use the channels of military interchange to help further these interests.

In March of 1951 the Yugoslav government initiated a secret request for arms aid from the United States, Britain and France. This request was announced a month later by the Yugoslav government not as a change in policy, but as a necessary step to counter the growing threat posed by the rearmament of the Balkan satellite states by the Soviet Union.³¹ The request included tanks, artillery, small arms, communications equipment and spare parts to modernize the Yugoslav armed forces.³² U.S. response to the request was quick and favorable. On April 17th President Truman acted under the same authority he had used the year before, which permitted him to reprogram up to 10 percent of the annual MDAP appropriation to any nation where it was needed. The materials sent were not arms, however. U.S. shipments began with less politically explosive materials such as hides for shoes, wool for uniforms and machine tools.³³ The mechanism for transferring arms and military equipment would take some time to set up in Yugoslavia: U.S. laws governing MDAP operations required that the delivery and use of U.S. furnished equipment be checked upon arrival in the recipient country by U.S. military personnel, and no military personnel were in Yugoslavia to perform this function. This matter, the inspection of

³¹The official announcement by Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Vlahovic was reported in Ibid., 12 April 1951, p. 23.

³²Ibid., 9 April 1951, p. 1.

³³Ibid., 17 April 1951, p. 1.; 19 April 1951, p. 7.

MDAP equipment in the hands of Yugoslav troops, was a matter of continuing disagreement between the U.S. and Yugoslavia all during this period. The U.S. government, particularly the Congress, insisted on being assured through on-site inspection that the equipment was being used in the manner and for the purposes for which it had been given. The Yugoslav government looked upon all foreign military presence in much the same manner as they had come to see Soviet military presence before the Cominform break: as an intelligence gathering effort, and an external effort to subvert the Yugoslav military.

In order to begin the actual procurement of military supplies, the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, Colonel General Koca Popovic was sent to the United States in June, 1951. He toured U.S. military installations to learn more about the American military system.³⁴ During his visit, he stated that the goals of Yugoslav requests for military assistance from the U.S. were threefold: to modernize the army; to increase the firepower of the forces to preserve a balance of power in the Balkans; and to permit the Yugoslavs to fight offensively, a capability they did not have as Partisans during World War II. Colonel General Popovic was looking for arms through commercial channels at the time of his visit, although by the time he arrived the Administration had committed the United States to providing arms through mutual defense channels as soon as they were requested by Yugoslavia.³⁵

In fact, the government in Belgrade had made such a request prior to the arrival of Colonel General Popovic, and on June 20th it

³⁴Ibid., 9 June 1951, p. 1.

³⁵Ibid., 12 June 1951, p. 15.

was announced that: ". . . as an earnest of the United States' desire to help maintain Yugoslavian independence, arrangements were made for the delivery of a small quantity of military materiel which was drawn principally from excess stocks of the Department of the Army."³⁶ In two months, the use of military resources had gone from a rumor to one of the confirmed element of U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia. The speed with which this program was established illustrates one of the inherent advantages of military interchange as an implement of foreign policy. International diplomacy proceeds very slowly until some basic decision is reached, then there is an immediate requirement to respond. Because the military has available trained individuals and materiel, it is able to react quickly under the direction of the policy makers.

In August, 1951, W. Averill Harriman visited Tito as a special representative of President Truman. Their discussion of U.S. aid was an effort by the U.S. to reinforce the Yugoslav perception that the U.S. was providing aid without conditions. The talks resulted in agreement between Tito and Harriman that the U.S. and Yugoslavia would cooperate in defending against a Soviet attack, although Tito had no desire to enter into any formal, written agreement on the matter.³⁷ This visit constitutes an example of operational representation, and can be considered one form of military interchange, because of the subject matter of the talks, even though the participants were operating at a broad level of policy that included more than military issues.

³⁶From a Department of Defense statement published in Ibid., 20 June 1951, p. 1.

³⁷Ibid., 27 August 1951, p. 1. For an editorial favoring support for Tito, see Ibid., p. 18.

Mr. Harriman's return to Washington was closely followed by a Yugoslav military mission, which came to discuss the details of aid needs. Major General Milo Killibarda, Chief of Supply, and Major General M. S. Sammonja, Chief of Operations conferred with General George C. Marshall to work out details of the developing program. This was the first of many high level representational visits by Yugoslav military leaders to the United States during this phase of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

High level military interchange visits took place in both countries. U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins was sent to Yugoslavia during the fall of 1951 to discuss aid problems, make further arrangements for the administration of the aid program and assess the capabilities of the Yugoslav armed forces. He discussed the possibility of establishing a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) with Tito, who was reluctant to accept American military advisors into Yugoslav units.³⁸ During his visit General Collins became better acquainted with Yugoslav military capabilities, and watched Yugoslav troops on maneuvers. He returned impressed by the maneuvers, and convinced that the Yugoslavs needed tanks, artillery and aviation. He also managed to work out an arrangement that would permit the U.S. to perform the necessary observation and inspection of equipment without creating an unacceptable problem for the Yugoslavs. This required the establishment of a new form of military representation within the structure of the American Embassy in Belgrade. An Office of the

³⁸General Collins visit and his discussions with Tito were reported in The New York Times, 15 October 1951, p. 1; 17 October 1951, p. 18; 18 October 1951, p. 17; 19 October 1951, p. 8.

"Military Assistance Attache" was formed to coordinate U.S. military activity in Yugoslavia that were essential to the MDAP support. A U.S. Army brigadier general was brought in from Rome to head the office. He was to work under the control of the U.S. Ambassador, and have a total of 30 personnel in his office.³⁹ This staff was to be in addition to the small attache offices from each of the armed services. The functions of the Military Assistance Attache were to:

1. Program materiel to be shipped after ascertaining local needs and U.S. ability to satisfy them;
2. Confirm arrival of equipment and certify its condition;
3. Check Yugoslav use of equipment, and provide maintenance assistance; and
4. Organize training programs for Yugoslav officers in the United States and possibly West Germany.⁴⁰

Once Brigadier General Harmony's office was set up and functioning, the pace of military interchange began to quicken. Many details of the programs established were never released to the public, so a complete analysis of the timing and dollar value of each military interchange incident can not be determined without access to classified records. However, the events reported in the press during this period do indicate the variety and the general acceptability of military interchange: the examples in Figure 4.4 indicate the types of interchange that were used during this period.

During this period of extensive military interchange activity the United States was also providing economic aid to Yugoslavia, at a rate roughly equal to the military assistance. These close relations

³⁹Details of the new post of "Military Assistance Attache" were announced in Ibid., 11 November 1951, p. 14.

⁴⁰The new Military Assistance Attache discussed his mission in an interview, Ibid., 20 November 1951, p. 19.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE
Mar 51 - May 55

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Type Interchange</u> |
|-------------|---|--|
| Dec 51 | 19 fliers and technicians to U.S. for flight training in F-47 (NYT, 12 Dec 51, p. 14) | Foreign aid funded, operational, service |
| Jan 52 | Yugoslavia places high ranking generals as attaches in U.S., U.K. to expedite arms aid, improve liaison (NYT, 30 Jan 52, p. 6) | Recipient funded, operational, representation |
| Apr 52 | U.S. delivers fighters, tanks, scout cars, armored cars, AT and AA guns, engineer and signal equipment (NYT, 11 Apr 52, p. 6) | Foreign aid funded, operational, goods |
| May 52 | Yugoslav armed forces to display U.S. equipment at May Day parades throughout country (NYT, 25 Apr 52, p. 6) | Recipient funded, operational, representation |
| Jun 52 | U.S. sends 35 Soviet howitzers captured in Korea for replacements parts (NYT, 26 Jun 52, p. 9) | Foreign aid funded, operational, service ⁴¹ |
| Jul 52 | U.S. director of Military Assistance and U.S. Army DCSOPS review Yugoslav use of aid: find it well used (NYT, 14 Jul 52, p. 1) | Military funded, operational, representation |
| Aug 52 | U.S. Secretary of Army Pace visits Tito, discusses Balkan cooperation (NYT, 14 Aug 52, p. 8) | Military funded, operational, representation |

⁴¹In this case, the U.S. paid for the delivery, not the manufacture of the goods.

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Type Interchange</u> |
|-------------|--|---|
| Dec 52 | Additional supply deliveries reported: M-47 tanks, 90mm guns, trucks, artillery ammunition, spare parts maintenance equipment, gasoline (NYT, 1 Dec 52, p. 8) | Foreign aid funded, operational/ logistical, goods |
| Dec 52 | Yugoslav officials interested in joint operational planning for defense of Ljubljana Gap (NYT, 12 Dec 52, p. 13) | Recipient funded, operational, representation |
| Mar 53 | Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey sign Balkan Pact; agree to joint military planning board, but no military treaty (NYT, 2 Mar 53, p. 8) | Recipient funded, operational, representation |
| Mar 53 | U.S.A.F. sets up jet training program in Yugoslavia (NYT, 11 Mar 53, p. 7) | Military funded, operational, service |
| Mar 53 | U.S. delivers first jets: four T-33. F-84 (100-200) pledged to come (NYT, 11 Mar 53, p. 7) | Foreign aid funded, operational goods |
| Mar 53 | Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff tours U.S. Army installations as Army guest (NYT, 13 Mar 53, p. 13) | Military funded, operational, representation |
| Mar 53 | U.S. orders U.K. helicopters, with U.S. engines, for Yugoslav aid program (NYT, 21 Mar 53, p. 4) | Foreign aid funded, operational, goods |
| Jun 53 | 3 U.S.A.F. generals visit Yugoslavia: inspect bases and use of supplies (NYT, 22 Jun 53, p. 4) | Military funded, operational/ logistical, representation |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Type Interchange</u> |
|-------------|---|---|
| Jun 53 | U.S. contracts for \$5.4 million ammunition made in Yugoslavia (NYT, 28 Jun 53, p. 3) | Foreign aid funded, logistical, service ⁴² |
| Apr 54 | Yugoslav pilots attend U.S.A.F. school in Germany (NYT, 6 Apr 54, p. 14) | Foreign aid funded, operational, service |
| Jun 54 | U.S. Navy contracts for four minesweepers built in Yugoslavia: \$3.5 million contract over three years (NYT, 26 Jun 54, p. 3) | Military funded, operational, service |

Figure 4.4

⁴²This was a "guinea pig" project in offshore procurement for the MDAP; when finished, the ammunition was tested by the U.S., found to be among the "... best made in Europe" and turned over to the Yugoslavs as part of the MDAP. This military interchange was a service in that it stimulated the Yugoslav industrial economy. See The New York Times, 20 March 1954, p. 4.

did result in some areas of cooperation in addition to the military interchange activities themselves. Yugoslavia was committed to oppose aggression in southeast Europe, for example, although the commitment was never made formal in a signed agreement, and did not extend to military cooperation beyond the Balkans. Yugoslavia worked informally with Greece and Turkey to coordinate the defense of the Ljubljana Gap, but would not join either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nor the ill fated European Defense Community: Tito was consistent in his insistence that Yugoslavia remain outside of any formal military pacts. The U.S. was able to assist in modernizing the Yugoslav armed forces, but not to the point where there was a completely open exchange of information between the two armed forces. The U.S. was not able to use its presence, or the weight of past assistance to influence the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia was not inclined to join NATO, for example, and the issue of control of Trieste was still unresolved, and represented a barrier between Italy and Yugoslavia, which in turn stood in the way of a closely integrated defense against Soviet aggression in Southeast Europe.

After the death of Stalin in March, 1953, the threat from the U.S.S.R., as perceived by the Yugoslavs, began to decrease somewhat. As the Soviet Union went through the internal struggles that marked a change of leadership, the political climate around Yugoslavia began to shift. It was a though Tito and his traditional attitudes about international relations remained constant, while the world around him shifted. From a Western perspective he began to look more like an ally of the U.S.S.R. than before. Stalin was gone, and the Yugoslavs seemed to be hoping for an end to the isolation he had placed them in since 1948.

Early in 1955, for example, the Yugoslav government declared that it saw no contradiction in accepting arms aid from the U.S. while remaining neutral, but friendly, toward both Eastern and Western blocs.⁴³

The Yugoslavs were being consistent with their values of long standing, seeking to insure their own security without losing their political autonomy, working to improve their influence among other nations who were not committed to either bloc, and looking for opportunities to improve their own position in the Balkans. Since the beginning of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes these goals seem to have been a large part of the basis for Yugoslav foreign policy. From the events reviewed above, they fit Yugoslav actions during and after World War II.

From the U.S. perspective, these same Yugoslav actions had painted a different picture. From the beginning of the Moscow-Belgrade rift to the spring of 1955, U.S. policy makers had been able to see that Yugoslavia was persona non grata in the Soviet bloc. From a Western perspective, this meant that there was some hope of pushing, pulling or enticing Tito to join the Western camp. Yugoslav alliance with the West would have demonstrated the superiority of life in the West over life under Soviet domination and encouraged the other East European states to weaken the Soviet bloc. Yugoslav cooperation with the West, and the ready Yugoslav acceptance of American military assistance since 1951 had been strong evidence that Yugoslavia was being won over into alliance with the West.

⁴³For a contemporary analysis of Yugoslav neutrality see Ibid., 23 January 1955, IV, p. 6.

Now Moscow and Belgrade were on speaking terms again. The Communist foundation of Yugoslav society, which had always been there, was somehow easier to see. The community of interest that had kept the U.S. and Yugoslavia on parallel tracks for four years was being overshadowed by a growing Yugoslav rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. From the Yugoslav perspective, American assistance had been reciprocated by Yugoslav cooperation in the face of a Soviet threat in the Balkans, and the U.S.-Yugoslav account was settled. In the U.S. view, American aid to Yugoslavia for the past four years had been an investment to insure Yugoslav loyalty in the face of a worldwide Soviet threat, and the Yugoslavs were falling behind in their payments.

Fearful Alienation: May 1955 - May 1957. The "golden age" of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange did not come to a sudden, unexpected end. Early in 1955, before the visit to Belgrade by the new Soviet leaders, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, the Yugoslav government had begun to take actions to establish an international policy of "absolute neutrality." Members of the U.S. Senate, concerned with what they perceived as a growing threat of Communist expansion, and Soviet plans for world domination, expressed concern in May of 1955 that the U.S. ought to re-examine aid to Yugoslavia if Tito declared a policy that did not commit Yugoslavia to a pro-U.S. position.⁴⁴ The statements were made during annual hearings concerning U.S. foreign aid programs. At a press conference on May 25th, Secretary of State Dulles reported that the U.S. had not changed its military aid policy toward Yugoslavia, even though Bulganin and Khrushchev were due in Belgrade the following

⁴⁴The New York Times, 15 May 1955, p. 1.

day.⁴⁵ The Administration was still committed to support Yugoslavia, even though Congressional sentiments were beginning to show the effects of Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist attacks.

The Khrushchev-Tito visit was a major breakthrough in Soviet relations with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev approved of the Yugoslav policy of "east and west," and Moscow observers saw the Yugoslavs excluding themselves from membership in NATO through the wording of the joint communique which was issued by the two leaders at the end of the visit.⁴⁶ This claim should not have surprised Western observers, since Tito had been carefully turning aside all attempts to tie Yugoslavia into a Western military alliance since 1951. Before the Soviet visit, however, the Yugoslav government had made a bid for talks on military aid with Great Britain, France and the United States.⁴⁷ The Yugoslavs were firm in their reluctance to join military pacts, but they still felt the need for arms to defend themselves. The Yugoslav government had not changed their basic policy on military pacts since the beginning of improved U.S.-Yugoslav relations in 1951, but American attitudes, particularly in Congress, had begun to change, and Yugoslav leaders were unwilling to reverse their policy just to please their American critics.⁴⁸

Americans who favored continued Western aid to Yugoslavia worked to restore confidence in the wisdom of the program. C. L. Sulzberger

⁴⁵Ibid., 25 May 1955, p. 4.

⁴⁶Ibid., 4 June 1955, p. 3.

⁴⁷A report of the mid-May proposal was released during the Soviet visit. See The New York Times, 31 May 1955, p. 1. U.S. confirmation of the proposed conference was released almost immediately, see Ibid., 2 June 1955, p. 1.

⁴⁸Tito's refusal to join the Warsaw Pact was reported in The New York Times, 6 June 1955, p. 1.

reviewed the de facto connection of Yugoslavia to NATO through the Balkan entente with Greece and Turkey.⁴⁹ The Yugoslavs accepted a British offer to conduct combined naval maneuvers in the Adriatic for the first time since World War II.⁵⁰ Even President Eisenhower had spoken out to support U.S. interest in Yugoslavia, but the suspicion growing in Congress could not be eliminated.⁵¹

In July, 1955, a new item was added to the U.S. suspicions. As Congressional fears about military aid to Yugoslavia grew, the extent of Congressional questioning of U.S. military programs also increased. In order to be prepared for these questions, Pentagon officials enlarged reporting requirements on the U.S. Military Assistance Mission in Yugoslavia. On the 20th of July the senior Military Assistance Attache reported that he had been unable to increase the inspection and review of the U.S. program in Yugoslavia.⁵² The Yugoslavs, familiar with Soviet pressure tactics from the period before the break with the Cominform, saw the U.S. attempt as "blackmail and pressure."⁵³ Tito, feeling the pressure, was moved to forbid U.S. "supervision" of military aid during a speech in Croatia.⁵⁴ This issue required a visit to

⁴⁹Ibid., 29 June 1955, p. 28.

⁵⁰Ibid., 4 July 1955, p. 3; and 16 July 1955, p. 3.

⁵¹President Eisenhower minimized the impact of the U.S.S.R.-Yugoslav agreement; see The New York Times, 9 June 1955, p. 16. The New York Times supported the President's statement in an editorial on 10 June 1955, p. 24.

⁵²Ibid., 20 July 1955, p. 9.

⁵³Ibid., 27 July 1955, p. 3.

⁵⁴Tito saw reflections of Soviet behavior prior to the Cominform dispute; Ibid., 28 July 1955, pp. 1 and 22.

Yugoslavia by Deputy Undersecretary Murphy in October, which included talks with Tito, in order to find a solution that allowed the U.S. representatives to carry out their mission without causing the Yugoslav government to feel a loss of sovereignty.⁵⁵ This is an example of a relatively minor administrative problem--how many MAAG representatives are permitted and how freely can they travel--that requires delicate negotiation at the highest levels of government. Such involvement of low level military operators in high level policy operations illustrates one of the weaknesses of military interchange. The personnel assigned to the office of the Military Assistance Attache in Belgrade were exposed to conditions during this period that would have magnified far out of proportion any failure to perform in an exemplary manner at all times. Training and maintaining such personnel is costly, but the military must be willing to spend the time and money to insure that good people are available within the services, and made available for critical assignments regardless of the cost.

As a result of the high level efforts of Secretary Murphy, the Yugoslavs permitted the U.S. to increase the size of the military assistance office at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade from 44 to 60 individuals, primarily military, permitting more complete reporting, and hopefully a more understanding Congress.⁵⁶ In a New York Times review of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange from 1951 through 1955, the following effects of U.S. military assistance were identified:

⁵⁵Ibid., 1 October 1955, p. 1.

⁵⁶Ibid., 5 November 1955, p. 3.

Twice saved Yugoslavia from acute food shortages;
 Helped develop the Yugoslav industrial base;
 Kept Yugoslavia out of the Soviet camp;
 Permitted the regime to relax internal controls;
 Strengthened Yugoslav defenses;
 Guaranteed the friendship of the Yugoslav people.⁵⁷

These were strong statements. They were not accepted immediately by all Americans. They were simply untrue to those critics of American policies toward Yugoslavia who had come to doubt the enmity between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R., who saw the Yugoslav regime as a police state, or who questioned the loyalty of a former friend who has a growing rapport with one's worst enemy. The Yugoslav policy of "east and west" was generating alienation within the U.S. Congress, and there was little the administration could do to overcome it.

When the foreign aid program for Fiscal Year 1957 came before Congress, proposed military aid to Yugoslavia came under sharp attack. As debate was getting underway in the Senate, Tito visited Moscow, and the friendship evident in his visit, particularly with Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov, added considerable weight to the arguments of those who wanted an end to U.S. assistance. Tito, typically, saw this opposition to Soviet-Yugoslav friendship as unacceptable pressure. He expressed his regrets over the threats to cut U.S. aid, but would not modify his policies to insure its continuation.⁵⁸ When the U.S. debate was over, there had been an unsuccessful attempt to cut out all new military aid to Yugoslavia. However, the process of authorizing and appropriating foreign aid funds had resulted in a significant restriction on new aid to Yugoslavia: beginning immediately new aid for

⁵⁷Ibid., 23 January 1956, p. 8.

⁵⁸Ibid., 28 June 1956, p. 1.

Yugoslavia could be spent only for spare parts and replacement items of equipment. Further, whatever aid was planned for Tito's armed forces could be sent only if President Eisenhower determined that it was in the national interest to do so.⁵⁹ This assault on the President's foreign aid program, the first defeat he had suffered in foreign policy,⁶⁰ gave the Yugoslav government a clear sign that there were problems in their relations with the United States.

In an apparent effort to offset the effects of this Senate action against the Yugoslav government, the Administration used a military interchange means that was not restricted by law, the naval ship visit. On August 8th, less than a week after the new restrictive foreign aid legislation had become law, Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, the Commander of the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, began a three day courtesy call on the Yugoslav Navy. The timing of this visit was too close to be coincidence: the flagship of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in port, at Split, with its commander ashore as the guest of the Yugoslav Navy could conceivably have been a big help in countering Yugoslav popular disappointment about the cut in aid. This form of military operations funded, administrative representation has been an important element in U.S. foreign policy since long before the "great white fleet" showed the flag of the United States in the major harbors of the world. It remains important today, as a low cost, available means of demonstrating

⁵⁹The Authorization bill required the Presidential finding of national interest; see The New York Times, 7 July 1956, p. 1. The Appropriations bill restricted new funds to spare parts and supplies; see The New York Times, 26 July 1956, p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., 8 June 1956, p. 1.

U.S. friendship or support for another nation, a technique which is completely under the President's control.

As the 90 day deadline for the President's finding on military assistance drew near, Yugoslav concern increased. In this connection, a visit to Yugoslavia by Khrushchev in mid September upset the government in Belgrade: they apparently expected that Khrushchev's visit would pressure President Eisenhower to decide against further aid for Yugoslavia.⁶¹ Their fears were realized in part by the Presidential decision on 16 October. Although he determined that Yugoslavia was independent of the U.S.S.R. and was therefore eligible for further aid under the Congressional restrictions, he decided to withhold further deliveries of heavy military hardware.⁶² This decision stopped the flow of tanks and jet planes until a more detailed appraisal of the situation could be made. The Yugoslav government was disappointed, but had little cause for surprise, after the Congressional debate and the timing of Khrushchev's visit. The President's action, to authorize continued aid then withhold some of it until the situation could be studied in more detail, became a familiar pattern during the next two years, as Congressional opposition to aid for Yugoslavia continued to grow.

When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary one month later, the threat to Yugoslavia seemed to have increased significantly. The Yugoslav reaction to Soviet intervention in Hungary seemed ambivalent from a

⁶¹Ibid., 19 September 1956, p. 14.

⁶²The President's letter to Congress was published in The New York Times, 16 October 1956, p. 4. For a related story, see Ibid., 16 October 1956, p. 1.

Western perspective. On one hand, he approved of the original aims of the Hungarian national Communists. But events in Hungary had gotten out of control, and Tito came to support the second, more violent Soviet invasion, on 23 October, as ". . . necessary even if unfortunate."⁶³

In the United States, the Hungarian Revolution was generally seen as a clear demonstration of the aggressive intentions of the U.S.S.R., suppressing what was assumed to be the deep seated yearning for freedom within the Hungarian people. If the Soviet Union was beginning a period of military intervention in East Europe, U.S. military assistance to help the Yugoslavs resist would once again be in the national interest of the United States. There were reports in December, 1956, that the President was considering the resumption of military aid to Yugoslavia.⁶⁴

According to The New York Times, Eisenhower was planning to invite Tito to visit the United States, and the resumption of aid was to have been made, or at least announced, as part of the visit. Once the proposed visit became known in Congress, opponents of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia began a loud, public objection that grew into what the press called "... an uproar."⁶⁵ A petition was circulated in Congress calling on the President to withdraw his invitation to Tito. Debate over the issue was loud and emotional, and widely reported in the press. Before the pressure forced the President to act, Tito announced that he would

⁶³Hoffman and Neal have an analysis of the Yugoslav position based on Yugoslav sources. See Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp 437-41. Zbigniew Brzezinski provides a detailed discussion of the rationale for Tito's actions during this dilemma. See Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 233-38.

⁶⁴The New York Times, 17 December 1956, p. 1.

⁶⁵For a report on Congressional pressures see Ibid., 30 January 1957, p. 1.

not be coming. For a man of Tito's pride and stature, canceling the trip was a major embarrassment, and another piece of evidence of the efforts of the U.S. to manipulate him and the way he conducted Yugoslav foreign policy. Once the visit was canceled, there was no immediate action taken publicly to reinstate military aid, although the issue was still very much alive.

In May, once the acrimony of Tito's canceled visit had died down, plans to resume the suspended military aid were revived.⁶⁶ There were at that time \$100 million worth of orders outstanding, including about 200 jet planes. Although fear of Communism continued to dominate much of the thinking about U.S.-Yugoslav relations, particularly in Congress, and the relations themselves continued toward apparent alienation, the President seemed committed to attempting a reconciliation, at least on a trial basis. The mechanism for military interchange in Yugoslavia was still intact: there were still attaches for military assistance as well as the more traditional representation and information gathering functions. On the 13th of May the President began what was to be the last major effort to use military grant aid as part of U.S.-Yugoslav relations: he ordered the resumption of previously committed shipments.⁶⁷

Trial Reconciliation: May 1957 - March 1958. This effort to restore relations between the U.S. and Yugoslavia to the more cooperative, pragmatic basis of the "golden age" of five years earlier was not

⁶⁶On May 10th, the President was reported ready to resume the aid suspended seven months earlier. See Ibid., 10 May 1957, p. 1.

⁶⁷Ibid., 13 May 1957, p. 7.

successful. The reasons were many. In the United States, Congress, which had for long had a strong group of opponents to U.S. aid to Yugoslavia, was still opposed, for basically ideological grounds. Typical of this position was the comment of Senator William F. Knowland (Rep., Calif.), Senate Republican leader and long time opponent of aid to Yugoslavia, who was against ". . . taxing the American people to support the economic and political systems of Communist countries abroad."⁶⁸ The Administration stood nearly alone during the summer of 1957 in trying to get a foreign aid bill through Congress containing aid for Yugoslavia.⁶⁹

Motivated by this growing American antagonism, and an apparent Soviet willingness to tolerate more diversity among satellite governments, the Yugoslav government moved toward a new rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Tito and Khrushchev met at a secret meeting at Bucharest in August to discuss closer affiliation.⁷⁰ Yugoslavia began more active support of the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations. Tito criticized the West in an article in the fall issue of Foreign Affairs, which called for the dissolution of NATO. The break-point for the U.S. most likely came on October 15th, when Belgrade recognized the East German government. This "evidence" that Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. were acting in concert was followed quickly by an announcement by

⁶⁸Ibid., 15 May 1957, p. 13.

⁶⁹Congressional debate and popular opposition to the Administration's aid proposals was reviewed in The New York Times, 5 June 1957, p. 8; 23 June 1957, p. 1; 8 July 1957, p. 25; 20 July 1957, p. 3.

⁷⁰Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 444. For a discussion of Soviet tolerance for diversity among satellite governments, see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 279-84.

Secretary of State Dulles that the U.S. was reviewing current aid agreements with Yugoslavia.⁷¹ The basic issue seemed to be the degree of Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslav reaction to this latest reappraisal of U.S. air might have been predicted from a careful study of Tito's actions as leader of the Partisans during World War II: he "renounced" further U.S. aid, then called in the U.S. Ambassador to see what positive gains could be made of the resulting turmoil.⁷² Tito said he wanted to end the irritation for both sides, and would prefer to have the program ended. However, neither Tito nor the U.S. Ambassador were willing to close the door on further military interchange such as spare parts for equipment that was already in Yugoslav hands.⁷³ The Yugoslavs were also interested in securing the rest of the jet planes, promised earlier, that had not been delivered. As it had been for most of the time since 1951, the real issue was the military mission that inspected the delivery and maintenance of U.S. equipment. In March of 1958 the frustration was removed when, after six years in Yugoslavia, the office of the Military Assistance Attache was disbanded, and the 44 Americans who comprised the element left the country. On his departure, the chief of the mission, Major General Walter, reviewed the results of U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia: 8 of 28 Yugoslav divisions had been modernized with U.S.

⁷¹The New York Times, 20 October 1957, p. 4.

⁷²Tito's initial renunciation was reported in The New York Times, 8 December 1957, p. 1. The meeting with Ambassador Riddleberger, held on 9 December, was described as "amicable" on both sides; see Ibid., 10 December 1957, p. 9.

⁷³Ibid., 17 December 1957, p. 22.

equipment; nearly all of the combat aircraft in Yugoslavia were from the U.S.; and except for the Air Force (where the work of the mission was estimated to be only 50-60 percent complete), the job was nearly done.⁷⁴ General Walter also recommended that the U.S. help finance Yugoslav purchases of spare parts: there was a common feeling that the military bridge to Yugoslavia should not be burned completely.

With the departure of the U.S. military mission from Belgrade, military interchange took on a different character. Up to this point military interchange, particularly in the form of foreign assistance funded operational goods, had been a visible, highly publicized part of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. This had advantages and disadvantages for both states, in that highly visible aid, while valuable in building general rapport (the "friendship of the people") is more easily attacked by critics at home and abroad. During this first major period of military interchange, it was often used as a political or symbolic tool--by the U.S. to stay the progress of Soviet expansion, and by the Yugoslavs to demonstrate and protect their national independence, in the international arena.

During this period military interchange did not determine the course of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Neither state saw their military relationship as the only important element of their relationship. The assistance furnished by the U.S. to the Yugoslavs to modernize their armed forces in the face of a Soviet threat provided a flexible tool for assisting in the development and maintenance of relations. Much of its value lay in three characteristics: it was flexible enough to accommodate

⁷⁴Ibid., 26 March 1958, p. 8.

political restrictions perceived by either state; it was available almost immediately in the form of trained personnel, useful information or equipment already in being; and it was acceptable to both the American and Yugoslav governments, as indicated by the number and variety of different types of interchange employed. As long as military interchange remains flexible, available and acceptable to both the donor and the recipient, U.S. military services can expect to be involved in the conduct of foreign policy. When high publicity programs such as grant aid lost political acceptability in U.S.-Yugoslav relations, the military continued to be involved in military interchange, although the means used were less obvious, as a review of the period since March 1958 will demonstrate.

CHAPTER V

YUGOSLAV NONALIGNMENT AND MILITARY INTERCHANGE

When the American military assistance mission left Belgrade in the spring of 1958, there was a definite change in the type of military interchange most frequently used to support U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, although the policy itself remained essentially the same. The United States government continued to develop a relationship based primarily on "... mutual respect for independence."¹ From March, 1958, to the end of 1972, U.S.-Yugoslav relations followed a cyclical path similar in many ways to that followed earlier. There were times of active military cooperation separated by periods of relative isolation. Viewed as a whole the 14 years show a slow decline in the Congressional hostility that precipitated the termination of aid in 1958. This decline seems to have accompanied a general reduction of American perceptions of the importance of Yugoslav independence from Moscow as an example to the other nations of East Europe. This apparent change in the importance of U.S.-Yugoslav relations can be seen in a general decline in the reports of U.S. military interchange with Yugoslavia reported in The New York Times.² Although the number of reports of military interchange was

¹The phrase is taken from President Nixon's communique.

²As in the preceding chapter, The New York Times has been used here as the primary source of data on U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. The editorial position of the Times has generally favored continued contact with Yugoslavia. Coverage of U.S.-Yugoslav relations was considered adequate for the purposes of this study, although no single source can provide complete coverage of U.S. international relations, the Times was considered representative.

reduced after 1958, there are examples of a wide variety of interchange types, as can be seen from the following discussion.

Like the earlier period, this time from 1958 to the end of 1972 can be divided into phases, marked by important changes in the nature of military interchange used between the two states. The differences between periods are not as sharply defined as were those of the years immediately following World War II, but they do divide the period for discussion, and serve to illustrate the flexibility of military interchange means. The four phases of this period are as shown in Figure 5.1.

PHASES OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE 1958 - 1972

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Mar 58 - Sep 61 | "Secret" sales |
| Sep 61 - Feb 64 | Yugoslav nonalignment |
| Feb 64 - Aug 68 | Nonalignment with broadening contact |
| Aug 68 - Dec 72 | Military interchange revitalized |

Figure 5.1

"Secret" Sales: March 1958 - September 1961. The period following the termination of the U.S. military mission to Belgrade was one of growing Congressional criticism of American involvement with the Yugoslavs. At the same time, the Administration continued to build positive relationships through channels that had not been restricted by Congress. One of these was the continuation of a program of selling military training, supplies and equipment to the Yugoslavs for cash, rather than loaning or giving it to them. Earlier sales of spare parts and replacement equipment had been reported in the press on a routine basis, and had not been criticized extensively. Now, the policies which had formerly guided these relatively small scale purchases were applied to major items of equipment such as the jets and tanks desired by the

Yugoslavs. These policies were spelled out by Defense Department representatives in October, 1961, when the full extent of U.S. military sales to Yugoslavia finally came to light:

1. Material sold is too obsolescent for use in a major European war, so possession by the Yugoslavs will not upset the balance of power in Europe.
2. Training of Yugoslav operators and technicians is conducted in the U.S., thereby exposing Yugoslavs to Western ideas.
3. Maintenance and delivery requires that U.S. technicians be allowed inside Yugoslavia.
4. If the U.S. didn't sell to the Yugoslavs, then the U.S.S.R. would.³

During the summer of 1958, Congress went through the annual struggle over all forms of aid for Yugoslavia. This time the supporters of Yugoslav relations were more successful: the restriction which Congress had enacted the previous year, requiring a special declaration by the President in order to continue the aid program, was dropped from the foreign aid legislation for Fiscal Year (FY) 1959.⁴ This may have been a hollow victory since the U.S. aid mission was gone from Belgrade, but it encouraged the Yugoslavs and disturbed the Soviets.

Yugoslavia was still working hard to remain outside the two major power blocs. In June the departing Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Leo Mates, informed an American audience on the "Meet the Press" television program that Yugoslavia would not join NATO, even if invited, and furthermore had no intention of joining the Warsaw Pact.⁵ What the Yugoslavs wanted, as they had wanted in the past was U.S. arms, not an alliance with the United States. Two days after Dr. Mates' television

³Guidelines for sale of jet aircraft to Yugoslavia, provided by a Defense Department spokesman. See The New York Times, 16 October 1961, p. 1.

⁴Ibid., 18 June 1958, p. 66.

⁵Dr. Mates' statement was reported in Ibid., 16 June 1958, p. 7.

appearance in Washington, Belgrade complained that U.S. military equipment deliveries were taking too long. They claimed that it was taking six to eight months to receive parts for F-84 jet aircraft, once the parts had been purchased in the United States. The report noted that the Yugoslavs had spent \$2 million on equipment since the end of the aid program earlier in the year, and was in the process of placing orders for an additional \$6 million. New sales requests were foreseen, although no details were given at the time.⁶ Ambassador Mates attempted to minimize the possibility of increased military purchases or a resumption of military aid.⁷ From Ambassador Mates' comments, it appeared that the Yugoslav government did not see a significant threat from the U.S.S.R. at that time, and there was no clearly apparent need for a return to a program which had been so strongly attacked in the U.S. Congress.

While Ambassador Mates was keeping a low profile in Washington, the Yugoslav government was in the process of buying 148 combat aircraft from the United States. Although the agreement was not revealed until October, 1961, 78 F-86E jet fighters and 70 TV-2 jet trainers were sold by the U.S. to Yugoslavia during the 1958-1959 period.⁸ During 1959 another military interchange means was introduced into U.S.-Yugoslav relations, the training of senior officers at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.⁹ Since 1959, the Yugoslav government has paid the expenses for one or two field grade officers to spend nine months at the senior tactical school of the U.S. Army. The experience provides

⁶This report was the first mention of the F-84 as an element of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. See Ibid., 19 June 1958, p. 1.

⁷Ibid., 20 June 1958, p. 3.

⁸Ibid., 18 October 1961, p. 15.

⁹Ibid., 14 October 1961, p. 8.

these officers with extensive information on U.S. operational doctrine and techniques, and exposes them to many U.S. Army officers who later move into positions of leadership within the American military community. Both of these interchange means were funded by the Yugoslav government. In one sense, this was not aid, since the U.S. government was being paid for what was given to the Yugoslavs. However, "foreign military sales" (as arrangements of this type have since come to be called) are authorized by the same legislative acts which establish the U.S. foreign aid programs. Most Congressmen and military personnel involved in the program consider these activities to be a part of "military assistance" or "aid." This confusion has caused considerable ill will in the past between Congress and the President. When Congress restricts "aid," as had been done in the case of Yugoslavia, and the Administration continues to encourage military sales on the grounds that they are not "aid," Congressmen feel that they have been manipulated by the White House.¹⁰ Other nations who pay for military goods or services received from the U.S. also resent having their cash sales discussed as "American aid" in Congress and the press.

A year later, in September of 1960, the matter of an official visit to the U.S. by Premier Tito was revived. Tito and Gamil Abdel Nasser of Egypt had decided to attend the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations to continue their growing efforts to coalesce the nations of the "third world" into a force against the growing armaments

¹⁰This form of power politics is a common part of the interaction between the President and Congress. In matters where the Constitution gives neither one clear primacy, both will use the letter of the law to advance what they believe to be in the best interest of the country.

race among the major powers of the world.¹¹ Government leaders in Washington considered making the invitation, but instead decided in favor of an informal visit between Tito and President Eisenhower in New York, where there was less chance of an embarrassing incident such as the Congressional uproar which had forced the cancellation of Tito's visit to the U.S. four years earlier.

Tito's speech to the United Nations General Assembly stressed the need for disarmament, but his comments apparently referred to the major powers, and not to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs still felt the need for improved military forces to insure their own independence, as shown by the following two instances of military interchange.

In December, 1960, the Greek government sold to the Yugoslavs 50 F-84G jet fighters which had been made in the United States.¹² Although the business transaction was between Belgrade and Athens, the United States became involved. Under the terms of the legislation which had initially provided the items to Greece, U.S. approval was required before they could be sold, transferred or salvaged by the Greeks. It is possible but not likely, that this sale was engineered in Washington from the start: that the planes were provided to the Greeks with the intention that they would be sold to Yugoslavia. It is more likely that the Greek government notified Washington of her intention to dispose of the planes, and the transaction with Yugoslavia was arranged to satisfy all parties. This sale was completed without publicity in the United States. The fact that Greece had sold U.S. made aircraft to Yugoslavia was not

¹¹Ibid., 13 September 1960, p. 1.

¹²Ibid., 14 October 1961, p. 8.

revealed until the following year, during the general exposé of U.S. military sales to Yugoslavia. This incident is another example of a situation where the Administration was not required by law to notify Congress of a particular military interchange activity, and chose not to do so voluntarily.

Later, in March, 1961, the U.S. completed a contract that had been under negotiation for more than a year, to sell 130 obsolescent F86D jet fighters to the Yugoslavs.¹³ Like the Greek sale above, this instance of military interchange was not reported in the United States at the time it took place. Once again, the U.S. officials in the Administration responsible for arranging the sale were able to take a military interchange action that supported the development of U.S.-Yugoslav relations without notifying Congress, and risking the loud condemnation that had interrupted earlier, more widely publicized incidents, such as the abortive attempt to invite Tito to visit the United States in 1957.

With the exception of routine announcements early during this phase, the sales events discussed above were not publicized at the time they were carried out. The Congress was willing to allow the U.S. support of Yugoslavia to continue at the level which they were aware of, and the Administration seems to have been willing to continue to support the development of increased positive relations through unpublicized means, many involving military interchange. The ability of the military to act quickly and quietly to carry out the foreign policy desires of the President, without necessarily informing Congress or the American people, is a powerful element of military interchange. So long as there are

¹³Ibid., p. 8.

differences of opinion within the U.S. government over how much assistance the United States should provide for another country, military interchange is likely to be used to carry out foreign policy without full public disclosure. Because of their involvement in such issues as the sale of jets to Yugoslavia, the military services can expect to find themselves in the middle of domestic political issues which are far removed from the foreign policy itself. This political aspect of military interchange can place the military services in the undesirable position of having to choose between alienating themselves from Congress, which provides the funds to them, or refusing to carry out a legal order of the Commander-in-Chief. Success under these situations requires that all personnel involved in military interchange have a thorough understanding of the political nature of their work.

Yugoslav Non-Alignment: September 1961 - February 1964. This phase of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange began with the Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Belgrade in September, 1961, and ended with the U.S. Congressional action to bar all aid to nations that traded with the Communist led regime in Cuba. It had many of the characteristics of the earlier phase of "fearful alienation" from 1955 to 1957:

1. Yugoslav emphasis on non-alignment.
2. Popular reaction against Communism in the U.S.
3. Arms aid by the U.S.S.R. to Yugoslavia.
4. A battle by the U.S. Congress over foreign aid to Yugoslavia.
5. War in a small country of interest to both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
6. A visit by Tito to Moscow.
7. An invitation to Tito to visit the U.S.
8. New limitations on U.S. foreign aid.

The Belgrade Conference was called by Tito to further his drive toward a position of leadership among the non-aligned nations of the world.¹⁴ Prior to the conference, the U.S. had been assured through diplomatic channels that the conference proceedings, and particularly the speech by Tito during the conference, would not be an embarrassment to the United States;¹⁵ however, the proceedings were thought by Western observers to be aimed directly at the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The final communique called for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to halt war preparations and prepare for peace; an end to colonialism; abolition of foreign military bases such as the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo, Cuba; admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the U.N.; and the convening of a world disarmament conference.¹⁶ All of these issues had been discussed before by Tito, but the combination of all of them together as the platform of an international conference gave rise to new concern within the United States. Once again the U.S. considered re-evaluating aid commitments with Yugoslavia.

The popular reaction against Communism finally led to disclosure of the extent of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange since the end of the aid program. In mid October, 1961, an Air National Guard major reported in a Dallas, Texas, newspaper that the U.S. was involved in a "treasonous situation" because four Yugoslav officers were undergoing pilot training

¹⁴One of the problems of the English language is the necessity to use "non-aligned" as the descriptor for a group of nations that seek to align themselves with each other against the two major power blocs.

¹⁵The New York Times, 14 September 1961, p. 5.

¹⁶Ibid., 7 September 1961, p. 1.

at Perrin Air Force Base outside of Dallas.¹⁷ Investigation of this report led to the public disclosure for the first time of the extensive sales agreements which had been made between the U.S. and Yugoslavia since March, 1958. Press exposés and official explanations followed each other in rapid succession for a week.¹⁸ By the time popular interest shifted to another issue, the dimensions of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange were drawn more clearly for the public than they had been for many years. U.S. military aid during the 1952-1957 period had been estimated at \$693.8 million, the number of planes sold to the Yugoslavs was reported at 553, and the legal basis for further sales of military materiel to the Yugoslavs had been firmly defended. In the earlier period American anti-Communist feeling had led to an attack on alleged Communist influence in America by Senator McCarthy. This time it had resulted in a revealing look into the unpublicized use of military sales in foreign policy operations.

In October, 1961, the U.S. was involved in a crisis with the U.S.S.R. over the future of Berlin. The Soviets had given an ultimatum in June that a German peace treaty must be signed by December. President Kennedy had pledged in response to fight to defend the people of Berlin. The Soviet Union countered with the construction of the Berlin wall and resumption of nuclear testing.¹⁹ At this tense moment, the story of U.S. "aid" to Yugoslavia was released. Domestic reaction to the story of U.S.-Yugoslav cooperation was relatively mild. Attention may have been

¹⁷Ibid., 14 October 1961, p. 1.

¹⁸For major articles see The New York Times, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 22 October 1961.

¹⁹For a detailed analysis of the Soviet campaign against Berlin, see Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 89-96.

diverted by the more critical situation in Berlin. Congressional leaders may have recognized the futility of condemning a military sales action that had been procedurally correct even if it did violate the spirit of Congressional desires. The reasons are not yet clear for the lack of objection to this news, but regardless of the reason, the incident passed, and the Administration continued too with the programs already in operation.

As if to add to the provocation already perceived many places in the United States, the Yugoslavs accepted a shipment of Soviet T-54 tanks for the first time since the Cominform dispute began in 1948.²⁰ The U.S. Congress reacted during the debate over the FY 1959 foreign aid legislation with a strong attempt to limit all forms of U.S. aid to Communist dominated countries, especially Yugoslavia. The attempt to restrict President Kennedy's use of aid as an implement of foreign policy was finally defeated, but only after a stiff, eight hour debate, and then only by a narrow 48 to 41 margin.²¹ The mood in Congress about U.S. aid for Yugoslavia continued to deteriorate.

A visit to Yugoslavia by Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,²² in late September, 1962, and the Cuban missile crisis the following month served as additional signs to those in the United States with anti-Communist perspectives that nations led by the Communist Party, particularly Yugoslavia, could not be trusted. In December, Tito paid a visit to Moscow. In his discussions there and the pronouncements made upon his return he stressed that Yugoslavia

²⁰The New York Times, 2 May 1962, p. 4.

²¹Ibid., 20 July 1962, p. 20.

²²This post is the nominal head of state of the U.S.S.R.

was following a genuine Marxist-Leninist path to socialism, but would not alter its policy of non-alignment and friendly relations with all countries. None of this, when seen from a Western, anti-Communist viewpoint was encouraging.

The U.S. Administration did not hold this view of Yugoslavia, and was still committed to encouraging the Yugoslavs to take a line as independent as possible from Moscow. In May of 1963 Secretary of State Rusk visited Tito in Belgrade. During the discussion, two Yugoslav concerns came to light: the fear that loss of most favored nation (MFN) status would seriously disrupt Yugoslav economic development; and the Yugoslav desire to purchase military equipment from the United States, particularly spare parts.²³ This renewal of interest in military sales by the Yugoslavs, and the willingness of the U.S. Administration to have it publicized in the United States gave the appearance of a shift in attitudes about military interchange between the two states.

The speed with which military interchange can be employed was demonstrated during the summer of 1963, when a devastating earthquake occurred in the vicinity of Skopje, in southern Macedonia. The American reaction was immediate. Within four days of the quake, the U.S. Army had dispatched a field hospital from Wiesbaden, Germany, to provide assistance to quake victims. The medical team was cheered by the Yugoslavs, who were impressed by the speed of the U.S. response

²³Ibid., 5 May 1963, p. 1. Congressional legislation for the FY 1963 foreign aid program had included a measure to revoke most favored nation status for Yugoslavia. However, because of a provision of the original treaty granting Yugoslavia MFN status, final action could not be taken for one year, from the date of notification. For a background report see Ibid., 6 October 1962, p. 1.

and the extent of the aid provided. Commenting on the value of this service funded, administrative service, a spokesman from the U.S. Embassy said: "There is no question . . . that the presence of this mercy mission here has done more to raise American prestige among Yugoslavs than any other thing in years."²⁴ This small example of military interchange illustrates the flexibility, availability and general acceptability of a common use of military resources to support U.S. foreign relations.

The next incident of military interchange to be revealed came to light on the eve of Marshal Tito's first official visit to the United States in October, 1963. The week before Tito's arrival, Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck, the Republican leaders in the Senate and House, revealed on their weekly television program that President Kennedy had "defied" a Congressionally imposed restriction on military aid to Yugoslavia, by permitting the Yugoslavs to purchase \$2 million in military supplies from the United States. In the opinion of these Congressmen, this was a clear case of the President overstepping his bounds.²⁵ In fact, the Congress had restricted aid through grants and loans for military purposes, but had not specifically addressed the question of sales to the Yugoslavs for cash. As mentioned above, the distinction between aid and sales is often overlooked, particularly by opponents of military involvement in foreign policy. It is an important difference, one that frequently gives the Administration some flexibility in the use of military interchange that is not readily apparent. In defending the sale to Yugoslavia, George F. Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, made the distinction clearly:

²⁴The New York Times, 1 August 1963, p. 8.

²⁵Ibid., 11 October 1963, p. 18.

With respect to the particular sale in question, the term "aid" ought never to have been used. Our military aid program for Yugoslavia was terminated some 6 years ago at the initiative of the Yugoslavs. Since then they have paid dollars cash for military equipment purchased in this country. They will do so in the present instance.²⁶

During Tito's visit, President Kennedy initiated another instance of military interchange: he offered to provide to the Yugoslavs enough surplus barracks buildings to house 10,000 homeless victims of the Skopje earthquake.²⁷ The barracks were to come from surplus stockpiles in France. These items may have been paid for by the military, by authorizing a reduction of required stockage levels, but it is more likely that the U.S. military custodian of the barracks was reimbursed for their value from emergency relief funds that are part of every annual foreign aid bill. Military interchange was a valuable means here because of the immediate availability of the material. Once the President decided to move an immediate response was possible using military goods. If normal contracting procedures had been followed to provide equivalent housing through non-military channels, there would have been a much longer delay, since non-military welfare agencies were not likely to have surplus housing on hand for 10,000 people.

During Tito's visit, he and President Kennedy agreed that U.S. aid for Yugoslavia was no longer needed, and that future relations would concentrate on economic and agricultural development loans and trade, which was a recognition of the status quo rather than a new policy. Congress, however, was still seeking further restrictions on U.S.-Yugoslav relations. In November they deprived the President of his

²⁶Ibid., 16 October 1963, p. 44.

²⁷Ibid., 18 October 1963, p. 1.

discretionary authority to waive the ban on military and economic aid to Yugoslavia,²⁸ and in February, 1964, they barred military aid to any country trading with Cuba.²⁹ Since U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange was being carried out primarily through cash sales at this time, these further restrictions did little to alter the conduct of foreign policy, although they did give U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia a rather "schizophrenic" appearance.³⁰

As this phase of U.S.-Yugoslav relations came to a close, there were signs that the United States was becoming more concerned about the Yugoslav efforts to become a leading spokesman among the non-aligned nations of the world. The history of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange has begun to show a pattern of domestic struggle between a Congress suspicious of dealings with Yugoslavia and an Administration interested in supporting a nation with a common enemy, even if that nation was not always the most cooperative partner in the international political arena. Military interchange during the period was limited primarily to sales of supplies to maintain equipment delivered earlier, and the immediate humanitarian response to the earthquake in Skopje.

Non-Alignment With Broadening Contacts: February 1964 - August 1968. During this phase, U.S. attention began to become preoccupied with Vietnam. From the earliest days of active American involvement in Southeast Asia, the Yugoslav government spoke out in opposition. Yugoslav power as one of the major spokesman of the non-aligned states became

²⁸Ibid., 8 November 1963, p. 1.

²⁹Ibid., 19 February 1964, p. 1.

³⁰The New York Times editorialized on the schizophrenic nature of U.S. policy in this area. See Ibid., 5 November 1963, p. 30.

a factor in her relations with the U.S. Twice during this period, Ambassador W. Averill Harriman called upon Tito to hear his ideas for ending the fighting in Vietnam and for enlisting his good offices in an effort to find a solution to the conflict.³¹ Concern over the war may have reduced the level of Yugoslav interest in buying military goods or services: it certainly reduced still more the already limited news coverage of interchange activities. There were no reports of military interchanges of any type reported in The New York Times during this period, except for the Tito-Harriman discussions over Vietnam. This does not mean that there was no interchange activity. The attache offices in Belgrade and Washington remained operational. There was undoubtedly some discussion of military matters by U.S. and Yugoslav representatives. But none of these activities was significant enough to warrant coverage in the Times.

Contacts were broadened between the two states during this phase by initiating a program for Fulbright Scholars, American students who study abroad using local currency funds accumulated through the sale of agricultural surpluses.³² This program was followed by a scientific exchange program in December, 1965, and an increase in the cultural exchange program in May, 1966. Economic help from the U.S. was made available despite of Congressional restrictions, by postponing repayment of earlier loans, thus making the payment funds available for economic reform.

³¹The two visits are described in The New York Times, 1 August and 31 December 1965.

³²This program, the first in a Communist country, was arranged during a visit to Yugoslavia by Senator Fulbright in November, 1964.

As in the past, the Administration was working toward broader contacts with the Yugoslavs while the Congress moved toward more restrictions on U.S. aid for Yugoslavia. In December, 1966, a Congressional ban was placed on sale of surplus food under the "Food for Peace" program to any nation that furnished or sold materials to North Vietnam.³³ Since private citizens' groups in Yugoslavia had been sending blood plasma to Hanoi, the restriction was applicable. The Administration worked to find means to help Yugoslavia that did not violate any of the many legislative restrictions, but was able to do little. Although both states continued to pledge themselves to positive relations, there was little interaction until the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia changed the environment in August, 1968.

Re-Establishing Contact: August 1968 - December 1972. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, like the interference in Hungary 12 years earlier, caused deep concern in the government in Belgrade. Tito's policy of non-alignment, and his desires to keep Yugoslavia free from entangling alliance with either major power bloc, was suddenly in direct conflict with a commitment to keep Yugoslavia free from invasion or internal pressure from the Soviet Union. As in 1956, there was no clear assurance that the Soviets would not find it in their interest to deal with Yugoslav independence through the use of force. If Yugoslavia was to be ready to withstand pressure

³³The impact of the "Findley Amendment" to the Agriculture Appropriations Act is discussed in The New York Times, 31 December 1966, p. 1. The Findley Amendment applied only to the sale of U.S. agricultural surpluses for payment in the currency of the purchaser (local currency). It does not prevent cash sales of agricultural products, such as those made to Yugoslavia, Poland and the U.S.S.R. since 1966.

from the U.S.S.R., support from the West was required. Tito set about re-establishing the closer contact that would be necessary to insure the availability of that support.

In the period since 1958, when the U.S. military assistance mission had departed, Yugoslav forces had been equipped largely with Soviet equipment. Although a few officers received training in the United States, many more were being trained in the U.S.S.R. Yugoslav military leaders had begun to train their forces to expect attack from the West, through Italy, Austria or Greece. Extended military operations were dependent upon a continuing flow of military supplies and equipment from the U.S.S.R. and that flow could no longer be assumed.³⁴

The Yugoslavs wanted closer economic ties with the United States, and the possibility of U.S. military assistance was growing once again. In mid October, Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, U.S. Undersecretary of State, conferred with Tito on the economic implications of the Czech invasion.³⁵ The details of the conference were not released, and no specific defense commitment was made by the U.S., but the communications were improving once again. Yugoslavia was repairing its bridges to the West, and military interchange was once again a likely element of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

The first open discussion of including Yugoslavia in Western defense planning came as a result of a speech by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to the NATO ministers' conference in November, 1968. His speech was widely interpreted as an American effort to prod NATO into extending its

³⁴Early reassessment of the Yugoslav dependence on the U.S.S.R. was reported in The New York Times, 1 September 1968, p. 2.

³⁵Ibid., 19 October 1968, p. 6.

security shield to cover the "gray" countries, Austria, Yugoslavia and Finland.³⁶ In other less threatening times, Tito might have been expected to protest this patronizing approach to the national interests of Yugoslavia, but no major protest was heard this time. Yugoslavia was reorganizing internally to meet this increased threat, and it appeared that American support in NATO was tolerable, if not welcome.³⁷ The first major U.S. action to assist Yugoslav defense efforts was an economic concession to postpone repayment of debts for agricultural commodities purchased earlier, so that the funds could be diverted to improving the readiness of Yugoslav defenses.³⁸ This was the same mechanism used four years earlier, but this time the U.S. intention was clearly military assistance, rather than general economic support for the Belgrade government. It was felt at the time that this was in line with the desires of President Tito, who was reported to be concerned about avoiding any action to secure arms that might provoke the U.S.S.R.³⁹ In the U.S., direct aid to Yugoslavia was still out of the question because of the legislative restrictions which remained in effect. If the Administration desired to use military interchange to support Yugoslavia, means would have to be found that did not require foreign aid

³⁶The speech was seen as a warning to the U.S.S.R. to stay out of these non-Warsaw Pact nations that lie in the path of any Soviet expansion beyond the eastern bloc into areas considered strategic to the U.S.S.R. See The New York Times, 16 November 1968, p. 1.

³⁷The Yugoslav budget for 1969 was announced in mid November, and included a defense budget comprising 61 percent of the national total. See The New York Times, 19 November 1968, p. 5.

³⁸These debts remained from loans made to Yugoslavia prior to the Congressional restrictions discussed above.

³⁹The New York Times, 18 April 1969, p. 12.

funds or the sale of agricultural surpluses. This left open direct cash sales and interchange funded through the military operations budget, or representational interchange that was not generally considered "aid" by Congressional critics.

The means chosen for the next step was high level representation: in July, 1969, an invitation was extended to President Nixon to visit Yugoslavia.⁴⁰ Representational interchange continued with the visit to Yugoslavia of the U.S. astronauts, Niel Armstrong, Colonel E. E. (Bud) Aldrin, and Colonel Collins. The astronauts were not in Yugoslavia to represent the U.S. military, but their professional background was not lost on President Tito, who took the occasion of their visit to toast them with a reminder of his current concern for security:

I do not like invaders on earth, but I hold in high esteem the conquering of celestial bodies, and I express my wishes for biggest success.⁴¹

The U.S. government was apparently getting Tito's message. In May, 1970, Yugoslavia celebrated the 25th anniversary of victory in World War II. Representatives from many allied nations were invited to Yugoslavia to take part in the celebration. Although the event received only a brief mention in the press, and no mention was made of U.S. presence at the ceremony, the U.S. sent a military delegation, headed

⁴⁰The invitation was first issued by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic during a visit to Bonn, while President Nixon was on his visit to the Far East. See The New York Times, 30 July 1969, p. 14.

⁴¹Toast by Tito at an official banquet for the astronauts. Ibid., 19 October 1969, p. 68.

by a major general, who served as an official representative of the Department of Defense.⁴²

The absence of any report in the open press of U.S. representation at the World War II Victory Anniversary suggests that there may have been other such instances of military interchange between the U.S. and Yugoslavia which have not been made public, or else were not considered newsworthy at the time they took place. Clearly this eliminates the possibility of a comprehensive study of military interchange if research is restricted to the open press. The purpose of this review of interchange between the U.S. and Yugoslavia, it must be remembered, is to evaluate the extent of the use of military means to support foreign policy operations: there is no requirement that each instance be identified in order to make this point, although the lack of comprehensive records can frustrate research into the area.

Once President Nixon accepted the invitation to visit Yugoslavia, the pace of military interchange began to accelerate. The instances shown in Figure 5.2 illustrate the progress that was made during the rest of this phase, through representational interchange.

The variety of military interchange means used during the period from 1958, when the military mission left Belgrade, until the end of 1972 provides an insight into the availability, flexibility and acceptability of military resources to conduct foreign policy operations

⁴²This visit is the first of five military-to-military contacts listed in the current files of the Assistant for East Europe and the U.S.S.R., Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs. An unclassified list of these contacts of August, 1973, was made available by Captain R. J. Kurth, USN, Staff Assistant for East Europe and the U.S.S.R., OASD/ISA.

MILITARY INTERCHANGE
Sep 70 - Dec 72

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Type Interchange</u> |
|-------------|---|--|
| Sep 70 | Honorable Warren G. Nutter, ASD/ISA, DOD visits Yugoslavia; information visit to build rapport (ISA Files) | Military funded, administrative, representation |
| Sep 70 | President Nixon visits Yugoslavia; praises developing relations (NYT, 4 Oct 70, p. 18) | Special, administrative, representation |
| Sep 71 | Major General Kadijevic, Deputy Chief of Operations, Yugoslav People's Army, visits U.S.; first mission in 20 years (ISA Files; NYT, 16 Sep 71, p. 9) | Military funded, administrative, representation |
| Sep 71 | U.S. increases offshore procurement in Yugoslavia of meat, furniture for U.S. military in Europe annual value, \$40 million (NYT, 19 Sep 71, p. 25) | Military funded, administrative, service |
| May 72 | I. P. Dolnicar, Yugoslav Assistant State Secretary of National Defense, visits U.S. (ISA Files) | Military funded, administrative, representation |
| Jun 72 | U.S. Secretary of State Rogers visits Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Greece; discusses improvements in cooperation and security (NYT, 10 Jul 72, p. 9) | Military funded, administrative, representation |
| Nov 72 | Major General E. B. Roberts leads U.S. military mission to Yugoslavia; orientation visit (ISA Files) | Recipient funded, administrative, representation |

Figure 5.2

under varied conditions. When viewed chronologically, the cycles of alienation and rapprochement can be appreciated. In general terms, it appears that the types of military interchange used are dependent on the attitudes about foreign aid (and particularly military assistance) that are held by the recipient nation and the U.S. Congress and Administration. Further, the willingness or ability of the recipient to pay for military goods and services has a definite effect on the types of interchange that are employed. In order to develop a better understanding of these relationships, it is necessary to conduct a more detailed analysis of the types of interchange used in each period. Such an evaluation will be undertaken in the chapter which follows, using the military interchange matrix developed in Chapter II to provide a framework to structure the comparison.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX TO U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

Viewed in general terms, the evidence of the preceding three chapters seems to indicate that military interchange has played an important role in U.S.-Yugoslav relations, at least during much of the time since World War II. Every incident of military interchange which took place between the U.S. and Yugoslavia was not reported in the press: the events discussed at the end of Chapter V which are recorded in the files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) but did not appear in The New York Times attest to this conclusion. However, there have been a wide variety of types of military interchange represented by those events which were recorded in the press. The purpose of this chapter is to use the military interchange matrix developed in Chapter II to study the variation of military interchange types between March, 1946, and December, 1972. A structured review such as this should reveal limitations on the types of interchange that were found useful at different times.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

In order to employ the matrix to analyze military interchange in U.S.-Yugoslav relations, as reported in the press, a four step process was devised for use in this study:

1. For each historical period discussed in Chapters IV and V, every reported incident of military interchange was identified with one

of the cells of the matrix. Each event was characterized by the type of PRODUCT involved, the military FUNCTION involved and the source of FUNDING used to support the interchange.¹

2. Each type of military interchange used during the period under review was plotted on a matrix such as the one shown in Figure 6.1.²

3. The completed matrices were examined to find patterns in the presence or absence of different types of interchange during the different periods.

4. Restrictions in the use of military interchange were identified, and explanations sought in the historical background of the period.

Each of the nine periods of U.S.-Yugoslav relations discussed earlier (five from Chapter IV and four from Chapter V) were examined in accordance with these procedures. The resulting charts of military interchange variety are included in Appendix I for reference. The data from these basic charts have been combined into Figure 6.1, which shows the variety of types of military interchange that have been used between the U.S. and Yugoslavia during the entire period studied. (A "type" of military interchange includes all events which involve the same PRODUCT, FUNCTION and source of FUNDING.)

¹In general this identification was not difficult to make. Some high level visits, such as those by the President of the U.S. or his personal advisors to Yugoslavia did not fit easily into one of the FUNDING categories, since neither military nor foreign aid funding is normally used to pay for these visits. These events were disregarded for the purposes of this analysis, although their importance to the development of military interchange is recognized.

²This matrix has the same elements as the military interchange matrix developed in Chapter II (Figure 2.5). It has been expanded to make it easier to use.

A quick look at this summary shows that there are complete voids in two categories of interchange: regardless of the source of funding, there were no reported instances of interchange involving INFORMATION PRODUCTS, or the INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION. The lack of information products is not explained by the available data, but a plausible explanation is suggested by the nature of the public press which supplied the data, and certain characteristics of Yugoslav society. A newspaper such as The New York Times is not an official public record of all international dealings between the U.S. government and other states. Reporters are not normally interested in covering routine, common place events. Even at the height of U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia, most shipments of supplies were not reported. The interchange of information is such a ubiquitous form of military interchange, that seldom does it come to the attention of reporters from the public press. Newspaper editors too, must make judgments concerning the worth of a news item. The adage about "Man bites dog: that's news!" must be applied to help explain the lack of reports of interchange involving information products. Unless the information is important, unusual or very interesting in some other popular way, it is not likely to appear in print.

Reports of military interchange involving the INTELLIGENCE function are likely to be missing from these charts for slightly different reasons. There may, in fact, have been few instances where both the U.S. and Yugoslavia were interested in sharing information, goods, services or representation with significant intelligence content. The ideological differences between the countries have remained great even during periods of close cooperation. Of all the types of military interchange, intelligence appears to be the last function to be developed, and the mutual suspicion between East and West is likely to have limited

U.S.-YUGOSLAV MILITARY INTERCHANGE
1946-1972

SUMMARY MATRIX

INFORMATION
 GOODS
 SERVICES
 REPRESENTATION
 ADMINISTRATION
 INTELLIGENCE
 OPERATIONS
 LOGISTICS

FUNDING:

Open cells indicate no reported military interchange of that type during the period un

FUNDING:

Open cells indicate no reported military interchange of that type during the period under review.

Filled cells indicate some reported instance of interchange.

Example: U.S. use of Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds in 1950 to furnish \$16 million worth of food and clothing for the Yugoslav armed forces, November, 1950. This was the first reported instance of foreign aid funded military interchange following the Yugoslav custer from the Cominform in the summer of 1948. (This is an example of foreign aid funded, administrative goods.)

Figure 6.1

intelligence interchange opportunities. If, on the other hand, some form of intelligence interchange were to have been developed, it is not at all likely that either government would have made announced it.

RESTRICTIONS AND POTENTIALS OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE

Looking at the nine charts of military interchange in greater detail, some patterns begin to appear. The types of interchange used seem to be affected by two general factors: the desires of U.S. and Yugoslav officials to have bilateral relations expressed through military means, and the availability of U.S. and Yugoslav funds to support the use of military interchange. The desire of the U.S. government to use military resources to support U.S. relations with Yugoslavia (as expressed through the Congress and the Administration as two separate actors) has shifted over time. Yugoslav desire to obtain military goods, and services from the United States has also varied, but not always according to the same schedule. Thus, there have been times when military interchange was desired by all, times when it was desired by virtually no one, and times when U.S. desires were mixed, or at cross purposes with those of the Yugoslavs.

In similar fashion, the available sources of funds have varied over time. At the outset, the devastation left by World War II was so extensive that the Yugoslavs had no resources, not to mention U.S. dollar reserves, to spend for U.S. military interchange. Later, after 1958, sales to the Yugoslavs became a significant method of funding military interchange with the U.S. Immediately after World War II the nearly complete demobilization of U.S. military forces would have reduced the availability of U.S. military funded interchange resources. From 1950

on, there were military resources available, but priorities were high in Western Europe and Korea, and later Vietnam, again restricting the availability of U.S. military funded interchange. The availability of foreign aid funding has varied from large scale support during the period between 1951 and 1955, to the complete restriction on all military aid to Yugoslavia after the 1964 Congressional action against nations trading with Cuba. The combination of differences of desire for military interchange and the capability to pay for it have separated the nine periods of U.S.-Yugoslav history discussed earlier. But, although each period is somewhat different, they can be grouped broadly into three phases. The first phase, before Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform in 1948, stands alone. It is an example of the limited value of military interchange when one or both states are fundamentally opposed to it. The second phase includes the remaining four periods discussed in Chapter IV, from the Yugoslav break with the Cominform to the end of the U.S. military assistance mission in Belgrade, in March, 1958. This time was marked by a willingness by both states to use military interchange, and availability of U.S. foreign aid funding, but general absence of Yugoslav resources to purchase military interchange products. The third phase contains the remaining four periods, when U.S. foreign aid funding had been restricted or forbidden by Congress, but both U.S. and Yugoslav officials still desired to conduct military interchange.

A discussion of each of these phases will help clarify the flexibility of military interchange, and the use of the matrix to point out the different types of interchange that have been used under these varied conditions.

Phase I: Dogmatic Yugoslav Rejection. During the first period of U.S. interaction with the Tito government after World War II, there was virtually no military interchange, as can be seen from the chart at Figure 6.2. Yugoslavia had rejected close alliance with the West on ideological grounds, and was committed to a full partnership with Moscow in the camp of the Socialist nations. There was, at the same time, a reluctance on the part of American officials to enter into military dealings with the satellites of the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia was thought to be of these among the most dedicated. As a result, military contact during this period was apparently limited to the work of attaches, whose presence, as part of the diplomatic mission, was tolerated by the Yugoslav government, if not encouraged. One military attache in Belgrade during this period was singled out by the senior U.S. representative in Yugoslavia for his ability to develop close and confident relations with Yugoslav officials.³ This skill at developing personal relations is the event referred to by the circle in the cell in Figure 6.2 under MILITARY FUNDED, ADMINISTRATIVE REPRESENTATION. The role for military interchange during periods of animosity such as this one can be described as maintenance and training: maintenance of contact wherever possible, and training to insure responsiveness when the climate for international relations changes. So long as the recipient country is unwilling to consider military interchange there will be little potential for this activity beyond representation through attaches.

³Colonel Partridge was commended by John M. Cabot for establishing friendly, confident contact with Yugoslav officials "... simply applying the principles of courtesy, understanding, justice, interest, consideration and straightforwardness as well as firmness." See U.S. Department of State, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Vol. IV in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 823.

PHASE I: U.S.-YUGOSLAV MILITARY INTERCHANGE
January 1946 - June 1948

"Dogmatic Yugoslav Rejection"

| P R O D U C T | R E C I P I E N T | | | | F O R E I G N A I D | | | | M I L I T A R Y | | | |
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| R E P R E S E N T A T I O N | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
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| I N T E L L I G E N C E | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
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| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| O P E R A T I O N S | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| L O G I S T I C S | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | |

NOTES: ☐ review. ☒ Filled cells indicate some reported instance of interchange of that type. ☒ The cell marked with a circle is discussed in the text.

Figure 6.2

Phase II: Active Cooperation. This second phase is the most active, in terms of the variety of military resources used to support U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Figure 6.3 shows the types of interchange used as reported in the public press and discussed in Chapter IV above. Except for food and clothing sent by the U.S. to aid the Yugoslav armed forces after a disastrously poor harvest in 1951, most activity is concentrated in U.S. funded efforts to provide OPERATIONS and LOGISTICS GOODS and SERVICES, and the REPRESENTATION necessary to develop an effective program. An example of one instance from this phase that fits into the FOREIGN AID funded, OPERATIONS GOODS cell of Figure 6.3 is the "Apr 52" entry in Figure 4.4. This entry refers to a reported shipment of quantities of propeller driven fighter planes, tanks, scout cars and other items of military equipment designed to improve the operational capability of the Yugoslav Army. The shipment was funded under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, authorized by one of the Acts of Congress that has been used to appropriate funds for foreign aid.

This was the era of U.S. mutual defense assistance pacts with many nations, motivated within the United States by common feelings among Americans that they had a responsibility to aid any nation that was opposed to domination by the U.S.S.R. During most of this phase, and particularly between March, 1951, and May, 1955, the U.S. government appeared to be willing seriously to consider every Yugoslav request for assistance that would enhance Yugoslav security against the U.S.S.R.

There was a growing pressure in the U.S. Congress during the latter part of this phase to restrict U.S. "aid" to Yugoslavia. This pressure grew in conjunction with the wide range of attacks on Communism led by Senator McCarthy. Although the pressure was not directly effective

PHASE II: U.S.-YUGOSLAV MILITARY INTERCHANGE
June 1948 - March 1958

"Active Cooperation"




Figure 6.3


in stopping U.S. grants for arms assistance for the Yugoslavs, it was an important indirect cause of the end of the U.S. military assistance mission in Belgrade. As discussed in Chapter IV, Tito became frustrated with recurring U.S. "reassessments" of programs to aid Yugoslavia, and asked in late 1957 that further aid be terminated.

Phase III: Foreign Military Sales. This phase covers the time after the U.S. Congress severely limited, then cut off, all U.S. foreign aid funds for Yugoslavia. It shows a different distribution of military interchange means used. Figure 6.4 shows the shift to recipient funding for most of the goods and services. The one FOREIGN AID funded, ADMINISTRATIVE GOODS entry in Figure 6.4 is the provision of emergency housing from U.S. military stockpiles in France following the disastrous earthquake in Skopje in the summer of 1963. Under normal circumstances, the military service providing such humanitarian assistance is reimbursed from funds specifically appropriated by Congress for disaster relief.

The variety of interchange means was restricted during this time by Yugoslav unwillingness to accept further U.S. grants, and reluctance within the U.S. Congress to provide any aid whatsoever to Yugoslavia. The U.S. Administration remained interested in continued support for the Yugoslav government, however, and some of the means of interchange used during this period reflect the flexibility of this means of supporting U.S. foreign policy. A good example is the use of military offshore procurement to increase Yugoslav ability to purchase from the U.S. through the foreign military sales program. As mentioned in Chapter V, in September, 1971, the U.S. military forces in Europe increased their annual spending in Yugoslavia for meat and household furniture from \$20 million to \$40 million. At the same time U.S. officials in

PHASE III: U.S.-YUGOSLAV MILITARY INTERCHANGE
 March 1958 - December 1972

"Foreign Military Sales"



Cell marked with a circle represents the provision of emergency housing to Yugoslavia following the earthquake in July, 1963.

Figure 6.4

Washington announced that the annual payment on Yugoslav debts to the U.S., in the amount of \$56 million had been postponed.⁴ These two actions made available \$96 million that could be used by the Yugoslavs to purchase military equipment, parts and services from the United States, through programs that did not require Congressional approval. In the face of the continuing history of Congressional restrictions on aid to nations trading with opponents of the U.S. (Cuba, imposed in 1964, and later North Vietnam, in 1966), this action illustrated the flexibility of military interchange as a means of supporting U.S. foreign policy. Despite Congressionally imposed restrictions on the use of foreign aid funds, and continued Yugoslav reluctance to take U.S. grant aid, military interchange remained available in the form of foreign military sales (RECIPIENT FUNDED) and representation or services funded through the U.S. military budgets.

In summary, military interchange was a part of U.S.-Yugoslav relations throughout nearly all of the period between the rise of Tito to national power in March, 1946, and the end of 1972. The types of interchange used were varied, depending upon the desire in the U.S. and in Yugoslavia to use military resources to support foreign policy, and the willingness within both states to provide funds for these activities. When military interchange was not desired by the Yugoslavs (as in Phase I) activity was limited to minimum contact by U.S. military attaches. When the U.S. Congress did not desire to aid Yugoslavia but both the Yugoslavs and the U.S. Administration wanted to continue to develop military contacts (as in Phase III) interchange was largely limited to RECIPIENT FUNDED and MILITARY FUNDED activity. Throughout the more than 25 years

⁴The New York Times, 19 September 1971, p. 25.

studied, the Yugoslavs appeared to be primarily interested in U.S. GOODS and SERVICES which would improve the OPERATIONS and LOGISTICS capability of the Yugoslav military forces. In times of food shortage, or natural disaster, ADMINISTRATIVE GOODS and SERVICES were accepted to relieve suffering.

As the willingness of the states to pay for military interchange shifted, there were changes in the patterns of activity. Initially neither the U.S. nor Yugoslavia had funds for extensive military contact, and activity was limited largely to representation. During the years of extensive Mutual Defense Assistance Program support (during Phase II) most activities were funded through this program. Later, as the Yugoslavs developed the ability to trade with the West, sales became more important. Whatever funding means were available, however, there was the potential for using military resources to support the development of U.S.-Yugoslav relations, and during most of the period reviewed, some form of military interchange was taking place.

PROJECTING THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE

Given the variety of ways military resources may be used to support U.S. foreign policy, and the flexibility that this represents, it would be useful to take advantage of U.S. experience in Yugoslavia when planning for the improvement of U.S. relations elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The military interchange matrix does aid in this task by identifying potential uses for military resources. This "projecting" of potential uses for military interchange, as it is called in this study, is not an attempt to predict the course of U.S. relations in Eastern Europe. The development of East-West relations is far too complex to be

attempted without much more information than was available during the course of this study. However, if a plausible future situation can be assumed for planning purposes, then potential uses for military interchange can be identified through the use of the matrix. The example which follows postulates such a situation in the Polish People's Republic. It is provided as an example of how the matrix can be used as a tool for planners to help identify possible types of military interchange for further detailed consideration.

It must be emphasized that the scenario developed below is not a prediction of the future of U.S. relations with any nation. It was written to be plausible, to conform to the characteristics of the area and the nations involved, but it is not a prediction. Further, the suggestion that military interchange may have potential use in any particular situation is not a recommendation for such use. The decision to use military resources in this way is usually based on considerations that are broader than the military situation alone. Military advice is normally available to policy makers, but the final decision rests with the President as Commander-in-Chief. Finally, these projections are not an endorsement of a particular U.S. policy toward any country. Such endorsements are beyond the scope of this study.

The method for projecting possible future uses of military interchange that was used in this example is as follows:

1. The situation between the U.S. and the recipient country for the desired time is described, based on the best assumptions available.
2. Based on this background, the desire for military interchange by both the U.S. and the recipient is developed, and the possible availability of funds is determined.

3. Depending on willingness to use military resources, and the availability of funds, cells of the matrix which are not feasible are lined out and eliminated.

4. Those matrix cells remaining represent potentials for military interchange. Specific acts for each type of interchange are then identified.

5. Each act identified is considered further in light of overall U.S. policy.

6. Those types of military interchange which remain feasible and politically acceptable (from the standpoint of other U.S. relations) are proposed as actions to support U.S. policy.

In the example which follows, this procedure has been followed to develop possible military interchange actions between the U.S. and the Polish People's Republic in the immediate future. Two additional examples are included in Appendix II, covering the Federal Socialist Republic of Romania in the near future and the People's Republic of Albania in the long-range future.

Military Interchange Projection: The Polish People's Republic in the Immediate Future. Poland is a close and faithful ally of the U.S.S.R., but not completely under the control of Moscow. The Polish people have a history spanning more than a thousand years, and this heritage has an influence on the attitudes of the Poles toward their neighbors to the east, as well as their goals for the development of the Polish state. A recent assessment of Polish development sees Poland as a society in transition ". . . from chivalry and cavalry . . . to . . .

industrialization and international 'realism.'⁵ This transition is reflected in many areas of Polish life, but most importantly in the drive to develop Polish industrial production on a "realistic" Marxist-Leninist model. Since the end of World War II, when Poland lay devastated after more than six years of Nazi occupation, Polish industry has been built into the major sector of the nation's economic life. Between 1950 and 1970 industrial investment grew at the average rate of 9 percent annually.⁶ It is estimated that by 1980 industry and construction will provide nearly 72 percent of Polish national income.⁷ This growth, though impressive, has been made by increased volume rather than improved productivity through the introduction of modern technology. Poland needs modern, Western technology and Western markets to permit this growth to continue as planned.⁸ The Polish government has worked to build commercial and cultural relations with the United States, while following the lead of Moscow in the broad outlines of policy.

Poland has a unique relationship with the U.S.S.R. They follow what is seen as a hard line in external relations, supporting Soviet policies abroad, while seeking to exercise limited internal freedom to guide the course of Polish society along a slightly different, but clearly parallel, path.⁹ They support economic integration into the Council

⁵Joseph R. Fiszman, "Poland - Continuity and Change," in Peter A. Thoma, ed., The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 41.

⁶U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-162: Area Handbook for Poland (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 249. (Hereafter referred to as DA Pam 550-162.)

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 172.

⁹Ibid., p. 177.

for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA or Comecon) because it favors industrial development which Poland desires.¹⁰ They further support the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and participated with the Soviets in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Poland is thus limited by the U.S.S.R. in international relations, particularly of a military or political nature, but seeking to develop a strong, modern industrial society with a Polish, rather than a Soviet flavor.

The U.S. has attempted to deal with Poland as an independent state, to the extent possible under these conditions. U.S.-Polish relations in commerce and science have been more extensive than with any other East European nation.¹¹ Given these current conditions, there are only limited possibilities for U.S.-Polish military interchange in the immediate future. Foreign aid funded interchange with Poland is not likely, because of restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress in 1968 prohibiting military assistance to nations trading with North Vietnam. Recipient funded military interchange is also not likely: Polish deference to Soviet stands on international military policy, and Polish integration into the WTO are likely to restrict their purchase of any form of military interchange products from the U.S. In the category of military funded interchange, there are also restrictions, but there are also some possibilities. The provision of U.S. military goods of any

¹⁰Ibid., p. 188. Comecon is the Soviet led alliance, founded in 1949 to promote and guide economic cooperation among Communist-led European states. The original theory, to develop international division of labor among Communist states, has not been realized because of the reluctance of some member states to surrender economic sovereignty to the U.S.S.R.

¹¹U.S. Department of State, Polish People's Republic - Background Notes, Department of State Publication No. 8020 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 5.

type is not likely as long as Poland is completely integrated into the WTO and supports Soviet military action by providing forces to the Warsaw Pact. Because of this integration, the U.S. is also not likely to desire to provide intelligence interchange of any kind. Similarly, the interchange of services are likely to be limited to emergency relief for humanitarian reasons, such as the fully staffed hospital which was sent to Yugoslavia following the earthquake in Skopje, Yugoslavia, in August, 1963.

Once these restrictions on the use of military interchange have been imposed, the types of activity still available to support U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia are primarily in the product areas of INFORMATION and REPRESENTATION. The chart at Figure 6.5 shows these potentials. If the decision were made to seek an increase in the level of military interchange activity with the Poles, these are the types of activities that U.S. military planners could suggest. Suggestions would require detailed analysis by policy makers to insure integration into overall U.S. foreign policy. Activities might include the invitation of Polish military attaches to visit certain defense installations where logistics or administrative training was underway (such as Fort Benjamin Harrison, or Fort Lee). Such visits would not compromise U.S. security, but would be likely to appeal to Polish pride in their modern, mechanized armed forces, and Polish desire to improve the technological level of their society.¹² More frequent and wider contact between Polish military attaches in the United States and U.S. military leaders is also possible, as a low-profile way of improving relations without sacrificing security.

¹²Polish pride in their modern armed forces is highlighted by Joseph Fiszman in his assessment of Poland today. See Fiszman, op. cit., p. 70.

PROJECTING MILITARY INTERCHANGE WITH POLAND

Identification of Possible Military Activity in the Immediate Future

| P R O D U C T | F U N D I N G | | | | R E C I P I E N T | | | | F O R E I G N A I D | | | | M I L I T A R Y | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | A D M I N I S T R A T I O N | | | | I N T E L L I G E N C E | | | | O P E R A T I O N S | | | | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | A D M I N I S T R A T I O N | | | | I N T E L L I G E N C E | | | | O P E R A T I O N S | | | | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | A D M I N I S T R A T I O N | | | | I N T E L L I G E N C E | | | | O P E R A T I O N S | | | | | | |
| | I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | A D M I N I S T R A T I O N | | | | I N T E L L I G E N C E | | | | O P E R A T I O N S | | | | | | |
| I N F O R M A T I O N | | | | A D M I N I S T R A T I O N | | | | I N T E L L I G E N C E | | | | O P E R A T I O N S | | | | L O G I S T I C S | | | |

FUNDING: RECIPIENT FOREIGN AID MILITARY
Cells lined out indicate that type of interchange not likely under projected situation.

NOTES:

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○

○

Open cells indicate a potential for that type interchange.

An example of MILITARY FUNDED, ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATION, visits by Polish attaches to some U.S. installation (such as Fort Benjamin Harrison) where administrative training is carried out.

Figure 6.5

One issue which would affect the overall willingness of U.S. policy makers to use military interchange at all is the status of U.S. relations with other European powers, and the relationship of Poland with those same states. If the use of military resources to develop improved relations with the Poles will be interpreted in other European capitals (or indeed, in any other place which the U.S. considers important) as an act counter to the best interests of Western security, there is no call for military interchange. However, these means are available, and can be used very quickly and quietly to support a change of policy, even before it has become generally known to the American people or to the world at large. In summary, for the immediate future, there are a few military funded interchange means that are available to support U.S.-Polish relations, which do represent some potential role for the military in relations with East European nations.

SUMMARY

Looking back over the discussion of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange since World War II, several general observations can now be made. First, the method of applying a structured analysis such as the military interchange matrix to data from the public press does provide some insights into the role for the U.S. military in support of foreign policy. This analysis is limited by the lack of assured completeness of the data, which will not include either items of classified information, or reports of incidents considered by publishers to be too routine or uninteresting to be printed.

Second, the role of military interchange is restricted by the unwillingness of the recipient nation (in this case the Yugoslavs) to

accept certain types of interchange. The possible scope of interchange has been further limited by the U.S. Congress, which must appropriate funds to support Foreign Aid programs each year, and has used foreign aid legislation as a forum to express criticism or disapproval of the Administration on many occasions. None of these restrictions should be considered permanent. Recipient nations have, in the past, rapidly changed their willingness to conduct military interchange with the U.S., as Yugoslavia did in 1948, 1956 and 1968, in response to a perceived threat from the U.S.S.R. Reluctance on the part of other nations is no less likely to change suddenly, in response to future situations which are only a matter of conjecture at the present time.

* Congressional opposition to foreign aid is not more permanent than recipient unwillingness. When Israel was threatened in October of 1973, and massive shipments of U.S. military supplies were required to prevent total defeat, Congressional support for the sale, on credit, of supplies and equipment to Israel was immediate. If Congress perceives that the United States can and ought to help, grant aid will probably be available. If not, U.S. experience in Yugoslavia indicates that there are military interchange means available which do not require Congressional approval.

There does appear to be some potential for using the matrix to aid in identifying possible uses of military interchange in the future. The value of the military interchange matrix does not lie in being able to predict how U.S. relations will develop. It is useful to provide an overview of the range of military options available to policy makers under given circumstances. Each of the types of interchange shown on the matrix is the responsibility of some office or staff agency in the

Department of Defense. In many cases, each service has one or more elements that are responsible for planning for and proposing particular types of military interchange. Except for a few high level staff offices within the Defense and State Departments, it is difficult to find any element with the broad responsibility to study the entire spectrum of military involvement in foreign policy in non-hostile situations. These few offices are often operating under severe time pressure, particularly during crisis situations. Staff planners in this situation do not have time to sift leisurely through a loosely organized mental catalogue of military capabilities with policy implications. They must have some means for identifying potentials for the use of military resources in the situation at hand, or accept the suggestions of specialists who are often not in a position to evaluate their own type of interchange in relation to all possible types. The military interchange matrix, used in the manner indicated in the scenario above, appears to provide an effective tool for organizing staff proposals and insuring that every type of interchange with potential application has been considered.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTERCHANGE

This study has focused in turn on the development of a matrix of military interchange, a discussion of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange using that matrix to array the examples of interchange reported in the press, primarily The New York Times, and finally the application of the matrix to projecting potential uses of military interchange in the future, elsewhere in East Europe. Several observations can be made on the basis of the discussion of these three related areas.

Military Interchange Matrix. Despite some initial problems of ambiguity arising out of accepted military definitions for functions and military interchange products, the matrix as developed proved easy to use. Except for the funding category of certain high level visits by U.S. officials to Yugoslavia to discuss military matters, and Tito's official visit to the United States, other examples fell clearly into one of the types of interchange defined by PRODUCT, FUNCTION and source of FUNDING for military interchange. Returning to the characteristics of good coding variables stated by G. David Garson and discussed in Chapter II, the matrix meets the criteria with the understanding that high level visits, though they may address military matters, are not, strictly speaking "military interchange."¹ Distribution of data elements

¹For a discussion of the properties of good coding variables, see Chapter II above, and G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1971), p. 76.

among cells of the matrix is not uniform, but the concentrations, as into foreign military sales, or foreign aid funded interchange, can be explained by the broader political context within which the activity was taking place.

The matrix provides a means for arraying incidents of military interchange for study and review. It highlights the effect of two factors, the desire for military interchange and the willingness to pay for it, on the actions of the recipient nation, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Administration. As these actors varied in their desire and willingness to pay for military interchange, there were corresponding changes in the nature of interchange means used. Analysis based on the matrix draws attention to the potential disagreement between the President and Congress over the use of military resources to support U.S. foreign policy. This is an appropriate focus, given the power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to order military forces into action, and the increasing Congressional concern with the employment of U.S. military forces overseas.

The matrix also shows some promise as a tool for use by strategic planners in identifying potential missions for the military in the development of U.S. relations abroad. Specifically, it provides a general overview of the types of military activity that may be appropriate in a given situation, and may aid in identifying specific military tasks far enough in advance to permit careful evaluation before U.S. forces are ordered into action.

U.S.-Yugoslav Military Interchange As Reported in The New York Times. From the review of Yugoslav history and the development of U.S.-Yugoslav relations prior to 1945, several themes emerge that have

influenced the course of later military interchange contacts; internal dissension among the Yugoslavs, a fierce independence of spirit, Tito's original loyalty to Soviet ideological leadership (which developed into his personal interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology--"Titoism") and the personal prestige of Tito himself.

These themes were operative during the period after World War II, when Yugoslavia withdrew from the West, and worked to become the most loyal of the Soviet partners. During this period the Yugoslav government was fundamentally opposed to military contact with the West, and U.S. interests, both in Congress and in the Administration were preoccupied with the reconstruction of a Europe devastated by the war. U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange was limited to minor acts of representation, funded by the U.S. military, and designed to keep open some channel of communication into Yugoslavia.

The period from June, 1948, until the end of U.S. military "aid" in March, 1958, was the most varied phase of military interchange. During this phase, both Belgrade and Washington (the President and Congress) were generally in favor of U.S. military assistance to the Yugoslavs. The U.S. was willing to fund such activities through foreign aid appropriations as well as through the operating budgets of the military services. Yugoslavia, at this time, was not able to purchase military interchange products from the U.S. because of a lack of capital. The pattern of interchange types employed during this phase indicates these conditions, in the absence of recipient funded activity, and the distribution of reported incidents of military interchange between foreign aid and military funding. Most activity was concentrated in American efforts to provide operational and logistic goods and services, along with the representation necessary to develop effective relations.

The third phase, covering the period from March, 1958, until the end of 1972, is marked by Congressional unwillingness to support U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange, and by Yugoslav fluctuation between a willingness to purchase considerable military goods, to apparent Yugoslav rejection of nearly all forms of U.S. military contact beyond the minimum provided through diplomatic representation. (This rejection seemed to be the case during the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.) Review of military interchange during this phase demonstrates the flexibility of this means of supporting U.S. foreign policy under widely varying circumstances of desire for interchange and willingness to pay for it.

During the review of this third phase, the limitations of The New York Times as a data source became apparent. For the period that the U.S. was most heavily involved in Vietnam (from February 1964 until August 1968), there was no coverage of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange in The New York Times. There was some form of representation in progress, through the attaches if by no other means, but there was a void in the press. Although this does not invalidate the matrix approach to analysis of military interchange, nor does it eliminate The New York Times as a source of unclassified data about the subject, it does establish limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from such data: no attempt is made to conclude in this study that the military interchange reported in the press was the only activity between the U.S. and Yugoslav military forces. Coverage in the press is taken to indicate that the activity did occur as reported, and the conclusions made here about value of military interchange are made on the basis of events which were reported.

From this review of the patterns of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange it can be seen that military interchange was a flexible means supporting American relations with Yugoslavia through a wide range of conditions. Military resources were normally available for this use, and could usually be tailored into a type of activity that was acceptable to U.S. and Yugoslav authorities.

Application of the Matrix to Planning for Relations in East Europe. After application to a hypothetical scenario of the development of U.S. relations with nations in East Europe, the matrix shows some promise as a tool for strategic planners. Specifically, it provides a general overview of the type of military activity that may be appropriate in a given situation. It appears to aid in identifying specific military tasks far enough in the advance to permit careful evaluation of the impact of this military involvement, before a decision to commit resources is required.

In conclusion, the military interchange matrix developed in this study does provide a logical method of describing the foreign policy operations executed by the United States' military. This means does show some promise as a device for projecting such operations into new situations. When applied to the history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations since World War II, the flexible, available nature of military interchange is highlighted. The use of military resources to support foreign policy has, on occasion, involved military personnel in activities that are beyond the normal scope of military operations. Such involvement must be anticipated and planned for. Military planners and operators are likely to continue to be involved in military interchange activity for

as long as the U.S. has any information, goods or services that are desired by other states.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

GRAPHICAL REVIEW: U.S.-YUGOSLAV

MILITARY INTERCHANGE


Included on succeeding pages are graphical representations of eight of the nine historical periods of U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange discussed in Chapters IV and V. The first period, from March 1946 to June 1948, is not included here since it is included in Chapter VI, in the discussion of Phase I of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

The methods used to make these charts are the same as were used for the charts in Chapter VI. Each reported instance of military interchange was associated with a cell of the matrix, and each cell which had some activity then was filled on the chart. Notes on each chart below contain brief comments on the major trends identified in each period. The charts included in this appendix are listed below.

| FIGURE | PERIOD | TITLE |
|--------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|
| I.1 | Jun 48 - Mar 51 | Worried Rapprochement |
| I.2 | Mar 51 - May 55 | Active Community of Interest |
| I.3 | May 55 - May 57 | Fearful Alienation |
| I.4 | May 57 - Mar 58 | Trial Reconciliation |
| I.5 | Mar 58 - Sep 61 | Secret Sales |
| I.6 | Sep 61 - Feb 64 | Yugoslav Non-Alignment |
| I.7 | Feb 64 - Aug 68 | Non-Alignment With Broadening Contact |
| I.8 | Aug 68 - Dec 72 | Military Interchange Revitalized |

WORRIED RAPPROCHEMENT

June 1948 - March 1951




NOTES: 1. Rapprochement began with the Soviet led attack on Yugoslavia in the Cominform in the summer of 1948, and ended with the arrival of a U.S. military assistance attache on the staff of the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade.

2. The FOREIGN AID funded, ADMINISTRATIVE GOODS entered on the chart were food and clothing for the Yugoslav armed forces, which were provided by President Truman at Yugoslav request, in November, 1950, using Mutual Defense Assistance Program resources.

Figure I.1

ACTIVE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST

March 1951 - May 1955



NOTES: 1. This period began with the arrival of the U.S. military assistance attache in Belgrade, and ended with a good will visit to Yugoslavia by Soviet leaders, which had strong psychological impact on some U.S. leaders.


2. This was the most active period of those reviewed.

3. Interchange was conducted primarily through U.S. funded means: Yugoslav capacity to pay was virtually non-existent.

Figure I.2

FEARFUL ALIENATION

May 1955 - May 1957




NOTE: This period began with the Soviet good will visit to Belgrade and ended when President Eisenhower ordered the resumption of aid, after a year-long suspension.

Figure I.3

TRIAL RECONCILIATION

May 1957 - March 1958




NOTE: During this period attention seemed to be focused on high level visits attempting to prevent the end of U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia. They were not successful, and the attache for military assistance departed from Belgrade in March, 1958, marking the end of foreign aid funded interchange, and the end of this period.

Figure I.4

SECRET SALES

March 1958 - September 1961




- NOTES: 1. This period includes the time of U.S. sales to the Yugoslav government without full disclosure to the public.
2. The period ends with the expose of U.S. sales and the public review of U.S.-Yugoslav relations which accompanied it.

Figure I.5

YUGOSLAV NON-ALIGNMENT

September 1961 - February 1964




- NOTES: 1. This period was characterized by growing Yugoslav attention to leadership among the non-aligned nations, and increased pressure in the U.S. Congress to stop all forms of interchange with Yugoslavia.
2. U.S. relief following the Skopje earthquake in the summer of 1963 accounts for two of the cells filled above (FOREIGN AID funded, ADMINISTRATIVE GOODS, and MILITARY funded ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES).

Figure I.6

NON-ALIGNMENT WITH BROADENING CONTACT

February 1964 - August 1968




NOTE: During this period the effects of the Vietnam war were apparent in U.S.-Yugoslav military interchange. Although U.S.-Yugoslav contacts broadened in other fields, and there were high level visits, there were no reported instances of military interchange.

Figure I.7

MILITARY INTERCHANGE REVITALIZED

August 1968 - December 1972



NOTES: 1. The Soviet intervention in August 1968 had a marked effect on Yugoslav interest in military interchange with the U.S.

2. Activity during this period can be characterized as building confidence in both nations toward more extensive interchange activity.

Figure I.8

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II

THE MILITARY INTERCHANGE MATRIX AS AN AID TO PLANNING

The use of the military interchange matrix was discussed in Chapter VI. In addition to the projection of interchange with Poland in the immediate future, two other examples have been prepared, one for possible interchange with the Socialist Republic of Romania in the near future, and one for the People's Republic of Albania. Following these two examples is a brief discussion of the possibilities of improving the value of the matrix by developing a computer assisted data base for generating military interchange options during the planning process.

Socialist Republic of Romania: Military Interchange in the Near Future. Romania, known to some as ". . . the maverick of the Warsaw bloc . . ." provides the locus for two to five year projection of U.S. military interchange into East Europe.¹ The Romanians, whose history spans 23 centuries of violent invasions, trace their cultural origins to the Roman Empire, which controlled the area during the first and second centuries.² Prior to World War II, the Romanians had looked to the West, primarily France, for their cultural, social and technological leadership. Romanian history shows many examples of the state being

¹The phrase is taken from Thomas W. Wolfe's study of Soviet power in Europe. See Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 303.

²U.S. Department of State, Socialist Republic of Romania--Background Notes, Department of State Publication 7890 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1.

ruled by a small minority with varying degrees of guidance from outside, hence the Communist takeover after World War II was not unusual.³

Since 1958, when occupation troops from the U.S.S.R. were removed during a Soviet reduction of forces, the Romanian government has been moving steadily toward a foreign policy independent of guidance from Moscow. In 1962, Premier Gheorghiu-Dej rejected a Soviet attempt to revive the Comecon as a supranational planning body that would have required the Romanians to concentrate on providing agricultural products and raw materials for other, more highly developed East European nations.⁴ Responding to this Soviet led attempt to keep Romania in an industrially undeveloped state, the Romanian government contracted with Britain and France to build a large steel mill at Galati, near the mouth of the Danube. Western technology has been flowing to the country ever since, although not always at a rapid rate. The Romanian "New Course" developed over the next two years, while the Soviets continued to exert pressure to bring the country into a subservient, specialized role within Comecon.⁵ In April, 1964, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) issued a statement that has become known as the "Declaration of Marxist Independence," which held that integration within Comecon was "incompatible with national sovereignty."⁶ Romania and the United States exchanged ambassadors

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-160: Area Handbook for Romania (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 158. (Hereafter referred to as DA Pam 550-160.)

⁵Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The Socialist Republic of Romania," in Peter A. Toma, The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 28.

⁶For a text of the statement see William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 269-96.

shortly after this, in another step by the Romanians to improve their relations with the West.

During the Czech Crisis in 1968, the Romanians mobilized their armed forces, but not to accompany Warsaw Pact elements into Czechoslovakia. They prepared to oppose a Soviet invasion of Romania, which seemed "imminent" during August and September.⁷ Although they opposed U.S. policies in Vietnam, the Romanians invited President Nixon to visit Bucharest after his visit to the Far East in the summer of 1969. He accepted, and the visit (first by an American President to a Communist state since the Teheran conference in 1945) was seen as a significant demonstration of Romanian independence from Soviet domination.⁸

Following the President's visit, economic relations between the U.S. and Romania began to improve, although they were hampered by Congressional restrictions on trade which had been imposed in 1966 against nations supporting Hanoi. Stephen Fischer-Galati emphasizes the western orientation of Romanian foreign policy:

The Romanian regime is relentlessly pursuing the well-established policies of building bridges to the West with the result that the country's economic dependence on the Soviet bloc declined further, while its economy continued to prosper.⁹

Given this history of promising economic cooperation, a projection of improving relations is not unlikely. Looking two to five years into the future a scenario can be drawn with improved Romanian-American relations and some potential for military interchange.

⁷Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 35.

⁸DA Pam 550-160, p. 159.

⁹Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 36.

Relations have continued to progress, with trade increasing sharply once most favored nation status was granted. U.S. ships are making regular calls at Romanian Black Sea ports, carefully watched by Soviet trawlers, but not hampered in international waters. Romania has developed a closer alignment with Yugoslavia: the joint project to construct hydroelectric facilities at the Iron Gate on the Danube River led to regional associations in other agricultural and technical fields. Rumors are occasionally surfaced about a Balkan Federation to tie more closely these two countries which now share very similar political philosophies.

In the United States, the Administration is encouraged by this apparently pro-Western atmosphere, and is seeking to contribute to the development of U.S.-Romanian relations in all possible ways that do not jeopardize relations elsewhere in Europe. Congress has approved limited economic assistance to Romania: the U.S. may provide loans or grants to Romania for economic or industrial development, and the U.S. government will guarantee private investment by U.S. citizens in Romania, but military grant aid has been cut from the budget every year since 1976, when the President first asked for funds to assist the Romanians in modernizing their coastal patrol fleet. (Premier Ion Maurer had requested during a visit to Washington in 1975, limited U.S. support to improve the ability of the Romanian navy to protect U.S. shipping in the Black Sea.) Some Congressional leaders were willing to see the U.S. become involved in military sales to the Romanians, if the list of items was very carefully limited, but the House Foreign Affairs Committee was adamant that no U.S. tax revenue would be used to pay for "Communist speed boats." In short, the Romanian government and the U.S. President


avored expanded U.S.-Romanian military interchange, but the U.S. Congress was divided on the issue. The Romanians had limited U.S. dollar resources, and would prefer not to spend them for military interchange if possible. Congress had refused to provide foreign aid funding, but the Administration was in a position to provide military funded interchange and would do so, so long as it did not damage U.S. relations with other states.

In this situation, what types of military interchange might be proposed by strategic planners as part of U.S. policy toward Romania? Figure II.1 shows a military interchange matrix on which those types of interchange that are not feasible have been lined through. All FOREIGN AID funded interchange has been eliminated because of the Congressional restrictions. All interchange involving the INTELLIGENCE function, except selective military procurement of information from the Romanians, has been eliminated, because of a DOD perception of the harmful effect that intelligence cooperation would have on the course of detente in Europe. Romanian RECIPIENT funded procurement of goods and services is not considered feasible in light of the limited U.S. currency available to the Romanians. Even with these restrictions, there are a number of possible types of interchange that should be evaluated carefully to see if they support U.S. objectives in Romania. Three of these are numbered on the matrix, and described in more detail, to illustrate, conceptually how they might be developed.

1. Offshore procurement for U.S. military forces in Europe. The Department of Defense could let contracts in Romania for fresh produce, dairy products and meat. Such a program, similar to the one initiated in Yugoslavia in 1971, would bring U.S. military logisticians into limited contact with important individuals in the Romanian economic structure. It would also provide an additional source of dollars for the Romanians, so that in the future, foreign military sales might be feasible for them. (MILITARY FUNDED, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE)

U.S.-ROMANIAN MILITARY INTERCHANGE PROJECTION

Near Future (Two to Five Years)



NOTES:

Cells lined out indicate types of military interchange not likely in the projected situation.

Open cells indicate a potential for interchange.

Numbered cells are examples discussed in the text.

Figure II.1

2. Visits to Romania by working level teams of U.S. military health specialists. Military specialists in epidemiology and communicable diseases are respected professionals both in and out of the military community. A team of such experts could conduct a health service mission to Romania, as guests of the Romanian government. Such a visit would be a low cost effort, well within the ability of the Romanians to afford, but would produce a high return in medical information as well as suggestions for improved public health programs in Romania. (RECIPIENT FUNDED, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE)

3. U.S. Navy ship visit to the Romanian Navy base at Mangalia. The U.S. Navy has right of access to the Black Sea, and a patrol from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Ocean could pay an official courtesy call on the Commander of the Romanian Navy at his major base, just north of the Bulgarian border. This would be an easy operation to plan and conduct, but the timing would be critical because of the psychological impact of U.S. Navy forces operating in territorial waters in the Black Sea. (MILITARY FUNDED, OPERATIONAL REPRESENTATION)

These are only three of many types of military interchange activities that would be possible under the scenario described above. Imaginative use of the military interchange matrix should suggest others that would meet whatever restrictions were imposed by an actual situation as it developed. Of the three examples described above, two, the ship visit and offshore procurement, have been used successfully with a European country under Communist control, as part of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. For the mid range projection, there appears to be some possibility that military interchange would play a part in the development of U.S. relations with Romania, at least if the hypothetical scenario described above should ever come to pass.

People's Republic of Albania: Interchange in the Long-Range Future. Albania, the smallest and economically most backward of the European Communist nations, suffers from such a lack of resources that foreign aid is a necessity for the continued development of the

nation.¹⁰ Internal development of the nation has been further restricted by the rugged terrain: steep hills and swift rivers subject to seasonal flooding make road building difficult, and effective maintenance almost impossible for the Albanians.¹¹ The country is cut off from the rest of the Balkan peninsula by this same rugged terrain. In 1971 there were only three hard-surfaced roads leading out of the country, and one of those was built during the Roman Empire.¹² Rail communications are no better. In 1970 there were 135 miles of completed rail lines in the country, and no rail connections with Albania's neighbors.¹³

This rugged terrain has not deterred foreign powers from controlling Albania. Except for a 35 year period in the mid 15th century, the Albanians were ruled by outside powers until 1912.¹⁴ At the Paris Peace Conference in 1920, efforts to divide Albania were thwarted, and the state remained independent until the eve of World War II.¹⁵ In 1939 Italy annexed Albania, and since that time the Albanians have been dominated by the Italians, Germans, Yugoslavs, Soviets and Chinese. In the past, Albania has profited by playing external powers against each other.

¹⁰U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-98: Area Handbook for Albania (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 2-4. (Hereafter referred to as DA Pam 550-98.)

¹¹Ibid., p. 45.

¹²Ibid., p. 44.

¹³Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁴U.S. Department of State, People's Republic of Albania--Background Notes, Department of State Publication 8217 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 1. (Hereafter referred to as Albania--Background Notes.)

¹⁵This effort to oppose the dismemberment of the Balkans after World War I was led by President Wilson of the U.S. See Chapter III above for comment of the effects of Wilson's efforts on U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

manipulating external rivalries to satisfy some national goal. For example, in 1948, the Albanians took advantage of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift to rid themselves of Yugoslav domination which had begun to have strong overtones of being swallowed up by Belgrade (at least from the Albanian perspective).¹⁶ This same technique was followed in 1960, when Albania took advantage of the growing Sino-Soviet split to escape from the close control of the U.S.S.R. into a partnership with China. According to one analyst, the Albanians have sought to place their own national goals above those of the world Communist system for the past 25 years.¹⁷ These national goals, as stated by the ruling Albanian Communist Party (the Albanian Party of Labor, or APL) are:

. . . to preserve and control their grip on Albania, to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Albania, and to modernize Albania in accordance with the Leninist-Stalinist Soviet model.¹⁸

Albania's current position in the international community, as a loyal but very dependent ally of the People's Republic of China, appears to fit into the Albanian pattern, and to contribute to these objectives.

The United States has had no formal diplomatic relations with Albania since 1939, at the time of the Italian annexation.¹⁹ An American mission in 1944 to the Communist-led National Liberation Front

¹⁶Nicholas C. Pano, "Albania in the Sixties," in Peter A. Toma, *op. cit.*, p. 248. According to Milovan Djilas, Stalin had encouraged the Yugoslavs to take this action in order to force Albania into greater dependence on the U.S.S.R. See Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 133-38 and 142-47.

¹⁷Pano, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 247.

¹⁹Albania--Background Notes, p. 4.

government was unrecognized for two years, and finally harassed into leaving.²⁰ Since that time there has been no formal contact between the two countries.

This picture of Albania, isolated from the United States, and fixed on a doctrinaire Leninist-Stalinist model for internal development, does not suggest much potential for the use of military interchange: there can be no interchange where there is no relationship. However, the relations between nations are not permanently fixed, and developments in the long range future could bring the U.S. and Albania closer together, as the following scenario is meant to suggest.

Looking eight to ten years into the future, the reasons for Albanian isolation from the U.S. have begun to diminish. After the death of Tito in 1976, an internal struggle for power began in Yugoslavia between Serbian and Croatian elements of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY)). This struggle opened the old wounds of nationality conflict in Yugoslavia, and quickly took on the characteristics of a major civil war. The Serbian faction, which had the upper hand initially, called upon the U.S.S.R. for support, claiming that their Croatian opponents were seeking to turn the nation from the path toward socialism, using clandestine U.S. assistance. In fact, the U.S. did have contact with the Croatian faction by virtue of previous military-to-military contacts with the Yugoslav armed forces, but U.S. aid was limited to advice and information.

The Albanians took advantage of this situation to raise the issue of independence for the Albanian people of Kosovo. As before, their claims were based on the ethnic origins of the people. The Croatian

²⁰Ibid.

faction in Yugoslavia seemed most receptive to the Albanian position, and Albania began to support them in propaganda broadcasts and in the debate over the fate of Yugoslavia which dragged on in the United Nations General Assembly. Eventually the Serbian elements were successful in large measure due to strong backing from the U.S.S.R. which included the provision of military supplies and equipment, but stopped short of advisers or military units. With the Serbian government in power, Yugoslav foreign policy became more strongly pro-Soviet than at any time since the break in 1948. Albania denounced this shift in position, and supported the PRC in condemning U.S.S.R. intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. In response to this condemnation, there was an uprising among the Albanian minority in Kosovo, who demanded that the new Belgrade government take their case for secession to the U.N. The uprising was quickly put down by Serbian elements within the Yugoslav military using Soviet equipment. During operations in Kosovo the Yugoslav Army maneuvered toward the Albanian border, and Albanian leaders feared that they were about to be overrun by the Serbs. They appealed to their principal ally, the PRC, for assistance. China, lacking the strategic mobility necessary to respond quickly, and fearing that immediate action was required to prevent the outbreak of World War III in the Balkans, called privately upon the United States to aid the Albanians in preserving their territorial integrity. The Chinese used their good offices to bring U.S. and Albanian leaders together for the first time since 1939.

In direct coordination, the Albanians requested immediate, convincing, low key help from the U.S. to prevent a Yugoslav takeover. By this time public opinion in the United States had identified the

Albanians as "poor, forgotten underdogs of the Balkans" and was urging Congress to provide whatever assistance was necessary to keep this tiny nation from being swallowed by its neighbor. The President, considering what direction U.S. policy ought to take, asked the Secretary of Defense what role he thought the military ought to play in this situation.

The potentials for military interchange with Albania under these conditions are shown in Figure II.2 as types which have not been lined out. All FOREIGN AID funded interchange is eliminated since Congress has not yet acted to permit aid to Albania, although such action is likely in the near future. The Albanian economy has been strained to the breaking point by the crisis, and there is no reserve to purchase military goods, services or information, therefore RECIPIENT funded interchange has been eliminated. Even if resources were available, they would not be in dollars, since there has been only negligible trade with the U.S. for the past 40 years. Certain other types of interchange are possible, but are not likely to have the immediate effect required under the present circumstances.


The types of interchange numbered on the matrix in Figure II.2 appear to have some potential for responding to this crisis.

1. Offshore maneuvers and ship visit. The Sixth Fleet could be ordered to conduct maneuvers near the Albanian coast, either in international waters, or if the U.S. desired to show stronger Albanian approval, in territorial waters in conjunction with the Albanian coastal defense forces. During maneuvers, U.S. ships could call at the Albanian Navy base on the island of Suzan, in the mouth of Vlore Bay (where the Soviets had a submarine base until 1960).²¹
(MILITARY FUNDED, OPERATIONAL REPRESENTATION)

²¹A general discussion of the Albanian Navy is found in DA Pam 550-98, pp. 184-85.

U.S.-ALBANIAN MILITARY INTERCHANGE PROJECTION

Long Range Future (Beyond Five Years)



NOTES: ☐ Cells lined out indicate types of military interchange not likely in the projected situation.

☐ Open cells indicate a potential for interchange.

☒ Numbered cells are examples discussed in the text.

Figure II.2

2. Naval assistance--coastal blockade. If a stronger form of assistance is required, the U.S. Sixth Fleet could participate in a blockade of the Albanian coast, in support of Albanian defense plans. Such a move would be clearly defensive in nature, and not likely to involve U.S. military forces in a conflict with either Yugoslav or Soviet forces, but it would be a visible sign of support, and a service much needed by the Albanians. (MILITARY FUNDED, OPERATIONAL SERVICE)

3. Intelligence support. The United States could make available to the Albanians either processed intelligence or unprocessed information concerning the disposition of troops threatening their borders. Such information would permit the Albanians to maximize the effectiveness of their defenses. (MILITARY FUNDED, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)

4. Unattended ground sensors. The United States could make available, as either a loan or an outright gift from military stockpiles, remote sensor equipment such as unattended ground sensors and surveillance radars, to help the Albanians improve their capability to detect an invasion. (MILITARY FUNDED, INTELLIGENCE GOODS)

As in the previous scenario, these are only a few of the possibilities for military interchange that would exist if a situation such as this scenario should come to pass. Each possible type of military involvement should be carefully evaluated to insure that it does support U.S. policies both in the particular case, and in the broader context of U.S. foreign relations.

Automating the Military Interchange Matrix. A detailed study of the possibilities of automating the matrix developed in this study is beyond the scope of the current effort. However, there is clearly a need for further study in this area. The matrix is a straightforward problem in coding and sorting. It could be automated simply, by developing a program that would file historical instances of military interchange by the characteristics of their cell location, and produce either a listing of the examples in any one cell or all examples with the same characteristic (i.e., type of FUNDING, FUNCTION or PRODUCT) or an entire map

of past military interchange activity. This historical file could be further coded by region and nation, so that a single search would produce the titles or brief descriptions of past military interchange activity that had been used in a particular country or region.

The procedures for coding entries for such a computer assisted data base would require refinement to insure that the coding was independent of the operator. That is, each individual who coded entries should be able to put a given example of military interchange in the same cell of the matrix.

A second, more exploratory possibility would involve developing 48 scenarios, each one written to describe in detail how military interchange in one cell of the matrix might be carried out. These scenarios could then be stored as "baseline projections," to be used under actual, more definitive situations, to develop policy proposals for the use of military interchange.

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